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Abstract

THE STRATEGIC ORIENTATION OF SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES
By Jennifer Palazzolo, Ph.D., MPH
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2021
Director: Jan P. Clement, Ph.D.
Cardwell Professor, Department of Health Administration

Since the early 2000s, skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) have operated in an environment
made uncertain by changes in health care policy, growth in substitutes for nursing care, and
increasing demand for services. To better understand how SNFs are strategically positioning
themselves to survive and thrive, this study develops a taxonomy of strategic groups of SNFs.
A conceptual framework is based in Strategic Management Theory and classification of
SNFs is based on scope of business decisions including length of stay, complexity of patients,
and referral networks with hospitals. Two-step, hierarchical cluster analysis finds six strategy
groups of SNFs: Post-Acute Care Focus – Wide Network, Private Pay Focus – Narrow Network,
High Acuity Care Focus – Wide Network, Intermediate Care Focus – Wide Network, Long-Stay
Care Focus – Narrow Network, and Long-Stay Complex Care Focus – Narrow Network.

xiii xiii

Support is found for a structure-performance link between membership in a particular
strategy group and financial and quality performance. A longitudinal analysis finds stability in
the structure of the groups, but fluidity of movement from one strategy group to another. A
comparison of strategy groups with those in prior studies suggests changes in reimbursement
policies and industry trends align with shifts in strategy.
This study contributes to the understanding of how SNFs adjust strategically to
environmental uncertainty and provides a unique assessment of the relational dynamics of
referrals to SNFs from hospitals. A better understanding of the industry structure can benefit
managers as they make strategic decisions and help policymakers better target funding and
policy changes to improve patient outcomes.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This study explores the strategic orientation of skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) during a
time of environmental uncertainty. The first section of this chapter discusses the uncertainties
faced by the industry in the last few decades through the present. The second section identifies
the study’s objectives and aims. An overview of the conceptual framework and scope and
analytic approach to the study are provided in the third and fourth sections, respectively. Finally,
the study’s contribution and organization of the remaining chapters are presented.
The Study Problem
Nursing homes serve patients along the continuum of care by providing long-term
custodial care for individuals who are not able to care for themselves and short-term post-acute
care to individuals rehabilitating after a stay in the hospital. In 2015, over 15,000 skilled nursing
facilities provided care for approximately 1.3 million individuals. It is estimated that 60% of
nursing home patients were long-stay residents staying 100 days or more in a facility, while the
remaining 40% were short-stay residents staying less than 100 days (Harris-Kojetin et al., 2019).
Medicaid, usually the payer for long-term care, spent $45 billion while Medicare, usually the
payer for short-term care, spent $30 billion on nursing home care in 2015 (Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission, 2017). These estimated expenditures do not include private payments or
managed care. The California Health Care Foundation estimates that $158 billion was spent on
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nursing care facilities in the US in 2015, or approximately 6.5% of U.S. health care expenditures
(California Health Care Foundation, 2020).
Nursing homes have been operating in an environment of uncertainty since the early
2000s because of multiple factors. The restructuring of payment systems, national health care
policy changes, growth of enrollment in managed care, increasing use of substitutes for nursing
home care, and changing demographics have contributed to environmental changes and greater
competition for preferred patients. Perhaps the greatest shock to nursing homes came in 2020
with the COVID-19 pandemic’s disproportionately high toll of morbidity and mortality on
nursing home residents and staff (Barnett & Grabowski, 2020; Ouslander & Grabowski, 2020).
This study focuses on understanding how SNFs are strategically positioning themselves to
survive and thrive in response to changes in the nursing home industry and the overall health
care system. A discussion of the turbulence in the environment of SNFs follows.
Major restructuring of payment systems in the U.S. health care system occurred in 1983
when Medicare introduced a prospective payment system for reimbursement of hospital care.
Hospitals, facing pressure to reduce the length of hospital stays, began discharging more acute
patients to SNFs than they had previously. Consequently, SNFs began to provide a greater
amount of short-stay care. SNFs were reimbursed with higher rates by Medicare for short-stay
post-acute care compared to per-diem rates paid by Medicaid for long-stay custodial care.
Medicare costs for post-acute care in SNFs rose accordingly, increasing at an average annual rate
of 25% between 1988 and 1997 (Buntin, Colla, & Escarce, 2009). The percentage of nursing
home costs paid by Medicare grew from 2% in 1988 to 15% in 1997 (California Health Care
Foundation, 2020). In an attempt to control growth in volume of care provided by SNFs to

2

Medicare beneficiaries, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 introduced a prospective
payment system incorporating case-mix reimbursement for SNFs. Initial financial pressures
negatively impacted the industry and led to adjustments to enhance Medicare payment rates
through the Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) of 1999 and the Benefits Improvement
and Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000. Subsequently, the intensity of services provided to SNF
patients increased, effectively extending the growth in SNF expenditures (Grabowski, Afendulis,
& McGuire, 2011). However, Medicare nursing home patients continue to provide more
profitable reimbursements than Medicaid nursing home patients. For 2015, the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) estimates that the average total profit margin of
stand-alone nursing facilities was 1.6%, but the average non-Medicare margin, excluding
Medicare fee-for-service (FFS), was -2.0%, while the average Medicare margin was 12.6%
(Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2017). Further, there is wide variation in Medicare
margins with the lowest quartile at 2.4% and the highest quartile at 21.0%. Overall, Medicare
FFS accounted for a median of 11% of facility days in 2015, but 21% of revenue, whereas, the
median Medicaid share of facility days was 61% (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
2017). For SNFs, profits on Medicare and private pay patients can offset low reimbursements by
Medicaid. MedPAC has recommended changes in the SNF prospective payment system (PPS) to
better align payments with costs incurred by SNFs (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
2018b). Most recently, changes to the SNF PPS include a Patient Driven Payment Model
(PDPM) implemented in October 2019 with the goal of reducing the delivery of inappropriate
services (Navathe & Grabowski, 2020).
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Since 2010, several national health care policy changes have included provisions that
affect the nursing home industry. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 creates Accountable
Care Organizations (ACOs), the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), and the
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative (BPCI), all providing incentives for better
hospital-SNF patient coordination and reducing the length of patient stays in hospitals and in
SNFs. The Protecting Access to Medicare Act (PAMA) of 2014 implements hospital
readmission penalties for SNFs through the SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program (SNFVBP)
beginning in 2018. Additionally, SNFs are required to comply with the Improving Medicare
Post-Acute Care Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014 to standardize assessments and
reporting measures across post-acute care settings. The overall goal of these programs is to
reduce the cost of care while maintaining, or improving, standards of quality, and most
incentivize better coordination across providers.
While contending with changes in payment systems and policies, SNFs have faced a
number of market changes that contribute to environmental pressures. Enrollment in Medicare
Advantage, Medicare’s managed care program, grew 50% between 2010 and 2015, to include
almost one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries (Jacobson, Damico, Neuman, & Gold, 2015).
Medicare Advantage plans can control post-acute care costs by limiting patient selection to a
specified network of providers and by reducing utilization of skilled nursing facilities (Gadbois
et al., 2018). State Medicaid agencies are also implementing managed care for long-term care
services (Lewis, Eiken, Amos, & Saucier, 2018). Additionally, nursing homes face growing
competition from substitutes for nursing home care. Substitutes for short-stay care include home
health services and inpatient rehabilitation facilities, and substitutes for long-stay care include
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home health services, assisted living facilities, adult day health care, and long-term care hospitals
(Denham, 2018).
Simultaneously, demographics in the US are changing as the population ages, increasing
the demand for health care. The number of Americans ages 65 and older is expected to represent
over 20% of the population by 2030. Demand for post-acute care will likely also increase based
on demographic trends, and individual need for some form of long-term care is expected to
double by 2030 (Spetz, Trupin, Bates, & Coffman, 2015).
The confluence of these factors has created an environment of uncertainty for SNFs. On
one hand, there is pressure to admit patients of greater acuity from hospitals requiring provision
of more intense services by SNFs, and the number of patients is expected to increase. On the
other hand, SNFs face pressures on profit margins from growth in managed care and value-based
programs, pressures on Medicare utilization and Medicaid reimbursement, and competitive
pressures from alternative sources of care. Although an aging population and extended lifespan
strengthen the demand for short-stay post-acute care and long-stay custodial care, ongoing
efforts to reform Medicare and Medicaid payments threaten the stability of revenues for nursing
homes (IBISWorld Industry Report, 2017). The progression to value-based and alternative
payment models with implementation of the ACA in 2010 and the growth in Medicare
Advantage beneficiaries have put increasing pressure on SNFs to more effectively coordinate
with hospitals the transfer of patients to SNFs (McHugh et al., 2017; Mor, Intrator, Feng, &
Grabowski, 2010) and to reduce lengths of stay (LOS) for post-acute care patients. At the same
time, incentives tied to SNFVBP to reduce readmissions from SNFs to hospitals may serve to
discourage premature discharges from hospitals (Mechanic, 2014).
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It is unclear how SNFs will seek to offset reduced LOS among Medicare patients. SNFs
may seek to increase the volume of patients by securing a preferred status with hospitals for
Medicare referrals, or they may seek more complex cases to increase utilization. Evidence
suggests there is increasing competition among SNFs for preferred patients, raising concerns
about access to care for less-preferred patients (Lawrence et al., 2018; Shield, Winblad,
McHugh, Gadbois, & Tyler, 2018). Given this context, the objective of this study is to address
the question: how are SNFs strategically positioning themselves to survive and thrive in response
to changes in the nursing home industry and the overall health care system?
Study Objective and Aims
This study explores the strategic orientation of SNFs to better understand their
organizational responses during a time of environmental uncertainty. For managers grappling
with how to address uncertainty resulting from environmental changes, strategic group modeling
provides a method for identification of strategic approaches within an industry and evaluation of
the success of the approaches (Marlin, Huonker, & Sun, 2002). Organizations are grouped based
on the commonality of their strategic approaches to competing within an industry. Strategy refers
to decisions made by organizations about which markets to serve, how they will compete in these
markets, and specific tactics for implementing these decisions (Scott & Davis, 2003). For
researchers and policymakers, identifying strategic groups can enhance analysis by focusing on
comparisons within and between relevant groups (Luke, Walston, & Plummer, 2004).
Additionally, identifying strategic groups provides an intermediate frame of reference
between individual firms and an entire industry that allows for analysis of how an industry is
structured that goes beyond organizational size or type of proprietorship. To the best of this
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researcher’s knowledge, only four studies have conducted strategic group modeling of SNFs.
The first study to identify strategic groups of nursing homes was Zinn, Aaronson, and Rosko
(1994). Marlin, Sun, and Huonker (1999) followed, adding their own improvements to the
modeling of strategic groups. Castle (2003) and Zinn, Spector, Weimer, and Mukamel (2008)
also modeled strategic groups of SNFs but used a different methodology. These studies are
discussed in depth in the next chapter. Findings in the existing literature do not consistently
identify strategic groups of SNFs, nor do they address the stability of strategic groups over time.
The current study provides an updated analysis of the strategic orientation of groups of SNFs in
the post-ACA reform time period and examines the structure of the industry across a time span
of three years.
This study has three aims. First, to better understand the behavior of SNFs by classifying
SNFs into groups based on their strategic orientation. Second, to examine whether financial and
quality outcomes are associated with strategic orientation. And, finally, to evaluate whether
SNFs change their strategic orientation during a time of environmental uncertainty indicating a
change in the structure of the nursing home industry. The following research questions are
examined to explore the strategic orientation of SNFs during environmental turbulence:
1) What taxonomies of strategic groups exist among SNFs?
2) Do strategic groups of SNFs differ in financial and quality outcomes?
3) How has the strategic orientation of SNFs changed over time?
Conceptual Framework
The study is based on a conceptual framework informed by Strategic Management
Theory (SMT). SMT helps explain strategic adaptation through managerial choices to identify
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and align external opportunities and threats with internal strengths and weaknesses.
Organizations adapt strategically to their environments to assure survival (Shortell & Zajac,
1990a). Moreover, strategic decisions are primarily responsible for an organization’s fit within
an environment and determine organizational performance (Kimberly & Zajac, 1985; Shay,
2014). Propositions and corresponding hypotheses addressing the study’s aims are derived from
the conceptual framework.
Scope and Approach
This study uses data from the Long-Term Care Focus database (LTCF) maintained by
Brown University, Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS) reports for SNFs from
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), Leavitt Partners’ Torch Insight
database, CMS’s Nursing Home Compare (NHC), and the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF).
The level of analysis for this study is at the facility level and the study sample is limited to
Medicare-certified SNFs reporting Medicare Cost Reports from 2012 to 2015. Hospital-based
facilities are excluded as they have different cost structures than freestanding SNFs.
To address the first aim of this study, a descriptive analysis employing strategic group
modeling is undertaken to classify SNFs into groups based on dimensions of strategic orientation
identified in the conceptual framework. A cluster analysis is performed using cross-sectional
data from 2015, the most recent study year, to test the hypothesis for research question one.
The study’s second aim, to see if performance outcomes are associated with strategic
orientation, is first tested by assessing differences in performance measures between groups.
Then, multivariate models are estimated to test the two hypotheses for research question two.
Both tests use cross-sectional data for 2015.
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For the study’s third aim, to evaluate whether the strategic orientations of SNFs have
changed over time, two methods are used to test the two hypotheses for research question three.
First, discriminant analysis is applied to a longitudinal panel study design to examine the
differences in the composition of strategic groups from 2012 to 2015. Then, performance
differences between SNFs that have changed strategic groups compared to those that have not
changed strategic groups are assessed with a difference-in-differences model.
Study Contributions
The study provides an updated assessment of SNF strategic groups after a time of
industry-wide environmental and organizational changes and utilizes a data source for
quantification of referral patterns that, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge, has not
previously been used in the classification of SNFs. Identifying the differences in strategy groups
may facilitate more focused research (Bazzoli, Shortell, Dubbs, Chan, & Kralovec, 1999; Shay &
Mick, 2017) and provide managers and policy makers with a more informed view of the local or
regional market. Assessing differences in the strategic orientation of SNFs and their associated
success in financial and quality outcomes may be beneficial as reforms in the health care system
are evaluated and disseminated. For managers, strategic group analysis can provide a framework
for strategic decision making (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Porter, 1980).
A better understanding of structural changes in the nursing home industry over time can
provide insight into how SNFs are adapting to confront environmental challenges posed by
changes in policy, demographics, and competition from substitutes. SNFs play an important role
in the provision of care across the continuum, and reforms that facilitate reduced costs may have
unintended consequences such as reduced access to more lucrative referrals for SNFs in some
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markets or restricted access to higher quality care for patients (Huckfeldt, Sood, Romley,
Malchiodi, & Escarce, 2013; Shield et al., 2018).
This research is being completed during the COVID-19 pandemic, requiring
acknowledgement of one of the greatest environmental shocks SNFs and entire health care
systems have ever experienced. The volume of COVID-19 cases and deaths of patients residing
in nursing facilities and staff caring for them, as well as the measures required to attempt to
prevent the spread of disease have been devastating for residents and staff (Barnett &
Grabowski, 2020; Ouslander & Grabowski, 2020). Medicare and state Medicaid agencies have
implemented policies and additional funding streams to try to provide guidelines and resources
to nursing homes during the pandemic (Chen, Ryskina, & Jung, 2020). It remains to be seen
what the longer-term consequences of the pandemic are for SNFs, but changes are certain
(Sinsky & Linzer, 2020; Young, Quinn, Brassard, Gualtieri, & Reinhard, 2020). The current
study does not include the timespan of the pandemic, but it is the author’s hope that the study
may provide some insights to help inform future nursing home policies through a better
understanding of the strategic orientation and strategic adaption of SNFs.
Organization of Remaining Chapters
The study is presented in six chapters. This chapter introduced the study’s focus on the
strategic orientation of SNFs during a time of environmental uncertainty, aims of the study, its
significance, and an overview of the study’s conceptual framework and research design. Chapter
2 discusses the literature relevant to the aims of this study. The study’s conceptual framework
and theoretical basis are presented in Chapter 3, along with the propositions and corresponding
hypotheses derived from the framework. Chapter 4 provides the study’s research design, data
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sources, the study sample, variable measurement, and analytical methodologies. The study’s
results are included in Chapter 5. Finally, the results of the study are summarized in Chapter 6,
and policy and theoretical implications, study limitations, and areas for future research are
discussed.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review

The first section of this chapter looks at strategic group modeling as a means for
explaining variation in strategic behaviors and in performance among organizations within the
same industry. The focus in the second section turns to strategic modeling studies specific to
SNFs. The third section reviews recent qualitative literature exploring strategic behaviors of
SNFs to obtain market share. The fourth section summarizes the existing studies and identifies
gaps in the literature. Finally, the last section discusses the potential contributions of the current
study to the understanding of the strategic orientation of SNFs.
Strategic Group Modeling
Managers, policymakers, and health services researchers desire a better understanding of
strategic behavior and why some organizations outperform others. Classifying firms into groups
based on similar management strategies provides a tool for identifying and explaining varying
levels of performance among firms within a single industry (Porter, 1980). The concept of
classifying organizations into strategic groups grew from the field of industrial organization.
Differences in performance were initially thought to be due solely to differences in profitability
at the industry level. Over time, examination of variation in performance of organizations at the
group level within an industry evolved into strategic group modeling.
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In the study of industrial organization during the 1950s, the primary paradigm for
explaining differences in performance among organizations was the structure-conductperformance (SCP) approach (Bain, 1956). SCP originated out of Harvard and posits a chain of
causation in which an industry’s structure (S) determines conduct (C) and, in turn, performance
(P). Structural barriers to entry into an industry, such as the necessity for large capital investment
to operate, serve to protect firms by making entrance difficult for organizations outside of the
industry (Bain 1956), thus preserving the level of profitability within an industry. Moreover,
industry profitability was thought to dictate the profitability of individual firms, with variation of
profitability among firms within an industry attributed to greater efficiency or to randomness
(Porter, 1979). During the 1960s and 1970s SCP was challenged, particularly by the Chicago
school of industrial organization, and greater emphasis was placed on the role of individual
managers in maximizing profit instead of an industry’s structure dictating profitability (Bogner
& Mahoney, 1998; Demsetz, 1973; Dobbin & Baum, 2014).
In response, Harvard industrial organization economists “attempted to rescue the SCP
view” (Bogner & Mahoney, 1998, p. 65). Michael Hunt (1972) provided evidence of
heterogeneity of competitive strategies and profitability within the home appliance industry in his
Harvard dissertation. Hunt was the first to use the term “strategic groups” to help explain
differences in performance between groups of firms within the same industry. Later, Caves and
Porter (1977), also at Harvard, and Porter (1979) built the foundation for what came to be known
as the strategic management perspective to explain differences in profitability among firms
within an industry. They argued that not only are there structural barriers to entry into an
industry, but there are also barriers to mobility within an industry limiting change from one
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strategy group to another. In this perspective, mobility barriers are the basis for explaining
differences in profitability among firms within an industry (McGee & Thomas, 1986; Porter,
1979). Higher mobility barriers combined with other factors such as less competition, greater
bargaining power with customers and suppliers, less exposure to substitute products or services,
and managers’ ability to execute strategy result in higher profit potential within some strategy
groups (Porter, 1979). Limited organizational resources or environmental constraints restrict
movement across mobility barriers. The costs of moving from one group to another group reflect
mobility barriers that discourage entry from rival organizations into a group (Caves & Porter,
1977; Marlin, Sun, & Huonker, 1999). This stream of work has evolved to bridge empirical
structural analysis of an industry and applications in strategic management (Porter, 1980).
Examining industries at a more refined level can provide insights into the structure of the
industry and performance differences among organizations. Identifying strategic groups within
an industry provides researchers and managers “an intermediate frame of reference between
looking at an industry as a whole and considering each firm separately” (Porter, 1980, pg. 132).
Regardless of industry, researchers make four key decisions when modeling strategic
groups. First, researchers determine their approach to defining strategic groups in an industry.
Second, researchers identify strategic dimensions for classifying organizational configurations
within an industry. Third, the method for classifying members into groups is selected. Fourth,
researchers may choose to test the structure-performance link between strategy groups and
performance outcomes. These distinguishing characteristics of strategic group modeling are
discussed in the following sections and help guide the review of the quantitative studies
presented in this chapter.
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Approach to defining strategic groups.
There are two approaches researchers can take to defining strategic groups within an
industry. Ketchen, Thomas, and Snow (1993) delineate approaches to modeling groups as either
a deductive method or an inductive method. Choosing a deductive approach to defining strategic
groups relies upon a priori expectations of typologies of strategic groups. This approach is
rooted in the strategic choice perspective and allows for testing of predictions based on theory. In
the deductive approach, a limited number of strategic configurations of organizations are
believed to exist and organizational behavior can be predicted and tested (Ketchen Jr, Thomas, &
Snow, 1993). A deductive approach assumes most organizations fall within one of the chosen
strategic typologies.
In contrast to a deductive approach, in an inductive approach to defining strategic groups
the researcher allows the number of strategic groups to emerge organically from the analyses.
This approach is exploratory and conducted without a priori expectations as to the number of
strategic groups or typology of groups (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). The assumption in the
inductive approach is that the number of strategy groups and the typology depend on the number
of unique strategies within an industry (Marlin et al., 1999). Selection of one approach over the
other depends on a priori expectations of the researcher (Short, Ketchen Jr, Palmer, & Hult,
2007).
Strategic dimensions.
Researchers select strategic dimensions as the basis for classification of organizations
whether the study takes a deductive or an inductive approach. A study using the deductive
approach to defining strategic groups uses strategic dimensions consistent with the generic
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typology being applied to the industry. Porter (1980), for instance, offers thirteen possible
strategic dimensions: specialization, brand identification, push versus pull, channel selection,
product quality, technological leadership, vertical integration, cost position, service, price policy,
leverage, relationship with parent company, and relationship to home and host government.
These strategic dimensions are used to classify organizations into strategic groups of low-cost
leaders, differentiators of product or service, or focused on a market segment or product line.
Miles and Snow (1978) identify three general dimensions of strategy as entrepreneurial,
administrative, and technical (Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman Jr, 1978; Shortell & Zajac,
1990b). Classification of organizations based on the Miles and Snow (1978) typology usually use
these dimensions to identify firms as prospectors, defenders, analyzers, or reactors.
In a study using an inductive approach to defining strategic groups, selection of strategic
dimensions should likewise have a theoretical basis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). There is
consistency in the literature that strategic groups should be classified using dimensions that are
relevant to an industry (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Porter, 1980). Strategic theorists have used
various strategic dimensions for classifying organizations. For example, McGee and Thomas
(1986) contest that dimensions pertaining to mobility barriers provide the best differentiation of
strategy among groups and broadly consist of: market-related strategies, industry supply
characteristics, and characteristics of firms. Luke and Begun (1988) identify growth and action
orientations as two general dimensions of strategy. Cool and Schendel (1988) use two broad
categories of strategic actions, business scope and resource commitments, to capture decisions
involving market segments, range of products or services offered, and geographic reach. The
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selection of dimensions for classification of groups should align with the purpose of the study
(Ketchen & Shook, 1996).
Methods for classifying members.
Both inductive and deductive approaches to strategic modeling necessitate a method for
classifying observations. Cluster analysis has been the commonly used method for identifying
strategic groups in the literature. Other methods include classification based on the size of a firm
such as in Porter’s (1973) early work, applying indices of differentiation measures (Marlin,
Lamont, & Hoffman, 1994), and factor analysis. Surveys of firms have been used to allow firms
to ‘self-type’ into generic typologies of strategic groups (Castle, 2003; Zinn, Spector, Weimer, &
Mukamel, 2008). However, cluster analysis better captures the multidimensional aspects of the
dimensions than these other methods of classification by maximizing between-group variance
and minimizing with-in group variance (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). Cluster analysis methods can
accommodate both an inductive approach to group modeling using hierarchical clustering
techniques, and a deductive approach to group modeling using non-hierarchical techniques that
include a priori expectations of the number of strategic groups. Some researchers have argued
there are drawbacks and limitations to using cluster analysis including the a priori assumption of
the existence of any clusters and a lack of a test of significance that discrete groups exist.
Methodologists are working to address these limitations, but cluster analysis remains the
dominant method for classifying strategy groups (Carroll & Thomas, 2019). Once a taxonomy of
strategic groups is identified, the researcher typically applies a typology to the groups and
profiles the groups based on characteristics relevant to an industry. Selection of the method for
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classifying group members depends on the approach taken to define strategic groups and data
used to define strategic dimensions (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006).
Structure – Performance link.
The genesis of strategic modeling was to explain differences in performance among
organizations. Porter (1980) explains that mobility barriers not only define strategic groups but
are a major reason “why some firms in an industry will be persistently more profitable than
others” (pg. 134). Higher mobility barriers are usually associated with greater profit potential and
serve to protect strategic groups, otherwise all competitors would attempt to implement the most
profitable strategies (Porter, 1980). Consequently, most studies that model strategic groups test
the structure-performance link between membership in a specific strategy group and associated
performance outcomes. Performance measures may include financial performance, quality
performance, or other measures such as efficiency. Further, association between performance
and the strategic group structure can help strengthen validity of the study (Hair et al., 2006).
Strategic Group Modeling of Skilled Nursing Facilities
There are four previous studies that have conducted strategic group modeling of skilled
nursing facilities based upon SNFs’ strategic orientation. The first study was published in 1994
by Zinn, Aaronson, and Rosko (1994) examining data from 1987 and 1989, and the most recent
study was published more than a decade ago in 2008 using data from 2004 (Zinn et al., 2008).
The first two studies, Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin, Sun and Huonker (1999), take an inductive
approach to identifying groups, and both are based on secondary data using measures of strategic
dimensions of scope of business and resource deployment. The later studies by Castle (2003) and
Zinn et al. (2008) employ a deductive approach to classifying SNFs, and survey nursing home
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administrators to ‘self-type’ their organization into one of the four strategic groups in the Miles
and Snow (1978) typology. The researchers later combine administrative data with the survey
data to test whether performance measures are associated with strategic types. All of the studies
investigate the relationship of strategic groups to quality performance while one study includes
an efficiency measure, and one study explores efficiency and financial performance. Two studies
examine SNFs in a single state to control for differences in state regulations; one study uses data
for SNFs in five states; and one study uses a national dataset. Table 1 summarizes the studies.
These four studies are reviewed in more detail in the following discussion to provide a
foundation for the current study. Of primary interest are each study’s approach to strategic group
modeling, the strategic dimensions selected for modeling groups, the method used for defining
strategic groups and resulting typology, and whether groups are associated with performance.
Table 1. Studies classifying SNFs by strategy
Study

Sample,
Timeframe

Approach to
Taxonomy

Strategic Dimensions

Zinn, Aaronson & Rosko
(1994)

PA, 1987 and 1989

Inductive

Scope of business &
resource deployment

Method and
Taxonomic
Results
Cluster Analysis:
7 groups

Marlin, Sun & Huonker
(1999)

FL, 1995

Inductive

Scope of business &
resource deployment

Cluster Analysis:
7 groups

Castle (2003)

KS, ME, MS, TX,
SD, 1999

Deductive

Miles & Snow

Survey :4 groups

Zinn, Spector Weimber &
Mukamel (2008)

National, 2004

Deductive

Miles & Snow

Survey: 4 groups

Approach, strategic dimensions, method, and results.
Zinn et al. (1994) take an inductive approach and limit their study to SNFs in
Pennsylvania to control for differences in state regulations. Cross-sectional data from 1987 is
used for classification of SNFs and change in strategic behavior is assessed using 1989 data.
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Their selection of dimensions for defining group membership draws upon earlier works
identifying scope of business and resource deployment as key dimensions for determining
strategic groups within an industry (Caves & Porter, 1977; Cool & Schendel, 1988; Newman,
1978).
An organization’s scope of business encompasses market segments in which the
organization competes and services it offers within these market segments (Cool & Schendel,
1988). Zinn et al. (1994) distinguish source of payment to nursing homes as the most important
basis of market segmentation in the nursing home industry. At the time of their study, Zinn et al.
(1994) cite private or self-pay patients as comprising the majority (51%) of nursing home
revenue, Medicare accounting for only 2% of revenue, and the remaining care paid for by
Medicaid (47%). By 2015, private pay patients comprised a smaller proportion of revenue (35%
versus 51%), while Medicare revenues had grown to 23% from 2% of revenues, and payments
from Medicaid fell to 31% of nursing home revenues, with the remaining revenues coming from
other payers (California Health Care Foundation, 2020). The following variables are included as
measures of scope of business decisions in their analysis: percent of Medicaid recipients, percent
of Medicare recipients, percent of capacity for independently paying patients, case mix index,
average length of stay, and percent of residents over age 85. Longer lengths of stay and higher
percentages of residents over age 85 characterize nursing homes more likely to have a greater
number of patients with longer-term care needs. The second key dimension, resource
deployment, measures resources committed to the targeted market segments. For nursing homes,
Zinn and colleagues (1994) identify labor, price, and capacity key resources as using the
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following measures: registered nurses per resident, staff per resident, private pay rate, number of
staffed beds, and facility occupancy rate.
A cluster analysis results in seven different strategic groups of SNFs. Table 2 summarizes
the strategic groups found in the Zinn et al. (1994) and in the Marlin et al. (1999) studies and
selected variables used in each of their cluster analyses. For Zinn et al. (1994), Group 1
“Medicare Skilled Nursing Care Focus Strategy” (19% of SNFs) has a significantly higher
Medicare census and lower percentage of Medicaid residents than the other groups. SNFs in
Group 2 “Differentiated Focus Strategy: Care Continuum” (5% of SNFs) focus on a care
continuum including independent living services and have the lowest percentage of Medicaid
residents. Group 3 “Generic Skilled Nursing Care Strategy” (18% of SNFs) is labeled generic
since it has both a high Medicare and Medicaid census and the highest average case mix index.
Group 4 “Low-Cost Intermediate Care Strategy” (23% of SNFs) has a low-cost intermediate care
strategy with high Medicaid census, but lower staffing and case mix compared to other groups.
Group 5 “Low-Cost Skilled and Intermediate Care Strategy” (13% of SNFs) has a low-cost
intermediate care strategy like that of Group 4 but has a shorter average length of stay and fewer
residents over age 85. Group 6 “Low-Cost Focus Strategy: Care Continuum” (19% of SNFs)
similarly focuses on a care continuum as does Group 2 but has more Medicaid residents than
Group 2. Finally, Group 7 “Large Municipal Facilities” (3% of SNFs) has the largest average
number of beds, length of stay, and Medicaid census.
Marlin et al. (1999) conduct a study of SNFs in response to Zinn, Aaronson, and Rosko’s
(1994) call for comparative studies, but make some changes to correct what they consider to be
“pitfalls” of the prior study. Like Zinn et al. (1994), Marlin et al. (1999) use an inductive
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approach to identifying strategic groups and the same dimensions of strategy as the prior study.
However, they classify nursing homes in a different state, Florida, using more recent 1995 crosssectional data, and they enhance cluster dimension and performance measures. Marlin et al.
(1999) examine the process of formation of strategic groups specific to the nursing home
industry in more detail than Zinn et al. (1994), and they discuss the significance of the
application of strategic group modeling to nursing home administrators instead of focusing on
implications for policymakers, as do Zinn, Aaronson and Rosko (1994).
Marlin et al. (1999) retain the same dimensions of strategic grouping, scope of business
and resource deployment, but add utilization measures of health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), the Veterans Administration and private payers. The percent of residents aged 85 and
older is replaced by the average patient age. Two measures, percentage of nursing costs and
percentage of ancillary costs, are added to the measures of resource deployment. While there are
many similarities in these early studies, there are differences. Zinn et al. (1994) include hospitalbased SNFs, but Marlin et al. (1999) are not clear as to whether hospital-based SNFs are
included in their sample. Importantly, the samples vary in markets and point in time which may
account for differences in some characteristics of the samples. The average percentage of
revenues from Medicare in the Zinn et al. (1994) study is 3%, while in the Marlin et al. (1999)
study the average percentage of revenue from Medicare is almost 12%. In the Zinn et al. (1994)
study in Pennsylvania in 1987, the percent of non-profit ownership of SNFs is lower with an
average of 43% among the strategic groups compared to an average of 88% among the strategic
groups in the Marlin et al. (1999) study.
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Like Zinn et al. (1994), Marlin et al. (1999) find seven distinct strategic groups of SNFs.
Some of the seven groups identified by each of the studies are very similar and the characteristics
of the rest are roughly aligned. Table 2 pairs the strategic groups identified in the Marlin study
with those found in the Zinn et al. (1994) study on selected attributes for comparison in this
review. Paired groups are labeled in this study with letters as Groups A through G. For ease of
discussion, we refer to the Group letters in the first column to compare strategic groups from the
two studies.
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Table 2. Comparison of strategy groups in Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin et al. (1999)
Group

Group
A

Group
B

Group
C

Group
D

Group
E

Group
F

Group
G

% of
Sample

Case
Mix

%
Medicaid

%
Medicare

19%

HIGH

LOW

HIGH

17%

MID

MID

HIGH

5%

LOW

LOW

Group 7

Medicare Skilled Nursing Care
Focus
Medicare Skilled Nursing Care
Focus
Differentiated Focus - Care
Continuum
Private Pay and Medicare Focus

%
Private
Pay
LOW

6%

MID

Zinn

Group 3

Generic Skilled Nursing Care

18%

Marlin

Group 5

Zinn

Group 4

Low-Cost Intermediate Nursing
Care
Low-cost Intermediate

Marlin

Group 6

Zinn

Group 5

Marlin

Study

Study
Group #

ALOS

% ForProfit

%
Chain

Zinn

Group 1

LOW

79%

NA

Marlin

Group 3

MID

LOW

97%

97%

Zinn

Group 2

LOW

HIGH

MID

5%

NA

Marlin

LOW

MID

HIGH

LOW

91%

74%

HIGH

MID

MID

LOW

MID

59%

NA

9%

HIGH

MID

MID

MID

LOW

83%

78%

23%

LOW

MID

LOW

LOW

MID

25%

NA

Intermediate Nursing Care

11%

LOW

HIGH

MID

LOW

MID

86%

72%

13%

MID

HIGH

MID

LOW

MID

63%

NA

Group 2

Low-cost Skilled & Intermediate
care
Short-term Skilled Nursing Care

20%

MID

MID

MID

MID

LOW

96%

91%

Zinn

Group 6

Low-cost Focus -Care Continuum

19%

LOW

MID

LOW

MID

HIGH

17%

NA

Marlin

Group 1

Low-Cost Skilled Nursing Care

18%

LOW

MID

MID

MID

MID

92%

93%

Zinn

Group 7

Large Municipal Facilities

3%

MID

HIGH

MID

MID

HIGH

0%

NA

Marlin

Group 4

Long-term Intermediate Nursing
Care

19%

MID

HIGH

LOW

MID

HIGH

72%

66%

Description of Group
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Group A includes strategy groups found in both studies focused on Medicare skilled
nursing care providing short-term rehabilitative care with the highest Medicare census, midrange and low percentages of Medicaid, shortest lengths of stay, and mid-range and high case
mix. The proportion of SNFs in Group A is similar in both studies, with the Zinn et al. (1994)
study having 19% of SNFs in this group compared to 17% in the Marlin et al. (1999) study.
Likewise, Group B includes strategy groups found in both studies focused on private pay patients
that account for the highest average percentage of private pay patients, have low and mid-range
Medicare census, the lowest Medicaid census, low and mid-range lengths of stay, and low and
mid-range case mix. The proportions of SNFs in Group B are similar with 5% in the Zinn et al.
(1994) study compared to 6% in the Marlin et al. (1999) study. The paired groups in Group C
that Zinn et al. (1994) call “Generic Skilled Nursing Care” have the highest average case mix,
mid-range levels of Medicare and Medicaid census, low and mid-range rates of private pay, and
low and mid-range lengths of stay. The proportions of SNFs in Group C differ with the Zinn et
al. (1994) study finding 18% of SNFs in this group compared to 9% in the Marlin et al. (1999)
study. The Zinn et al. (1994) study notes that this group has the highest percentage of hospitalbased facilities (12%) which may help explain the proportional difference as it is not clear if the
Marlin et al. (1999) study includes hospital-based facilities. The paired groups in Group D
described as “Low-cost Intermediate” in the Zinn et al. (1994) study have low and mid-range
rates of revenues from Medicare, mid-range and high rates from Medicaid, low rates from
private pay, mid-ranges of length of stay, and low case mixes. Though these groups appear
similar, the proportion of SNFs in Group D in the Zinn et al. (1994) study is 23% versus 11% in
the Marlin et al. (1999) study.
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The paired groups in Group E described as “Low-cost Skilled and Intermediate Care” in
the Zinn et al. (1994) study and “Short-term Skilled Nursing Care” in the Marlin et al. (1999)
study have the least in common, but do not align well with any other groups. Both have midrange case mix and Medicare census, but the Zinn et al. (1994) group has a high percentage of
Medicaid, and low percentage of private pay residents and mid-range lengths of stay, while the
Marlin et al. (1999) group has mid-range levels of Medicaid residents, and private pay residents,
shorter lengths of stay. The proportions of SNFs in Group E differs, with 13% in the Zinn et al.
(1994) study compared to 20% in the Marlin et al. (1999) study.
The paired groups in Group F described as “Low-cost Focus – Care Continuum” in the
Zinn et al. (1994) study are alike with low case mixes, mid-range proportions of Medicaid
patients, and mid-range levels of private pay residents. They differ in mid-range and high levels
of lengths of stay and low and mid-range Medicare census. The proportions of SNFs in Group F
is similar in both studies, with 19% in the Zinn et al. (1994) study compared to 18% in the
Marlin et al. (1999) study.
The paired groups in Group G are alike with mid-range case mixes, high Medicaid
censuses, mid-range rates of private pay, and long lengths of stay. They differ in the level of
Medicare patients being at mid-range and low levels. and. However, in the Zinn et al. (1994)
study, this group represents large municipal facilities with an average bed-size of 539 beds. In
contrast, the largest average bed-size in the Marlin study is 151 beds (Marlin study Group 6).
Consequently, the proportion of SNFs in Group G in the Zinn et al. (1994) study is only 3%,
while the most similar group in the Marlin et al. (1999) study accounts for 19% of SNFs.
The two later studies, Castle (2003) and Zinn et al. (2008), use a deductive approach to
identify strategic groups of SNFs by applying the Miles and Snow (1978) typology. Castle
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(2003) and Zinn et al. (2008) survey nursing home administrators and then classify SNFs based
on self-typing as having a Prospector, Defender, Analyzer, or Reactor strategy. Castle (2003) and
Zinn et al. (2008) adapt their surveys from a survey of key informants in hospitals (Shortell &
Zajac, 1990a; Zajac & Shortell, 1989) to identify an organization’s strategic orientation. Castle
(2003) surveys 470 nursing facilities in 1999 in five states: Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Texas,
and South Dakota. Zinn et al. (2008) survey a random sample of 10% of all facilities in the
nation included in the Nursing Home Compare report conducted May through June 2004.
The makeup of the industry structure differs between the two studies taking a deductive
approach. Castle (2003) finds: 32% Analyzers, 27% Reactors, 25% Defenders, and 17%
Prospectors, whereas Zinn et al. (2008) find their sample includes approximately: 43%
Defenders, 33% Analyzers, 19% Prospectors, and 7% Reactors. The number of Analyzers (32%
and 33%) and Prospectors (17% and 19%) in both studies are similar, but Defenders (25% and
43%) and Reactors (27% and 7%) differ by wide margins. The surveys are conducted at different
times using different samples which may explain the variation in the structure of the industry.
Castle (2003) surveys a sample of nursing homes in 1999 located in five states to determine
strategic orientation. Zinn et al. (2008) surveys a national sample of SNFs for classification in
the Miles and Snow (1978) typology. Using a survey to self-type strategic orientation may better
capture the strategic intent of management, compared to using secondary data, but respondents
are subject to response bias by perhaps making themselves look more desirable or strategically
adept than the management decisions that have been implemented (Zinn et al, 2008). Surveying
also requires a larger amount of resources than using secondary data. The Miles and Snow
(1978) typology has been used in a number of health care studies (Shortell & Zajac, 1990b), but
it may not fully capture the structure of the nursing home industry.
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Performance.
Each of the four studies finds support for the association of strategic groups with
measures of performance. Reasoning that maximizing profit may not be the only or most
important objective of all nursing homes since many SNFs operate as non-profits, Zinn et al.
(1994) choose performance indicators of quality and an efficiency measure in lieu of financial
performance measures. Rates of patients with pressure ulcers, catheterization, and restraint use
measure quality, and an efficiency score is derived using data envelopment analysis. Change in
Medicare census from 1987 to 1989 is assessed to determine whether SNFs changed their
behavior in response to the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) by increasing
Medicare participation.
In addition to finding distinct groups based on strategic dimensions among nursing
homes, Zinn et al. (1994) find support for their hypotheses that performance and strategic
behavior are associated with strategic group membership. Multiple analysis of variance
(MANOVA) is used to test the significance of group membership on group means for clustering
and performance variables, and Tukey’s honestly significant differences (HSD) tests are used to
compare group means for each variable. Significant differences in performance measures among
the groups are found. The highest performing groups on quality measures are Groups 2 and 6
with a focus on a continuum of care, while the poorest performing groups are Groups 4 and 5,
focused on low-cost intermediate care. The most efficient group is Group 1 with a high Medicare
census, and the groups with the least efficiency scores are those with a care continuum focus,
Groups 2 and 6, in contrast to their high performance on quality measures. All groups increase
Medicare participation as a result of “the MCCA effectively lower[ing] mobility barriers to
participation in the lucrative Medicare market” (Zinn, Aaronson, & Rosko, 1994, p. 202). Group
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1, however, already having the highest Medicare census, has the largest increase. Groups 2 and 6
have the lowest increase in Medicare participation over the study time period.
Marlin and colleagues (1999) include operating margin and average profit per patient day
as indicators that would be useful to nursing home administrators in order to measure financial
performance. An efficiency score is calculated using similar inputs and outputs as Zinn et al.
(1994). For quality performance measures, however, Marlin et al. (1999) add total number of
health deficiencies and the total number of life and safety deficiencies to address overall nursing
home quality. The same three quality measures used by Zinn et al. (1994) (prevalence of patients
with pressure ulcers, catheterization, and physical restraint) are included, but the number of
admitted patients having the condition is subtracted to exclude counting conditions present on
admission. An additional quality measure, unplanned weight change, is included.
Like Zinn et al. (1994), Marlin and colleagues find significant differences in performance
measures among strategic groups using MANOVA to test for significance of difference between
groups on the clustering and performance variables and Tukey’s HSD test to compare group
means for each variable. However, strategic groups do not perform in the same ways across the
two studies. Marlin et al. (1999) find that their Group 7, SNFs with high private pay and
Medicare census, perform the best financially and at a high level of quality and efficiency. The
high level of quality is similar for the comparable group in the Zinn study (Group 2), but the
Marlin study finds a high level of efficiency in this group, in contrast with Zinn’s finding. Other
comparisons in performance measures between the two studies have mixed results. Sampling
differences and local competition and regulations are offered as explanations by Marlin et al.
(1999) along with a call for further research to address differences in the findings of the two
studies.
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Castle (2003) assesses quality across strategic groups by examining rates of patients with
catheterization, restraint use, contractures, pressure ulcers, and psychoactive medication use.
Logistic regression is used to test the association of strategic groups with high or low scored
measures. Castle (2003) finds support for association of each the quality measures with strategic
orientation. SNFs classified as Prospectors demonstrate the best outcomes followed by
Defenders, Analyzers, and Reactors in each of the quality measures as hypothesized. Differences
in measures between the four groups are significant with the exception of the rate of use of
psychoactive medications, which trended in the same manner as the other quality measures with
Prospectors having the lowest rate of usage and Reactors having the highest.
The last study, Zinn et al. (2008), assesses whether a SNF’s response to a change in
policy for publicly reporting quality measures is associated with its strategic group designation.
Measures of quality include seven actions SNFs may take in response to public release of the
Nursing Home Compare (NHC) website. Logistic regression is used to assess whether the
response of SNFs is associated with their Miles and Snow (1978) strategic orientation. Overall,
SNFs classified as Prospectors and Analyzers are more likely to respond and Reactors are less
likely to respond compared to Defenders. Specifically, Prospectors and Analyzers are most likely
to have an immediate response, investigate reasons for poor scores, and change priorities of
programs compared to Defenders; Prospectors are most likely to revise job descriptions based on
quality measure publications; Analyzers are most likely to invest in new technology as a
response compared to Defenders; Reactors are least likely to make an immediate response, and
Defenders are most likely to have no response to the publication compared to Prospectors. Zinn
and colleagues (2008) conclude that SNFs’ responses to the change in their environment follows
the competitive actions expected by their strategic types: Prospectors use change to their
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advantage, Analyzers tend to follow Prospectors, Defenders resist change, and Reactors respond
when forced.
Qualitative Studies Informing SNFs’ Strategic Management of Scope of Business
Qualitative studies are reviewed to gain a better understanding of strategies managers of
SNFs are currently pursuing in their scope of business in the context of industry changes. These
lines of research have much to add to identifying strategic dimensions of SNFs and mobility
barriers within the industry. Recent work has been undertaken by scholars to better understand
the hospital to SNF referral process in light of pressures experienced by hospitals and SNFs from
value-based purchasing programs. In particular, the qualitative work of Shield and colleagues
(2018) and Lawrence and colleagues (2018) elucidate the processes and strategies that some
SNFs use to obtain patient admissions. Drawing upon exploratory qualitative research is
intended to provide insights that can help inform the development of the conceptual framework
for quantitative analyses of SNFs (Creswell, Klassen, Plano Clark, & Smith, 2011).
Shield, Winblad, McHugh, Gadbois, and Tyler (2018) conduct qualitative research to
explore perspectives of hospitals discharging patients to SNFs and of SNFs admitting patients
from hospitals in a post-ACA environment. The research team conducted interviews with 138
administrative personnel in 16 hospitals and 25 SNFs across eight sites. They find that some
hospitals are creating formal and informal preferred networks of SNFs in hopes of reducing
readmissions from SNFs and readmission penalties. For some SNFs, having a strong source of
hospital referrals allows the SNF to be more selective about accepting patients with complex care
needs. However, SNFs that do not have a reliable source of hospital referrals may be more likely
to accept less-desirable patients (more complex patients requiring a greater level of care without
generating a higher level of revenue) to increase occupancy. SNFs screening patients by
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expected source of payment and complexity, with a preference for short-stay and less complex
patients, are strong themes throughout the study. Shield et al. (2018) conclude with a concern
that SNFs with higher referral rates may have greater access to post-acute care patients with
higher reimbursement rates, while SNFs with lower referral rates will be left with more complex
and long-term care patients with lower reimbursement rates. Moreover, as SNFs shift more of
their beds to short-stay from long-stay, there is even greater competition for short-stay patients.
Though smaller in scale than the Shield et al. (2018) study, a qualitative study by
Lawrence and colleagues (2018) similarly find some hospitals creating narrow networks of SNFs
for their post-acute patients and the potential for preferred SNFs to respond with greater
screening of patients. Eighteen clinicians at three different SNFs were interviewed using semistructured interviews. They find that screening and admissions processes vary at the SNFs, and
external pressures driving variation in process are identified as: lack of consistent medical
documentation, lack of familiarity of hospital staff with a SNF’s capabilities, and payment
models encouraging rapid discharge from hospitals to SNFs. SNFs’ screening of patients by
payer, complexity, and expected length of stay are overarching themes. Lawrence et al. (2018)
suggest that SNFs increase their agency in the hospital referral process by better screening
patients to match a patient’s needs with a facility’s capabilities.
Summary and Gaps in the Literature
There are only four studies that model the strategic orientation of SNFs and the
relationship between SNF strategic groups and performance outcomes. The studies find evidence
that groups of SNFs have similar strategies and that strategic orientation is related to
performance. Two studies identify their own typologies using an inductive approach and two
studies use a deductive approach by applying the Miles and Snow (1978) typology.
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The Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin et al. (1999) studies use an inductive approach to
define strategic groups based on dimensions of scope of business and resource commitments and
apply the cluster analysis method to identify the number of groups that exist within the industry.
Both studies rely upon cross-sectional secondary data to operationalize strategic dimensions,
both find a typology consisting of seven strategic groups of SNFs, and both test the association
between groups and performance measures. Marlin et al. (1999) conclude that the consistency in
strategic groups in the two studies “suggests an underlying stability in the segmentation of the
industry” (pg. 171). However, Marlin and his colleagues note differences in performance
measures between the groups found in their study compared to performance of the groups found
in the Zinn et al. (1994) study and indicate the need for further study to explain the differences.
The Castle (2003) and Zinn et al. (2008) studies take a deductive approach to defining
strategic groups using the Miles and Snow (1978) typology based on surveys of nursing home
administrators. Both studies find associations between group membership and performance
measures. However, the proportion of SNFs in each of the four Miles and Snow groups differ,
indicating a difference in the underlying structure of the industry in the two studies.
The qualitative studies (Lawrence et al., 2018; Shield et al., 2018) provide a glimpse into
the competitive trends in a post-ACA environment among SNFs for patient referrals from
hospitals that helps inform the current study. Themes of market related strategies are consistent
between the two qualitative studies, providing some convergence of strategic dimensions in the
current environment and indication of mobility barriers within the industry. Some SNF
administrators may be limited in their ability to acquire the most desired referrals due to capacity
constraints for short-stay patients or complex patients, or weak relationships with referring
hospitals. SNFs that have strong relationships with referring hospitals and excess capacity for
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short-stay patients may seek out less complex, more profitable patients. The proportion of shortstay and long-stay residents that a SNF can accommodate has implications for revenues.
However, there are capacity restraints and accommodations with referral partners that create
mobility barriers within the industry.
There are several gaps in the literature focusing on strategic orientation of SNFs. First,
there is some inconsistency in the existing literature as to the industry structure. The structure of
groups that emerged from the earlier studies by Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin et al. (1999)
demonstrated a similar structure of strategy groups, and hence mobility barriers, in their samples
of the nursing home industry. However, the strategic groups are not entirely aligned and the
structure – performance link, while significant in each study, is not consistent across similar
groups of SNFs. Variation in outcomes of the studies applying the Miles and Snow (1978)
typology suggest that the industry structure either is not stable altogether or is at least not stable
using the Miles and Snow (1978) typology of strategy groups. Second, there is an absence of
studies using more recent data to classify SNFs by strategic orientation despite strategic
modeling being applied to other services within the healthcare sector (Bazzoli et al., 2017; Shay
and Mick, 2017; Kirby, 2012; Evans et al., 2019). This is important because the gap covers a
time of changes in the industry and increasing environmental uncertainty. Policy changes
affecting SNFs include the SNF prospective payment system in 1998, Balanced Budget
Refinement Act (BBRA) of 1999, Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000,
Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) in
2012, Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) in 2013, the SNF Value Based
Purchasing Program (SNFVBP) in 2018, and the Patient Driven Payment Model (PDPM) in
2019. Simultaneously, there has been growth in managed care (Emily A Gadbois et al., 2018)
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and nursing home substitutes which may decrease demand for nursing home care (Geng,
Mansouri, Stevenson, & Grabowski, 2020; Silver, Grabowski, Gozalo, Dosa, & Thomas, 2018),
while a shift in demographics towards an older population may increase demand (Spetz et al.,
2015). Third, the generalizability of results of Zinn et al. (1994), Martin et al. (1999), and Castle
(2003) is limited as samples are restricted to one or a few states. An analysis using nationwide
data provides greater generalizability of results. Fourth, each of the studies reviewed uses crosssectional data to classify SNFs into groups. A longitudinal analysis of classification provides a
better perspective of changes occurring over time. Finally, the exploratory, qualitative studies of
strategies used by SNFs in the admissions process provided by Shield et al. (2018) and Lawrence
et al. (2018) are limited in generalizability. Quantitative analysis can serve to support their
qualitative findings.
Summary and Study Contribution
Strategic group modeling provides a means for researchers, policymakers and managers
to identify strategic approaches within an industry and evaluate the success of varying
approaches (Marlin et al., 1999). The method has been applied in multiple industries including
the healthcare sector since it was first developed in the early 1970s. This study provides an
updated and expanded analysis of the strategic orientation of SNFs and whether their strategic
orientation is associated with performance measures. Building upon studies by Zinn et al. (1994)
and Marlin et al. (1999), this study examines SNFs during a time of environmental change
occurring during the last ten years. Earlier works were limited to one state and used crosssectional data to identify groups at one point in time. This study provides greater generalizability
by including SNFs across the United States and provides a more robust perspective of changes
occurring over time by utilizing a longitudinal analysis to examine the composition of strategic
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groups of SNFs in different time periods. Finally, this study is informed by recent qualitative
studies exploring strategic priorities of some SNFs competing for business in a changing
environment. These priorities, maximizing payer mix of short-stay patients, screening for
complexity of care, and strengthening referral relationships, align with Cool and Schendel’s
(1988) definition of scope of business, and are the dimensions used to classify SNFs in this
study. These strategic dimensions are discussed fully as part of the conceptual framework in
Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework

This chapter develops a conceptual framework to address the aims of the study. Strategic
Management Theory (SMT) provides theoretical underpinnings to the framework to help explain
the expectation of strategic groups within the nursing home industry and variation in financial
and quality performance associated with membership in a group. The first section of this chapter
provides an overview of SMT, the second section presents the conceptual framework and how it
is informed by SMT, and the third section of the chapter develops the propositions and
hypotheses derived from the conceptual framework to address each of the study’s research
questions.
Strategic Management Theory
Chandler’s (1962) Strategy and Structure is credited as the genesis of SMT with works
by Ansoff (1965), Andrews (1971), Child (1972), Schendel and Hoffer (1979), Miles and Snow
(1978), and Porter (1980, 1985) shaping and expanding its theoretical concepts. SMT emerged in
the context of conceptualizing organizations as open system models operating within an
environmental context (Shortell & Zajac, 1990a). Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) and
Thompson’s (1967) works focused on the contingent relationship between an organization’s
environment and the structure of an organization leading to contingency theory, whereas,
theorists such as Chandler (1962) and Ansoff (1965) focused on the contingent relationship
between an organization’s environment and the strategy chosen by an organization to manage
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the environment that, in turn, leads to changes in structure (Boyd, Takacs Haynes, Hitt, Bergh, &
Ketchen, 2012; Hoskisson, Wan, Yiu, & Hitt, 1999). This difference in the interplay between the
environment and strategy is the foundational assumption of SMT: organizations adapt
strategically to their environments to assure survival (Shortell & Zajac, 1990a).
SMT recognizes the influence of organizational and environmental factors in
organizational performance, however managerial strategic choices are believed to be the primary
factor determining the structure and performance of an organization. Child (1972) identifies
management and strategic choice as the mechanism by which structures are adapted to
environmental and organizational dimensions. Choices such as “where the organization’s
operations shall be located, the clientele it shall serve, or the types of employees it shall recruit”
(Child, 1972, p. 10) provide organizations with the ability to enact strategic choice to reduce
dependence upon environmental factors and achieve better performance. SMT conceives of “fit”
between the environment and organizational strategy, differing from contingency theory’s
conception of “fit” occurring between the environment and organizational structure (Zajac,
Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000). SMT emphasizes the agency of managers to make strategic decisions
regarding how to handle environmental factors and changes for the advantage of the organization
(Scott & Davis, 2007). Just as contingency theorists recognize there is no one best way to
organize, strategic management theorists recognize there is no one best strategy for an
organization to undertake and that some strategies work better than others in certain
environments.
The study of strategic management assumes a continual process of strategic adaptation
by organizations to changes in the environment. Managers are expected to “anticipate or react to
environmental changes by formulating specific strategies, taking into account environmental
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conditions, organizational variables, and past performance” (Shay, 2014, p. 111).
Implementation of chosen strategies may require structural adaptation. Moreover, it is
anticipated that strategic adaptations and structural changes affect performance outcomes
(Kimberly & Zajac, 1985; Shortell & Zajac, 1990a; Zajac & Shortell, 1989). Managers’ abilities
to adapt strategically by aligning organizational factors with environmental demands ultimately
determine performance and whether the organization survives (Kimberly & Zajac, 1985; Shay,
2014).
Porter (1979, 1980, 1991) applies tools from industrial organizational economics to the
concepts of SMT by emphasizing the identification and alignment of internal strengths and
weaknesses with external opportunities and threats in analysis for strategic management (Luke et
al., 2004). Porter’s work focuses on the strategic positioning of organizations within an industry
by aligning internal structures with the external environment to gain competitive advantage. For
Porter, “the key aspect of the firm’s environment is the industry or industries in which it
competes” (Porter, 1980, p. 3). Understanding the industry structure helps organizations identify
mobility barriers within the industry that may limit the strategic opportunities available to an
organization, while allowing it to use competitive advantages in pursuit of better outcomes. Hunt
(1972) and Porter’s (1979) work is the foundation of strategic group modeling to explain
differences in organizational performance within an industry. Porter (1980) and Miles and Snow
(1978) developed generic typologies of strategic orientation that they argue apply to all
industries.
SMT draws from multiple theories and perspectives to explain why some organizations
succeed and others fail. Some scholars think a wide range of perspectives gives SMT flexibility
and allows for greater insights into the complexities of strategic management (Boyd et al., 2012;
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Shay, 2014). However, a recurring criticism of SMT is that it lacks a clear theoretical foundation
and is difficult to define (Shay, 2014; Linhart, 2020).
Kimberly and Zajac (1985) attribute an increasing use of SMT in health care studies to
the changing environment of the mid-1970s that necessitated strategic adaptation for health care
organizations facing resource constraints not previously encountered. Scholars have used SMT
as the theoretical basis for many health care studies. A number have been focused on hospitals
(Linhart, 2020; Luke & Begun, 1988; Mick, Morlock, Salkever, & de Lissovoy, 1993; Shay,
2014; Trinh & O’Connor, 2000, 2002; Zajac & Shortell, 1989), and the nursing home studies
reviewed in Chapter 2 are also based on SMT (Castle, 2003; Marlin, Huonker, & Sun, 2002;
Zinn, Aaronson, & Rosko, 1994).
Conceptual Framework
The purpose of this study is to better understand the strategic behavior of SNFs facing
environmental uncertainty by: 1) identifying groups of SNFs using similar strategies, 2) testing
whether performance is associated with membership in a particular strategy group, and 3)
assessing how the composition of strategic groups changes over time.
The conceptual framework proposed for the current study closely follows the process of
strategic adaptation assumed in SMT. Examples of a conceptual framework based on strategic
adaptation are present in multiple studies. Zajac, Kraatz, and Bresser (2000) provide a model of
strategic adaptation of US Savings and Loan institutions. In their study of dynamic strategic fit
and performance, they find support for hypotheses that variation in environmental and
organizational contingencies leads to variation in strategic change, resulting in strategic fit or
misfit and influencing organizational performance. Trinh and O’Connor’s (2000; 2002) studies
of rural and urban hospitals examining whether strategic change influences financial
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performance employ a similar conceptual framework. Their research questions address the
influence of environmental and organizational characteristics on hospitals’ strategic behavior and
performance and whether specific strategies are related to changes in performance. The authors
attribute their conceptual framework to SMT, and the framework models the process depicted in
Zajac et al. (2000): namely, that managers react to environmental changes with specific
strategies that lead to performance changes. Whether change in performance is better or worse
depends on whether the strategic changes increase fit with external pressures imposed on the
organization or the strategic changes result in misfit.
Figure 1 presents a visual representation of this study’s conceptual framework. The
overarching flow of the framework follows the pattern of strategic adaptation: environmental and
organizational factors lead to the development of the strategic orientation of an organization and
both strategy and structure exert influence on organizational performance. However, there are
some additions to the framework for this study and the earlier studies just described. First,
managers identifying external opportunities and threats, as well as internal strengths and
weaknesses, is explicitly acknowledged as part of the strategic process. Second, strategies are
conceptualized as dimensions of strategic orientation. The focus on strategic dimensions
facilitates modeling of strategic groups. These additions, including opportunities, threats,
strengths, and weakness, and dimensions of strategic orientation, support developing
propositions and hypotheses to address this study’s research questions. Starting on the left side of
the conceptual framework in Figure 1, a description of the theoretical foundation of the
conceptual flow of strategic adaptation in the nursing home industry follows.
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework of SNF strategic orientation and performance

Environmental and Organizational Factors.
Environmental factors influence all aspects of strategic adaptation: the development of
strategies, the structure of the organization, and performance. The influence of external
environmental factors is represented by direct paths from environmental factors to organizational
characteristics, opportunities and threats informing strategic behaviors, and performance.
As discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, SNFs have faced environmental uncertainty
stemming from changes in reimbursement and health care policies, market forces, and
demographics. Most legislative changes have applied to all SNFs equally, however local
environmental factors are likely to vary with geographic and market location. The environment is
conceptualized in terms of munificence, dynamism, and complexity (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).
For SNFs, the munificence of the environment is characterized by the percentage of the
population that may need its services, the wealth of the population, and the rurality of its
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location. Changing demographics with an increase in the population over sixty-five years of age
points toward an increase in demand for services. Per capita income of a locality is an indication
of the availability of patients anticipated to be low or high margin patients. The level of rurality
of the location of a SNF is an indicator of the density of potential patients in the area and the
ability to find staff to provide complex care. Dynamism in the market is characterized by the
change in penetration of managed care in the form of Medicare HMOs. The level of penetration
of Medicare ACOs, newer models of care for nursing homes, is used due to data limitations.
Greater levels of managed care may create pressure to reduce lengths of stay for Medicare
patients. Complexity in the environment is characterized by competition in the area among SNFs
and for substitute care provided by home health services. Environmental factors represent
opportunities and threats managers must recognize and assess when making strategic decisions.
A direct link between environmental characteristics and organization characteristics
acknowledges that organizations may choose to organize differently under different
environmental conditions to ensure their success. In the US, there are almost 15,000 SNFs and
their organizational forms vary widely. SNFs are often characterized by form of ownership,
chain affiliation, and size in terms of number of beds. Rate of occupancy provides an indicator of
the ability of a facility to respond to market demands (Marlin, Sun, & Huonker, 1999; Zinn et al.,
1994). Organizational characteristics represent strengths and weaknesses managers must assess
when making strategic decisions.
Strategic Orientation.
SMT, while recognizing the importance of environmental factors, emphasizes that it is
the ability of managers to align opportunities and threats in the environment with strengths and
weaknesses of the organization with sound strategies that lead to performance outcomes.
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Managerial actions and reactions to opportunities and threats taking into consideration their
organizational strengths and weaknesses lead directly to the formulation of strategies. SMT
provides an important prediction about strategic orientation in the conceptual framework. SMT
predicts there is variation in strategic orientation contingent on differences in environmental and
organizational factors, tasks, and managerial decision making in terms of key decision variables
(Porter, 1979). This prediction of variation of strategies facilitates the importance of strategic
group modeling of SNFs to better understand strategic behavior within the industry. The
implication is that there is variation in strategic adaptation, but some SNFs may face
environmental constraints or industry mobility barriers that limit strategies available to them.
Research question one (RQ1) seeks to identify the existence of distinct strategy groups of SNFs,
and dimensions for classifying SNFs are discussed in detail in a later section of this chapter. The
process of strategic adaption may require or result in changes in organizational structures. This is
depicted in the conceptual model as a feedback loop from SNF strategic dimensions to
organizational characteristics reflecting “that major changes in strategy will be accompanied by
changes in structure” (Kimberly & Zajac, 1985, p 284).
Performance.
A premise of strategic group modeling is the link between the structure of an industry and
profits within an industry. While there are some industrywide structural traits, such as market
growth or regulations, that affect profitability across firms in an industry, “profitability of the
individual firm will depend on the structure with the industry” (Porter, 1979, p.215). The
structure of the industry depends on the number of strategies firms take to address key decision
variables. For nursing homes, patient care is their primary business and patients are a key
resource. Obtaining and maintaining a source of patient referrals for nursing home care is crucial
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to the survival of SNFs. Qualitative studies reviewed in Chapter 2 suggest that the greatest
opportunities for SNFs to improve financial performance is to maximize the number of shortterm patient referrals having less complex care needs (Lawrence et al., 2018; Shield et al., 2018).
SMT bridges environmental factors and performance by emphasizing that managerial
decisions affect performance as “managers have discretion in choosing and implementing
strategies to match environmental demands in ways that enhance organizational performance”
(Zinn et al., 2007, p. 1202). SMT expects that there will be variation in organizational structures
and strategies adopted by managers in response to external pressures to ensure survival and strive
for better strategic fit. A feedback loop from performance to organizational characteristics
represents the ongoing strategic adaptation process. When the fit between strategy and
performance deteriorates, managers make adaptations to structures and strategies to regain fit
and better performance.
There is evidence of SNFs adapting strategically to environmental changes. Zinn and
colleagues (2007) find support for strategic adaptation by SNFs to diversify services in response
to environmental changes increasing the acuity of patients. Their research indicates that SNFs
adjusted strategy and structure and achieved a better fit with environmental pressures, leading to
improved performance. Park, Konetzka, and Warner (2011) likewise find that nursing homes
responding strategically to public reporting of quality of care is associated with better financial
performance outcomes. Research question two (RQ2) addresses whether strategic groups of
SNFs differ in financial and quality performance measures.
The conceptual framework for this study is designed to follow the flow of strategic
adaptation with theoretical underpinning informed by SMT. Environmental and organizational
factors recognized by organizational leaders as external opportunities or threats and internal
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strengths or weaknesses facilitate strategic decision making that affect organizational
performance. Moreover, this is an ongoing process as changes in the environment occur. This
section of the chapter discussed the logical flow of the conceptual framework. In the next section
of the chapter, propositions and hypotheses derived from the framework are presented.
Propositions and Hypotheses
RQ1: Strategic Dimensions for Classification of SNFs.
The conceptual framework is used to derive a single proposition and hypothesis
concerning the typology of strategic groups among SNFs. SMT prioritizes managerial choices in
determining the strategies organizations employ to adapt to environmental forces. Organizations
operating in the same industry can strategically choose to pursue different markets depending
upon where managers identify opportunities in the environment and how they choose to position
their organization’s strengths (Porter, 1980). Therefore, SNFs adapt strategies to align their
internal strengths and weaknesses with environmental opportunities and threats to gain
competitive advantage. However, mobility barriers may restrict strategic adaptation within the
industry due to organizational characteristics and environmental constraints resulting in a finite
number of strategies available to SNFs. For example, SNFs that desire to increase the number of
post-acute care Medicare patients may be restricted by the number of short-term beds available
in their facility. An investment of resources and time would be needed to have access to more
highly trained staff (Wagner et al., 2020), adapt physical space to short-stay patients, and
develop referral relationships to increase the number of short-stay beds. Moreover, SNFs in rural
areas are likely constrained in the number of hospital referral relationships that can be cultivated
and access to highly trained staff. The result is that although there is variation in the strategies
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that SNFs pursue as predicted by SMT, there may be a limited number of strategies available to
SNFs given environmental and organizational constraints that constitute mobility barriers.
As discussed in Chapter 2, classifying organizations into groups of similar strategic
orientation provides a more refined view of an industry than looking at the entire industry. When
performing strategic group modeling, strategy groups should be classified using dimensions that
are relevant to a particular industry (Cool & Schendel, 1988), and the number of strategy groups
depends on the number of unique strategies within an industry (Marlin et al., 1999). Using this
logic, this study takes an inductive approach, allowing the number of strategic groups to emerge
from the analysis, like the approach taken by Zinn et al. (1994) and by Marlin et al. (1999).
Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin et al. (1999) classify SNFs along dimensions of scope of
business and resource deployment. Both studies base their selection of dimensions on Cool and
Schendel’s (1988) use of scope of business and resource deployment in classifying strategy
groups in the US pharmaceutical industry. However, this study uses only dimensions of scope of
business to classify SNFs. Marlin et el. (1999) make the point that “scope and resource
deployment decisions…are more or less consistent with one another” (p. 158). Following that
reasoning, this study assumes that resources are used to support scope of business strategies and
resource commitments are not considered separately in this analysis.
Moreover, the dimensions of scope of business as defined by Cool and Schendel (1988)
align with the strategies some SNFs are using to obtain a key resource for nursing homes: patient
admissions. The qualitative work of Shield and colleagues (2018) and Lawrence and colleagues
(2018) identify the strategic priorities of SNFs when seeking admissions as: 1) expected length
of stay, 2) patient complexity, and 3) strength of referral networks. These strategies align with
Cool and Schendel’s (1988) description of scope of business decisions: 1) range of market
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segments targeted (short-stay care versus long-stay care), 2) types of services offered in the
selected market segment (complexity of care), and 3) the geographic reach or scope of productmarket strategy (strength of relationships with referring hospitals), respectively. The rationale for
using scope of business dimensions as strategic dimensions for classification of SNFs is
summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. Strategic dimensions for classification of SNFs
Scope of Business
(Cool and Schendel,
1987)
1. Range of market
segments targeted

Dimension for
classification of SNFs

Short-Stay Care
versus
Long-Stay Care

Rationale

Short-stay care is usually post-acute care and
more profitable than long-stay custodial care.
SNFs may decide to seek admissions from either
segment of patients.
Mobility barriers: greater resources for shortstay care; higher quality rankings to attract shortstay care referrals

2. Types of products
and/or services
offered in the
market segments
selected

Patient Complexity

The complexity of patients varies along with
comorbidities, cognitive ability, and
psychosocial challenges. SNFs may seek patients
that maximize revenue but not costs.
Mobility barriers: greater resources for more
complex patients

3. Geographic reach
or scope of
product-market
strategy

Referral Network

Concentration of referrals indicates scope of
market. Patient choice of SNFs is usually based
on location. SNFs may benefit by gaining
admissions through a stronger hospital
relationship, or through relationships with a
greater number of hospitals.
Mobility barriers: geographic restrictions;
resources for hospital relationship; quality
rankings may limit partnerships
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The first dimension, proportion of short-stay care versus long-stay care patients, is
indicative of the payer mix within a SNF. Short-stay and long-stay care are the primary market
segments in nursing home care. Short-stay care is usually post-acute care paid for by Medicare
and is more profitable than providing long-stay custodial care which is most often paid for by
Medicaid (Mor, Zinn, Angelelli, Teno, & Miller, 2004). However, caring for post-acute patients
requires more resources and structural adaptation in terms of staffing and equipment than caring
for long-stay patients, which may create mobility barriers for SNFs seeking to acquire more postacute patients (Tyler et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2020). Zinn et al. (1994) consider the ratio of
source of payment (from Medicaid, Medicare, or private payers) to be the most important
differentiator of market segments among nursing homes. Quality rankings may also affect the
ability of SNFs to attract patient referrals (McHugh et al., 2017).
The second dimension, patient complexity, varies with comorbidities, cognitive ability,
and psychosocial challenges. More complex patients can increase revenues, but may consume
more resources resulting in lower profits (Goldfeld, Stevenson, Hamel, & Mitchell, 2011; Hurd,
Martorell, Delavande, Mullen, & Langa, 2013; Kelley, McGarry, Gorges, & Skinner, 2015).
Services provided by nursing homes can differ in complexity for both short-stay and long-stay
patients. Some SNFs offer specialized care for complex patients such as memory care units,
while others may actively screen to avoid complex patients. Resources, such as increased
staffing or secured units, required to provide care to more complex patients (Eskildsen & Price,
2009) may present mobility barriers to SNFs seeking to offer these types of services in the
market.
The third dimension, strength of relationships with referring hospitals, indicates the scope
of the market that SNFs are capturing. Referrals concentrated from one or two hospitals indicate
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a different scope and geographic concentration than SNFs receiving referrals from multiple
hospitals. SNFs may receive more preferred referrals from hospitals with which they have a
strong relationship (McHugh, Rapp, Mor, & Rahman, 2021), or they may be able to be more
selective in their admissions if they are not dependent on one hospital, but instead receive
referrals from multiple hospitals (Shield et al., 2018). SNFs may face different kinds of mobility
barriers in the geographic scope of their market. SNFs seeking to expand referral relationships
with hospitals may face limitations to the number of hospitals in their geographic area, whereas
SNFs seeking to strengthen referral relationships may face having to achieve a level of quality
required by hospitals for preferred referral partners.
Therefore, it is proposed:
Proposition 1: Classification of strategic groups of SNFs is based on dimensions of scope
of business.
Hypothesis 1: There are differences among subsets of SNFs based on: 1) the proportion
of long-stay care patients, 2) complexity of admitted patients, and 3) the strength of referral
relationships with hospitals.
RQ2: Performance of Strategic Groups of SNFs.
The conceptual framework is used to derive one proposition and two hypotheses to
explain variation in financial and quality performance measures. SMT posits that strategic
management choices to align internal strengths and weaknesses with external opportunities and
threats lead to better performance. Strategic group modeling of SNFs helps to distinguish
strategies SNFs are using and may help explain different levels of performance among facilities.
In accordance with the structure – performance link of strategic modeling, membership in a
particular strategy group is expected to be associated with performance. Porter (1980) contends
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that firms operating in a segment of an industry with “high mobility barriers will have greater
profit potential than those in groups with lower mobility barriers” (Porter, 1980, p. 134). Higher
mobility barriers serve to limit competition, thus helping firms remain profitable in desirable
market segments. For SNFs, membership in strategic groups based on the dimensions of length
of stay of patient populations, patient complexity, and referral networks is expected to be
associated with performance measures. Therefore,
Proposition 2: Membership in a specific strategic group of SNFs is associated with a
SNF’s performance.
As shown in the third section of the conceptual framework, performance, in this study,
has two dimensions: financial and quality outcomes. Profitability is used as an indicator of
financial performance. Patient outcomes are used as indicators of quality performance. A brief
discussion of for-profit and non-profit organizations and the relationship of outcomes with form
of ownership, along with the interplay of financial and quality performance follows. Then, each
strategic dimension is considered in terms of its association with performance.
The expectations of financial and quality performance under different forms of ownership
in health care settings vary. For-profit organizations are expected to seek to maximize their
profitability, including for-profit health care providers (J. Clement, 2016). Traditional views of
differences between for-profit and non-profit ownership status contributed to widely held
assumptions that while for-profit firms seek to increase quantity until profits are maximized,
non-profit firms may seek to increase quality for the intangible value of prestige in providing a
service of high quality. However, non-profit firms may forsake quality and profits in order to
provide services where there is unmet need for the public good (Newhouse, 1970).
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Approximately 30% of nursing homes have non-profit ownership status. Research
examining the relationship of financial performance and quality outcomes in nursing homes has
found that generally non-profit nursing homes deliver higher quality than for-profit nursing
homes (Comondore et al., 2009; Grabowski, Feng, Hirth, Rahman, & Mor, 2013; Hillmer,
Wodchis, Gill, Anderson, & Rochon, 2005). However, some scholars suggest that profit and
quality maximization is more nuanced in both for-profit and non-profit organizations. Werner,
Konetzka, and Polsky (2016) find that demonstrating high quality scores on Nursing Home
Compare was associated with nursing homes experiencing greater demand for their services than
facilities with low quality scores. The implication is that for-profit organizations may focus on
better quality in order to build referrals and increase revenue. This complements evidence that
providing high quality care is associated with better financial performance (Park, Konetzka, &
Werner, 2011; Weech-Maldonado, Pradhan, Dayama, Lord, & Gupta, 2019). Other scholars have
explored the influence of spillover effects in the markets in which nursing homes operate.
Grabowski and Hirth (2003) find evidence of better overall nursing home quality when there is
an increase in the market share of non-profit nursing homes in a market. On the other hand,
Bowblis, Brunt, and Grabowski (2016) find competitive spillovers in the form of upcoding
patients into higher reimbursement categories by non-profit nursing homes when there is an
increase in the market share of for-profit nursing homes in a market. The regulatory exploitation
of reimbursement systems through upcoding results in greater revenue, an action consistent with
maximizing profitability.
In sum, predicting the performance of for-profit and non-profit nursing homes may be
more complex than assuming that for-profit firms seek to maximize profit and non-profit firms
do not. Market and regulatory forces may apply pressures on for-profit nursing homes to increase
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quality in expectation of increased profit, or non-profit nursing homes may take profitmaximizing actions or, alternatively, may accommodate patients while forsaking quality. This
study controls for ownership status, with an aim to explore the association of performance with
membership in a particular strategic group, rather than for-profit status.
Strategic dimensions and financial performance.
The market segment served by SNFs reflects a difference that has a strong impact on
revenues. Short stays in a SNF are usually for post-acute care that is reimbursed by Medicare or
private payers. Long stays are most often funded by Medicaid and are reimbursed at a lower rate
than Medicare or private payers reimburse. One source estimates that the overall average for
Medicare per diem rate of $503 is more than double that of Medicaid (Weech-Maldonado,
Pradhan, et al., 2019). SNFs that provide a higher proportion of care to short-stay Medicare
patients are likely to have greater levels of revenues and profit than SNFs that have higher
proportions of Medicaid residents (Weech-Maldonado, Lord, et al., 2019).
The types of services provided by SNFs are likely to vary in level of profitability. The
relationship of providing more complex care to profitability is unclear. After the introduction of
SNF PPS with case mix reimbursement in 1997, the proportion of intensive therapy days as a
proportion of total days increased from 29% to 82% between 2002 and 2015 (Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission, 2017). The utilization of inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) and
long-term acute care hospitals (LTACHs) also increased during this time (Buntin et al., 2009).
However, the qualitative studies reviewed in Chapter 2 indicate that most SNFs prefer patients
with less complex needs to maximize profitability (Lawrence et al., 2018; Shield et al., 2018).
Patient complexity may be a function of a need for more acute medical care or behavioral health
care. For those SNFs that handle more complex patients, revenues may be higher, but profit
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margins may not necessarily be greater as complex patients have higher costs and staffing needs.
On the other hand, the structural adaptation required to accommodate complex patients may
serve to protect a lucrative segment of the market, providing a competitive advantage to SNFs
with the necessary resources while preventing competitors from entering this market.
The scope of market for SNFs is defined geographically and by referral relationships with
hospitals. For SNFs, obtaining referrals from hospitals is a means of controlling resources in a
less restrictive manner than vertical integration with a hospital would require (Scott & Davis,
2007). SNFs may actively develop referral relationships with multiple area hospitals to obtain a
greater number of referrals, if multiple hospitals are within their geographic proximity.
Alternatively, SNFs may focus on referral relationships with one or a few hospitals. SNFs that
have close ties with one or a few hospitals may have a steady stream of patient referrals, better
access to information when screening patients from those hospitals, and may have access to
better transition planning (Konetzka, Stuart, & Werner, 2018; Rahman, Gadbois, Tyler, & Mor,
2018). Shay and Mick (2013) propose that post-acute care providers with strong relationships
with hospitals will be less likely to integrate vertically with hospitals post-ACA, relying instead
on trusted relationships to navigate policy changes successfully. The qualitative literature
reviewed in Chapter 2 corroborates the findings of studies that SNFs can demonstrate agency
through their referral relationships with hospitals without vertical integration. Shield et al. (2018)
find that “depending on the strength of their relationships, such as the volume of referrals SNFs
have with area hospitals, SNFs use different strategies both for screening out potential
admissions considered less preferable” if there is a strong relationship, or for “casting a wide net
to attract as many admissions as possible” (p.490) if there are not strong relationships with
hospitals.
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Given the variation that different levels of strategic dimensions of lengths of stay, patient
complexity, and strength of referral networks may have on financial performance, it is
hypothesized:
Hypothesis 2a: Membership in a specific strategic group of SNFs is associated with a
SNF’s financial performance.
Strategic dimensions and quality performance.
NHC reports separate quality indicators for short-stay and long-stay patients, reflecting
the different focus of care for short-stay and long-stay segments of the market (Saliba, Weimer,
Shi, & Mukamel, 2018). SNFs with lower rates of hospital readmission, a short-stay quality
measure, may be more attractive referral partners for post-acute patients for hospitals, thus
creating an incentive for SNFs to provide higher quality of care to obtain better fit with the new
policies. Those SNFs that have higher quality performance have a competitive advantage in
competing for short-stay patients. The growing proportion of short-stay post-acute patients in
SNFs and the greater profitability of these patients raises the question of whether quality of care
is being maintained among long-stay care patients. Findings in the literature are mixed. There is
evidence that increasing the proportion of Medicare days in nursing homes, and thus revenues,
improves quality of care for long-stay care patients in the same facility (Lepore & Leland, 2015).
Another study finds that most long-stay quality measures are not improved with an increase in
Medicare post-acute patients, but neither does quality decline (Gaudet Hefele, Wang, Bishop, &
Barooah, 2019). Recent research suggests quality improvements that spill-over from short-stay to
long-stay care patients may be limited to domains that span the two populations such as rates of
influenza and pneumococcal vaccination (Wang & Hefele, 2021).
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The relationship between quality outcomes and the types of services provided in terms of
level of acuity of admitted patients is unclear. SNFs are likely to benefit from having high levels
of quality measures by having a competitive advantage when seeking referrals. Shield et al.
(2018) found that lower rated SNFs were often those accepting more complex patients as a way
to compete for patient referrals. However, SNFs that admit a greater proportion of complex
patients require more specialized staffing and greater differentiation of tasks. The resources
required to care for complex patients may reduce resources used for quality improvement
activities, serving to reinforce a lower level of quality.
The relationship between high quality performance and concentration of referral
networks is expected to be positively related. Although SNFs can demonstrate agency in their
SNF-hospital referral relationships, hospitals have incentives to create referral partnerships with
SNFs offering high quality of care to short-stay post-acute care patients. Thirty-day hospital
readmissions is a key quality indicator of short-stay care. As many as one in four Medicare
beneficiaries discharged to a SNF in 2006 was readmitted to a hospital within thirty days (Mor et
al., 2010). As hospitals began to prepare for HRRP, many started developing or expanding
preferred networks of SNFs. Hospital readmission rates have been falling with the initiation of
the HRRP program, and hospitals with formal networks of SNFs have experienced greater
reductions in thirty-day readmissions rates than hospitals without preferred relationships with
SNFs (McHugh et al., 2017). Some ACOs have also established networks of SNFs to broaden
their continuum of care. The preferred networks are looking for SNFs that can help achieve
better outcomes for short-stay and long-stay patients and have high overall quality ratings
(Chang, Mainor, Colla, & Bynum, 2021; Huckfeldt, Weissblum, Escarce, Karaca‐Mandic, &
Sood, 2018). In contrast, there are indications that SNFs with lower quality ratings may take
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almost all types of referrals from hospitals in order to increase occupancy, suggesting that SNFs
with lower quality rankings may have a less centralized referral network in order to maximize
the number of patient admissions (Shield et al., 2018).
Given the variation that different levels of strategic dimensions of length of stay, patient
complexity, and strength of referral networks may have on quality outcomes, it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 2b: Membership in a specific strategic group of SNFs is associated with a
SNF’s quality performance.
RQ3: Changes in Strategic Groups of SNFs over Time
For research question three (RQ3), the conceptual framework is used to derive one
proposition and two hypotheses to explain longitudinal differences in the composition of
strategic groups. The current study is based upon a conceptual framework that closely follows
the process of strategic adaptation. Organizational strategy is contingent on decisions made by
management to address opportunities and threats in the environment. During times of
environmental changes resulting in uncertainty, managers may change their strategies to obtain a
better fit for the organization within the new environment. Strategic adaptation presumes
organizations are continually making efforts to adapt to changes in the environment to achieve
better fit between the organization structure and its environment helping to explain
organizational change (Kimberly & Zajac, 1985). This ongoing process is illustrated in the
conceptual framework as a feedback look from performance outcomes to strategy. This question
does not assess the fit of SNFs within their specific environments, but rather attempts to better
understand the association of strategy and outcomes (Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985).
Zajac and Shortell (1989) found evidence that health care organizations change their
strategic orientation over time when faced with turbulent environmental conditions. They
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examined shifts among hospitals classified using the Miles and Snow (1978) typology from one
group to another in response to the implementation of Medicare Prospective Payment over a twoyear period. Bazzoli et al.’s (1999) classification of multi-hospital arrangements has been used to
assess changes in structural dimensions in hospital-led health networks and systems from one
time period to another (Bazzoli et al., 1999; Dubbs, Bazzoli, Shortell, & Kralovec, 2004;
Shortell, Gottlieb, Martinez Camblor, & O’Malley, 2021).
As strategic adaption occurs, change in organizational structures “signals a change in the
concentration mix in the industry and therefore represents a change in the structure of the
industry as well as in the structure of individual corporate entities” (Kimberly & Zajac, 1985, p.
285). Though there have been studies that classify SNFs into strategic groups, there has not been
a study of longitudinal changes in strategy groups of SNFs. Marlin et al. (1999) suggest
structural changes in the nursing home industry may account for differences in their study and
the Zinn et al. (1994) study and they call for research on the stability of strategy groups over time
to gain a better understanding of unexplained differences.
SNFs have faced uncertainty since 2010 in the form of policy changes, growth of
enrollment in managed care, increasing use of nursing home substitutes, and changing
demographics. SNF managers may make strategic changes to achieve a better fit with a changing
environment. Specifically, evidence suggests they may seek to admit preferred patients that are
expected to be short-stay care, less medically complex, and develop a narrower referral network
as discussed in the development of prior hypotheses. In turn, the structure of the nursing home
industry may change. Therefore, it is proposed:
Proposition 3: The composition of the strategic groups changes over time.
Hypothesis 3a: The composition of the strategic groups changes over time.
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The process of strategic adaptation occurs to gain better strategic fit between an
organization and its environment. A better fit between an organizational strategy and structure
with the environment is expected to result in better performance (Donaldson, 2001, 2006; Zajac
et al., 2000). Mobility barriers within an industry are believed to restrict movement from one
strategy group to another, but if an organization is able to overcome mobility barriers, it may
achieve better financial performance if changes result in a better strategic fit with its environment
(Porter, 1979, 1980). Although there may be limited strategic choices in the nursing home
industry, SNFs are likely to attempt to adapt their strategies to compete in a more profitable part
of the industry for better performance, and for viability (Marlin et al., 1999). Thus, it is
proposed:
Hypothesis 3b: Shifting from one strategy group to another strategy group is associated
with a subsequent positive change in performance.
Summary
A conceptual framework was developed using SMT to explain the existence of strategic
groups and their association with performance outcomes. The conceptual framework was used to
derive three propositions and five corresponding hypotheses to address the three research
questions with the objective of better understanding the strategic orientation of SNFs during
environmental changes. The next chapter presents the research methods used to operationalize
the conceptual framework and test the hypotheses developed in this chapter.
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Chapter 4: Methods

This chapter presents the research methods used to address the study’s aims and research
questions of better understanding the strategic behavior of SNFs, assessing whether membership
in a particular strategy group is associated with performance outcomes, and evaluating whether
the structure of the industry changes over time. The first section describes the research design of
the study. Subsequent sections discuss data sources, the study sample, variable measurement, and
the analytical methodologies used to address the study’s research questions. The final sections
describe sensitivity analyses and provide a summary.
Research Design
The study is retrospective and observational in nature. To address the study’s first aim of
classifying SNFs into groups based on strategic orientation, a descriptive study design is
deployed. The proposition and hypothesis derived from the conceptual framework for RQ1 is
tested using cross-sectional data for one year (2015), applying cluster analysis methods and
validation techniques, and profiling a taxonomy of SNFs.
The study’s second aim of examining whether performance outcomes are associated with
strategic orientation is tested in two ways. First, a descriptive analysis is conducted using
ANOVA and post-hoc tests for differences in performance measures between groups. Then,
multivariate models are estimated to test the proposition and two hypotheses previously
presented for RQ2 using cross-sectional data for one year (2015).
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The study’s third aim is to evaluate whether SNFs changed strategic orientation during a
time of environmental uncertainty. A longitudinal analysis of differences in the composition of
strategic groups is used to test the proposition and two hypotheses previously presented for RQ3.
First, discriminant analysis results from the classification of strategic group clusters addressing
RQ1 is applied to 2012 to identify any shifts in the composition of strategic groups over time.
Then, differences in performance from 2012 to 2015 are compared for any SNFs that changed
strategic groups to those that did not change strategic groups. The most recent year, 2015, is
chosen as the base year for comparison of strategic group membership as 2015 is the crosssectional year of study for RQ1 and RQ2.
The unit of measure for the study is at the SNF level. A balanced panel is used to
compare the same facilities over time and to control for omitted variables that include timeinvariant effects. Analyses are conducted in Stata version 14.2 and SPSS version 27.
Data Sources
Administrative data are merged from multiple sources to obtain measures of SNFs’
organizational characteristics, financial and quality performance, and environmental factors. The
three primary data sources are the Long-Term Care Focus database (LTCF) maintained by
Brown University, Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS) reports for SNFs and
Nursing Home Compare (NHC) data from CMS, and Leavitt Partners’ Torch Insight database.
The first primary data source, the LTCF database, is sponsored by the National Institute
on Aging (1P01AG027296) through a cooperative agreement with the Brown University School
of Public Health. The dataset is provided upon request to researchers and intended to facilitate
understanding of how the long-term care system is organized, financed, and delivered. The
LTCF dataset contains data on resident and facility characteristics aggregated from multiple
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sources including the MDS (Medicare’s Minimum Data Set) and OSCAR/CASPER (Online
Survey Certification and Reporting/Certification and Survey Provider Enhanced Reporting
systems), Medicare claims files, CMS’s NHC, and the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF). A
brief overview of the data sources used to compile the LTCF dataset follows.
The MDS is based on clinical assessments of nursing home residents at admission, and
then quarterly, annually, when there is a significant change in patient status, and at discharge.
The assessment helps nursing home staff identify health problems by documenting
comorbidities, physical, psychological, and psychosocial functioning along with any treatments
or therapies the patient is receiving. Medicare or Medicaid certified nursing homes are required
to conduct the assessment for all residents, and CMS maintains the national MDS database
(CMS, 2012). The LTCF dataset contains selected resident level measures from the MDS
aggregated at the facility level.
CMS requires surveys of Medicare or Medicaid certified nursing facilities at least once
every 15 months through the OSCAR/CASPER system. The CASPER system replaced OSCAR
in 2012. On behalf of CMS, states conduct inspections of laboratories, acute and continuing care
providers, including hospitals, nursing homes, home health agencies (HHAs), end-stage renal
disease (ESRD) facilities, hospices, and other facilities serving Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries (CMS, 2018). For nursing homes, data is collected on organizational
characteristics, staffing, any quality deficiencies found during the inspection, and aggregate
resident characteristics (“Long-term Care: Facts on Care in the US,” 2017).
In addition to the MDS and CASPER datasets, the LTCF project uses Medicare
enrollment and Medicare claims data to track individual residents for calculating rehospitalization rates. Rates of readmissions are based upon an entire year’s worth of claims data,
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whereas most other variables are based on data collected at a particular point in time. Some of
the other quality measures included in LTCF come from NHC. The LTCF project uses AHRF
data for providing county level measures of health professionals and facilities, and state policy
indicators are available at the state level.
The second primary data source for this study are cost reports submitted to CMS and
maintained in the Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS). CMS requires
institutional providers certified by Medicare to submit an annual cost report including facility
characteristics, utilization data, cost and charges by cost center, and financial statement data
(CMS, 2019). HCRIS reports for SNFs by fiscal year are available from CMS as public use files.
The third primary data source is data from NHC for selected quality measures. CMS
compiles and publicly reports on quality measures and deficiency citations for Medicare and
Medicaid certified nursing homes. Public use files of NHC data are available from CMS. Data
representing a snapshot from the second quarter of each year is used as it most closely coincides
with some of LTCF prevalence measures from the first Thursday of each April.
The fourth primary data source for this study is Leavitt Partners’ Torch Insight database.
Torch Insight is a proprietary database that integrates over 2,000 data elements from multiple
proprietary and public data sources to provide information about the context of local healthcare
markets. Data metrics include ACO and value-based payments, claims, payers, health systems,
hospitals, provider groups, physicians, health insurance marketplaces, healthcare facilities, and
key market and demographic information (Leavitt Partners, n.d.). Two data elements from Torch
Insight were provided upon request by Leavitt Partners: 1) referrals between hospitals and other
healthcare facilities based on Medicare claims data aggregated to the facility level, and 2) the
rate of ACO penetration at the county level. The referral data from Torch Insight provides a
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novel way of measuring a SNF’s referral network. Referral data from hospitals to SNFs is used
to construct a measure of referral concentration from hospitals to SNFs that is used as a
dimension for classifying SNFs. There are limitations to the referral data. The Torch Insight data
only includes Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, and if the number of referrals from a
hospital to a SNF is less than eleven in a year, the relationship is excluded to conform with CMS
reporting requirements. ACO penetration also includes only Medicare fee-for-service
beneficiaries.
Additional data sources used in the study provide measures of environmental factors. The
Area Health Resource Files (AHRF) available from the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA) are an aggregation of over 50 data sources and provide many data
elements at the county level including information about health care professions, health facilities,
population characteristics, and hospital utilization. The study uses Rural-Urban Commuting Area
Codes (RUCA) maintained by the United States Department of Agriculture for a more refined
measure of rurality. These codes use measures of population density, urbanization, and daily
commuting to classify census tracts into ten primary levels of metropolitan, micropolitan, small
town, and rural areas. The RUCA data is provided at the zip code level and rolled up to four
levels of rurality: urban, suburban, large rural town, and rural.
The dataset is created by merging annual data from LTCF with annual HCRIS files for
each of four years from 2012 until 2015 by the SNF’s Medicare Provider Identification number.
HCRIS records with fiscal years not corresponding with a calendar year are assigned to a year
based on the year containing the majority days of the fiscal year. Using this method,
approximately 2% of HCRIS records are assigned to a calendar year differing from their fiscal
year. Linked records are merged with Torch Insight data and NHC data by the SNF’s Medicare
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Provider Identification number. AHRF data are merged by the SNF’s County Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) code, and RUCA data is merged by a SNF’s zip code.
Study Sample
The study sample is limited to freestanding, Medicare-certified SNFs reporting Medicare
Cost Reports from 2012 to 2015 (n=56,617). This sample does not include hospital-based SNFs,
which have different cost structures than freestanding SNFs and are not required to submit SNF
HCRIS reports. Consequently, 3,483 observations for 950 hospital-based SNFs were removed
from the LTCF data prior to merging with HCRIS data.
Table 4 describes the stepwise process of removal of observations across all study years
resulting from the merging of data sources and application of exclusion criteria. HCRIS and
LTCF observations are merged by the SNF’s Medicare Provider Identification number and
calendar year. SNFs report financial data to HCRIS for their fiscal year. Approximately 98.4% of
the HCRIS observations were successfully matched with corresponding LTCF data.
The sample is then merged with data from Torch Insight, RUCA, AHRF, and NHC. The
measure of referral concentration (centrality) from Torch Insight’s referral data is constructed
prior to merging with the data sample of SNFs. The next section contains details of how the
referral concentration (centrality) variable is constructed. Medicare Provider Identification
numbers are used to merge the Torch Insight referral measure with the sample, and
approximately 70% of the observations are successfully merged. AHRF data are merged with the
sample by FIPS code and RUCA data are merged by zip code with only 89 unmatched
observations. NHC data are merged by Medicare Provider Identification number with only 18
unmatched observations.
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The single largest loss of observations, approximately 30%, result from merging the
Torch Insight referral concentration variable into the sample. Although using Torch Insight
referral data results in a significant reduction of observations, this measure is crucial to
operationalizing a classification dimension of the cluster analysis. SNF observations unmatched
to Torch Insight referral data are examined separately to identify differences in this group of
SNFs and the final sample of SNFs.
After merging the datasets, additional steps are taken to increase the homogeneity of the
study sample including applying exclusion criteria and reviewing variables for missing or invalid
values. SNFs identified as government-owned facilities, specialty centers, and facilities with less
than ten beds are excluded because forces shaping their market behaviors are likely to differ
from other SNFs. The validity of the remaining observations is then evaluated. Facilities with
fewer than 360 days of financial data reported on the HCRIS reports are excluded. Observations
with missing variables are excluded, and those with an average case mix index greater than 3.0.
Finally, financial measures are calculated, and observations with the lowest and highest one
percent values of the measures of financial performance are trimmed as a step to remove outliers
(Coomer, Ingber, Coots, & Morley, 2017). Overall, 10,604 observations are excluded from the
sample due to sample criteria or missing or inconsistent values. The sample was then balanced
across the four years resulting in a final sample of 18,156 observations representing 4,539 SNFs
per year. Tests of RQ1 and RQ2 are conducted using 2015 data. RQ3 tests utilize data from 2012
and 2015.
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Table 4. Stepwise removal process of study observations across all study years
2012

2013

2014

2015

Total

HCRIS by assigned year

14,117

14,163

14,202

14,135

56,617

LTCF Unmatched
Torch Insight Unmatched
RUCA Unmatched
AHRF Unmatched
NHC Unmatched

115
4,164
25
0
6

150
4,271
23
0
6

265
4,340
22
0
4

381
4,405
19
0
2

911
17,180
89
0
18

Successfully merged

9,807

9,713

9,571

9,328

38,419

401
4
10

378
4
9

372
6
6

397
6
9

1,548
20
34

355
59
158
603
606
157
163
166

359
76
128
559
685
149
164
134

423
123
95
528
626
146
124
131

509
103
78
542
653
138
127
135

1,646
361
459
2,232
2,570
590
578
566

Observations excluded

2,682

2,645

2,580

2,697

10,604

Sample prior to balancing

7,125

7,068

6,991

6,631

27,815

2,586

2,529

2,452

2,092

9,659

4,539

4,539

4,539

4,539

18,156

Merging of data sources

Exclusions
Sample criteria
Govt - Owned
Specialty
Less than 10 beds
Missing/inconsistent values
Fewer than 360 days of data
Missing/Inconsistent Values
Missing Adjusted Readmissions
Missing % Pressure Ulcers
Missing % UTIs
Trim patient margin
Trim total margin
Trim Net Patient Revenue per Bed

Unbalanced observations
Final Sample

Variable Measurement
This section presents how the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are operationalized into
variable measures for conducting descriptive analyses and inferential testing.
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RQ1 and RQ3: cluster dimensions.
RQ1 examines whether a taxonomy of groups exists among SNFs based on their strategic
orientation, corresponding to Hypothesis 1. The conceptual framework of the study predicts that
clusters of SNFs exist based upon dimensions of their scope of business. Informed through
qualitative studies, dimensions of scope of business are identified as: 1) short-stay care versus
long-stay care, 2) complexity of care, and 3) strength of relationships with referring hospitals.
Dimension variables are summarized in Table 5 and operationalized as follows.
Table 5. Description of variables
Construct
RQ1 and RQ3

Variable

Measurement

Source

Cluster Dimensions
Short-stay versus
Long-stay Care

% Medicaid

Continuous variable; Proportion of facility
residents whose primary support is Medicaid.

LTCF

Patient
Complexity

Case Mix Index for
New Admissions

LTCF

Referral
Network

Referral Concentration

Continuous variable; The average Resource
Utilization Group Nursing Case Mix Index (a
measure of the relative intensity of care of
different nursing home populations) for new
admissions.
Continuous variable; An HHI calculation of
referral concentration. A low ratio indicates a
wider referral network, whereas a higher value
indicates a narrower network. See discussion
below for more details.

Continuous variable; Population > 65 divided by
Total Population in the county.
Continuous variable; Per capita income in the
county.

AHRF

Categorical variable to indicate Urban, Suburban,
Large Rural Town, or Rural. Rural Urban
Commuting Area (RUCA) Code assigned based on
the zip code in which the SNF is located.
Continuous variable; Percent change in Medicare
Advantage penetration in county
Continuous variable; Percent of population
covered by an ACO. Only available for 2015.
Continuous variable;
Constructed by summing the squared market share

RUCA

Constructed
from Torch
Insight data

RQ2
Environmental Characteristics
% Population > 65
Per capita income
(000s)
Rurality

% Change in Medicare
HMO Penetration
ACO Penetration
Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index
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AHRF

AHRF
Torch Insight
LTCF

Construct

Variable

Home health
availability / Population
> 65 per 100,000
Organizational Characteristics
Size

Occupancy
Ownership
Chain Affiliation

Measurement
of beds of each SNF in the county. Ranges
between 0 (perfect competition) and 1 (no
competition).
Continuous variable; Number of home health
agencies in a county divided by Population > 65
multiplied by 100,000.

Source

Continuous variable; Number of beds as reported
on the annual OSCAR (imputed from previous
year if missing or implausible).
Continuous variable; Number of occupied beds in
facility divided by the total number of beds.
Binary variable; Indicates whether or not the
facility is for-profit.
Binary variable; Indicates whether or not facility is
part of a chain.

LTCF

Continuous variable; Net patient revenue divided
by total number of beds.
Continuous variable; measured as ratio of net
income to total revenue (net patient revenue plus
total other income).
Continuous variable; measured as ratio of net
income from services to patients to net patient
revenue.
Continuous variable; All payer risk-adjusted
readmission rates.
Continuous variable; Proportion of low-risk longstay residents in the facility with pressure ulcers.
Continuous variable; Proportion of facility
residents with UTIs.

HCRIS/LTCF

AHRF

LTCF
LTCF
LTCF

Outcomes
Revenue/Bed
Total margin

Operating margin

Hospital readmission
rate
Prevalence of pressure
ulcers
Prevalence of urinary
tract infections (UTIs)

HCRIS

HCRIS

LTCF
NHC
NHC

The first strategic dimension, short-stay care versus long-stay care, reflects the focus of a
SNF’s market segment. In nursing home care, market segments are generally delimited as shortstay care or long-stay care. Medicaid is typically the payer for long-term custodial residents,
while short-term stays are the responsibility of Medicare and private payers. A measure of the
proportion of residents whose primary support is Medicaid serves to approximate a SNF’s
pursuit of short-stay versus long-stay residents. This variable comes from the LTCF dataset and
represents the proportion of facility residents whose primary support is Medicaid at the time of
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the annual CASPER survey. In this study, the proportion of Medicaid residents serves as a proxy
estimate of the proportion of long-term custodial residents, indicating the inverse of Medicare
and private payers.
The second strategic dimension, complexity of care, differentiates the types of services
offered in the selected market segments. Nursing home care varies by level of complexity. A
measure of the average CMI of patients at admission serves to approximate a SNF’s pursuit of
patients with lesser or greater health care needs. CMS approximates the complexity of care
required by nursing home patients by applying a classification of Resource Utilization Groups
(RUGs) to each patient as part of the MDS assessment upon admission. CMS uses the RUG
classification for adjusting Medicare payments to reflect patient acuity. The RUG classification
is converted into a Nursing Case Mix Index (NCMI) following CMS guidelines. LTCF provides
the average NCMI for all residents admitted to a facility during the calendar year. Higher scores
indicate a greater level of resident acuity, and thus the need for greater complexity of care.
The third strategic dimension, strength of relationships with referring hospitals, indicates
the relational dynamics of the product-market strategy. A measure of referral concentration is
constructed to approximate the flow of referrals from hospitals to a particular SNF. Leavitt
Partners’ Torch Insight database includes aggregated referrals from individual hospitals to
individual SNFs. Referral patterns from hospitals to SNFs are measured as a concentration of
discharges using a calculation similar to that of a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) (Liao,
Konetzka, & Werner, 2018). The variable of referral concentration is calculated by squaring the
proportion of each hospital’s referrals to a SNF and summing the shares across hospitals that
have generated referrals for a SNF. The variable measures whether a SNF receives referrals from
a wider network of hospitals or from a single hospital. For example, a value of 0.30 indicates that
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referrals are less concentrated and received from multiple hospitals, whereas a value of 1.00
indicates that all referrals of patients come from a single hospital.
This calculated measure of referral patterns has limitations. The data only includes
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries, and if the number of referrals from a hospital to a SNF is
less than eleven in a year, the relationship is excluded from reporting to conform with CMS
reporting requirements. This restriction likely accounts for the unmatched records when merging
Torch Insight referral data during the data sampling process. However, despite limitations in the
underlying referral data, the construct of referral concentration provides a measure of geographic
business scope that managers may strategically control through building relationships with
hospitals.
The same measures of cluster dimensions are applied longitudinally to determine if the
structure of the groups changed over time. RQ3 explores whether the strategic orientation of
SNFs changed over time, corresponding to Hypotheses 3a and 3b.
RQ2: dependent and key independent variables.
RQ2 investigates whether strategic groups of SNFs differ in financial and quality
outcomes, corresponding to Hypotheses 2a and 2b. This study uses three dependent variables to
measure the construct of financial performance and three dependent variables to measure the
construct of quality performance. Dependent variables are summarized in Table 5 and discussed
in the next sections.
SNF Financial Performance. To test the association between strategic groups and
performance outcomes, three different financial performance measures are used as dependent
variables. The first dependent variable of financial performance is revenue per bed. Revenue per
bed is measured as net patient revenue divided by the total number of beds in a facility. This
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measure provides an indication of whether there is sufficient revenue to meet the organization’s
mission and financial goals. The measure is calculated using HCRIS data for net patient revenue
and LTCF data for total number of beds and adjusted to 2015 values using the annual consumer
price index from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The second dependent variable of financial
performance is total margin. Total margin provides an indication of overall profitability (WeechMaldonado et al., 2012). Total margin is measured as the ratio of net income to total revenue.
Total revenue is net patient revenue plus total other income. The measure is calculated using
HCRIS data. The third dependent variable of financial performance is operating margin.
Operating margin removes non-operating revenue and provides a measure of the core business
function (Weech-Maldonado et al., 2012). Operating margin is measured as the ratio of net
income from services to patients to net patient revenue. The measure is calculated using HCRIS
data. Each of these measures allows comparisons across facilities of different size.
SNF Quality Performance. To test the association between strategic groups and quality
outcomes, three different quality measures are used as dependent variables. Because of the
hypothesized differences in the proportions of short-stay and long-stay patients among strategic
groups, one measure is an indicator of short-stay care and two are indicators of long-stay care.
Important considerations when choosing quality measures for study are salience, validity,
and if using more than one measure, lack of correlation (Grabowski, Angelelli, & Mor, 2004).
Since this study examines differences in outcomes associated with strategic group membership,
variance across SNFs is a consideration. An additional aspect to consider when choosing
performance measures is the dimension of quality being assessed. Donabedian’s Quality of Care
Model provides a framework for differentiating quality measures of health care in terms of
structures (S), processes (P), and outcomes (O). Measures of structural quality refer to
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organizational attributes of the setting where the care occurs. Structure can include the physical
structure as well as level of staffing. Process measures attempt to capture the process of care
provided to a patient. Measures of outcomes assess the effects of care provision on a patient's
health (Donabedian, 1966). Development and validation of nursing home quality indicators rely
upon the SPO framework (Zimmerman et al., 1995), and researchers often use Donabedian’s
approach to quality measures to distinguish dimensions of quality in the nursing home setting
(Castle & Ferguson, 2010; Wagner, McDonald, & Castle, 2012; Weech-Maldonado, Pradhan, et
al., 2019). For this study, Donabedian’s framework helps to guide selection of quality measures
that reflect outcomes of care to align with RQ2 concerning the association between quality of
care and membership in a strategic group. Based on these considerations, a measure of 30-day
hospital readmission rates provides an indicator of the quality outcomes for short-stay care
patients, while measures of prevalence of pressure ulcers and urinary tract infections (UTIs)
provide measures of quality outcomes in long-stay residents.
The first dependent variable measuring quality performance is 30-day hospital
readmission rates. Thirty-day readmission rates are considered a measure of quality for shortstay patients (McHugh et al., 2017). Thirty-day hospital readmission rates are currently the only
measure used to evaluate the performance of SNFs in the VBP-SNF program. CMS reports
considerable variation among 30-day readmission rates of SNFs with the best performing
quartile of rates at or below 7.7% and the worst quartile of rates at or above 13.5% in 2016
(Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2018a). The readmission measure used in this study
comes from the LTCF dataset and is the proportion of patients admitted to a SNF who were
readmitted to a hospital directly from the SNF within 30 days of a hospital discharge. The
measure is risk-adjusted and includes unplanned readmissions of all causes.
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The second dependent variable measuring quality performance is the prevalence of
pressure ulcers among low-risk, long-stay residents. The prevalence of pressure ulcers among
nursing home residents has dropped since the early 2000s, however, there are concerns that there
is racial disparity in the prevalence of pressure ulcers (Li, Yin, Cai, Temkin-Greener, &
Mukamel, 2011). Additionally, an increasing rate of obesity among nursing home residents may
increase the risk of pressure ulcers among residents (Cai, Rahman, & Intrator, 2013). Pressure
ulcers contribute to increased morbidity, mortality, and costs of care for patients (Jaul, Barron,
Rosenzweig, & Menczel, 2018; Li et al., 2011), but they are often preventable with appropriate
interventions that require the coordination of care providers (Berlowitz, Bezerra, Brandeis,
Kader, & Anderson, 2000). Some studies have found an improvement in the prevalence of
pressure ulcers among long-stay patients associated with an increase in Medicare census (Gaudet
Hefele et al., 2019; Lepore & Leland, 2015). These findings suggest that increasing focus on
short-stay care, thus greater financial resources, may lead to gains in some measures of quality
for long-stay patients. Grabowski, Angelelli, and Mor (2004) find improvement in prevalence of
pressure ulcers to be associated with higher Medicaid reimbursements. These findings suggest
there may be variation in the quality measures depending on profitability differences among
strategic groups. More profitable strategy groups, or those with higher revenues, may have
greater resources to dedicate to quality improvement activities (Lepore & Leland, 2015). The
measure for the prevalence of pressure ulcers comes from CMS’s NHC data reported for the
second quarter of the year.
The third dependent variable measuring quality performance is the prevalence of UTIs as
a measure of quality outcomes for long-stay patients. UTIs are an adverse outcome that can
likely be prevented with specific assessment and surveillance activities by care providers. In
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addition to increased morbidity and costs of care, treatment of UTIs with antibiotics may
contribute to colonization of multi-drug resistant bacteria (Nelson & Flynn, 2015). Prevention of
UTIs is included as part of the quality domain of infection control in nursing homes. The
measure for prevalence of UTIs in this study comes from CMS’s NHC data reported for the
second quarter of the year. Each quality measure is salient, validated, and there is minimal
correlation between the three measures. The key independent variable of interest in RQ2 is the
strategy group derived from RQ1.
RQ2: control variables.
In addition to the key explanatory variable of membership in a strategy group,
performance of SNFs may be influenced by environmental and organizational factors. To control
for confounding in the regression models in RQ2, seven control variables for environmental
characteristics and four control variables for organizational characteristics are included in the
model. Table 5 lists the variables for analyses, their measure descriptions, and data source.
Environmental factors are chosen to measure munificence, dynamism, and complexity in
a SNF’s environment. Munificence variables capture the demand for services and availability of
resources. The percentage of the population over 65 years of age and per capita income at the
county level from AHRF are included as continuous variables. An area with a greater proportion
of individuals over 65 years of age is likely to have greater demand for SNF services than an area
with a smaller proportion. Higher levels of per capita income are more likely to have Medicare
or private pay patients than areas with lower levels of per capita income. Rurality is estimated as
a categorical variable using the Rural Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) Code assigned based on
the zip code in which the SNF is located. More urban areas are expected to be munificent in
terms of patients and availability of staffing than are more rural areas (Yeager et al., 2014).
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Dynamism in the environment is measured as an indication of change in the nursing
home industry. A change in the level of managed care in the community provides an indication
of fluctuation in payer requirements that may reduce utilization of SNF services or require
participation in a preferred network for patient referrals. Dynamism is measured in two ways: the
annual change in the proportion of Medicare beneficiaries participating in a Medicare HMO, and
the level of Medicare ACO penetration in 2015. Medicare HMO penetration is from AHRF.
ACO penetration is from Torch Insight and only available for 2015. Both are continuous
variables measured at the county level.
Complexity in the environment represents environmental information required for
managers to make strategic decisions (Menachemi, Mazurenko, Kazley, Diana, & Ford, 2012),
and is often conceptualized as competition (Yeager et al., 2014). Complexity is operationalized
in this study as two measures of competition. First, a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is
constructed based on the number of SNF beds in the county using LTCF bed counts. An HHI is
frequently used to measure competition in health care studies (Yeager et al., 2014), and is often
based on the number of beds in a facility in the nursing home literature (Hirth et al., 2017). A
continuous measure is calculated by summing the squared market share of beds of each SNF in
the county, with a range from 0 indicating perfect competition and 1 indicating no competition.
Second, the availability of home health is calculated as the number of home health agencies per
1000 of the population over 65 years of age. The number of home health agencies in a county
and population over 65 years of age are continuous variables from AHRF.
Organizational characteristics included in the model are: size as measured by number of
beds, occupancy rate, for-profit or non-profit ownership, and chain affiliation. Bed size and
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occupancy are continuous variables, and ownership and chain affiliation are binary. The
organizational characteristic measures are from LTCF.
Analytic Approach
Descriptive/preliminary analysis.
Univariate profiles of individual variables and bivariate relationships are used to assess
the quality of the data. The count, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of
individual variables are examined to identify missing or outlying values. For nominal variables,
the frequency of values is examined. Box plots and histograms are used to help identify extreme
values and assess distributive properties of variables. Bivariate relationships of selected variables
are examined through scatterplots and correlation to assess multicollinearity. Variables
demonstrating skewed distribution are assessed for transformation to a normal distribution. The
panel is rebalanced if observations with missing or outlying values are excluded, and excluded
observations are profiled on selected characteristics.
RQ1: empirical model.
A taxonomic analysis is conducted to address whether a typology of groups exists among
SNFs based on their strategic orientation. Cluster analysis is the method most commonly applied
to classify strategic groups (Hair et al., 2006; Shay, 2014; Short, Payne, & Ketchen Jr, 2008). It
is also the method used by Zinn, Aaronson, and Rosko (1994) and Marlin, Sun and Huonker
(1999) to classify SNFs by strategic orientation. The objective of cluster analysis is to classify
members into groups that maximize between-group differences while minimizing within-group
differences.
Cluster analysis is a descriptive technique, and a test statistic does not exist for testing
hypotheses. Critics have raised concerns that stem from “the extensive reliance on researcher
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judgment that is inherent in cluster analysis” (Ketchen & Shook, 1996, pg. 442). Aldenderfer and
Blashfield (1984), Ketchen and Shook (1996), and Hair and colleagues (2006) identify critical
issues faced by researchers conducting cluster analysis and offer suggestions for addressing the
issues. The areas of concern and methods for addressing them in this study are discussed in the
following sections.
Preparing variables for cluster analysis.
Selection of variables. There is wide agreement that the selection of clustering variables
by researchers is fundamental to the analysis. Many scholars agree that basing the choice of
variables in theory provides the best foundation to an analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984;
Bazzoli et al., 1999; Shay, 2014). The selection of clustering dimensions and variables in this
study are guided by the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3.
Detecting Outliers. Identifying and eliminating outliers is important to a cluster analysis
because of the sensitivity of most clustering algorithms to outliers. Univariate and bivariate
procedures are used to detect outliers in the descriptive analysis. A multivariate assessment of
outliers is conducted using a Mahalanobis D2 calculation to measure each observation’s distance
from the mean of all observations. Observations with a D2/df greater than 4 are reviewed as
outliers as recommended by Hair et al (2006).
Standardization. Because cluster analysis seeks to maximize the distance between
groups, variables with greater magnitudes of scale can have more impact on the final solution
than variables measured in smaller scales. Standardizing variables in the cluster analysis gives
each variable equal weight. Aldenderfer and Balshfield (1984) suggest the decision to
standardize variables be made on a case-by-case basis. Ketchen and Shook (1996) propose
conducting the analyses with and without standardized variables and comparing the results.
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Each method can then be assessed to determine if there is inconsistency in the resulting clusters.
This study is conducted with standardized variables and then a second analysis using nonstandardized variables is conducted and assessed for reliability and validity. Z-scores are
commonly used for standardizing variables and are applied to the clustering variables in this
study.
Multicollinearity. In cluster analysis, multicollinearity effectively increases the weight of
a particular construct represented by more than one variable. Multicollinearity must first be
identified and then steps can be taken for correction. A correlation matrix can help identify high
correlation between two variables. Some scholars conducting cluster analysis adhere to detecting
multicollinearity between two or more variables using a variance inflation factor (VIF) (Hair et
al., 2006; Shay, 2014). A VIF score is the inverse of variability not explained by the other
independent variables. A VIF score above 10 is generally considered to indicate
multicollinearity. Should multicollinearity exist, it can be corrected by removing a variable,
using the Mahalanobis distance measure that standardizes and compensates for correlation, or
conducting factor analysis (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). This study evaluates cluster variables for
multicollinearity using VIF scores.
Clustering algorithm.
The clustering algorithm prescribes how observations are partitioned into clusters.
Clustering algorithms are either hierarchical or nonhierarchical. Hierarchical algorithms create
clusters of observations in a tree-like or hierarchical form by either agglomerating or dividing
clusters. In contrast, nonhierarchical algorithms divide observations into an initial set of specified
number of clusters and then allocate observations to clusters based on the nearest centroid (or
center point).
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An agglomerative hierarchical algorithm begins with assuming each observation is a
separate cluster and then aggregates similar observations into larger clusters until there is only
one group. There are five commonly used agglomerative hierarchical methods for distinguishing
similar observations: single linkage, complete linkage, average linkage, centroid method, and
Ward’s method. Single linkage measures the closest pair of members; complete linkage
measures the furthest pair of members; whereas average linkage compares the average of
members in a cluster to determine dissimilarity with other clusters. The centroid method uses the
central member of groups to determine distance. Ward’s method combines clusters by
minimizing the variance within clusters. In Ward’s method “at each step, the two clusters
combined are those that minimize the increase in the total sum of squares across all variables in
all clusters” (Hair et al., 2006, p. 588; Ketchen & Shook, 1996; Shay, 2014).
A method for measuring distance, referred to as a similarity measure in a hierarchical
cluster analysis, is required for comparison of clusters. The common measure of distance is
Euclidean or straight-line distance. A squared Euclidean distance is derived as the sum of the
squared distances and is recommended for Ward’s method.
Each method has its own biases, and the choice of method depends upon the researchers’
goals and knowledge of the dataset (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Some known biases of
cluster algorithms follow. The single linkage method is likely to result in less compact clusters
that are not well delineated. The complete linkage method is biased towards outliers since it
depends on the outer-most observations. The average linkage and centroid methods are less
biased by outliers than the other methods. The centroid method requires interval or ratio scales
and is often used in the physical sciences; it is not used in this study. Ward’s method tends to
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produce clusters of the same size and can be unduly influenced by outliers (Hair et al., 2006;
Ketchen & Shook, 1996; Shay, 2014).
Nonhierarchical algorithms are used for classification when the number of clusters is
predetermined and is also referred to as K-means clustering. Nonhierarchical methods are less
biased by outliers and effectively optimize homogeneity within clusters and heterogeneity
between clusters. One option for conducting cluster analysis is to take a two-step combination of
approaches by first conducting a hierarchical algorithm to determine the number of clusters and
cluster centroids, and then conducting a nonhierarchical analysis using those centroids as starting
points (Hair et al., 2006; Ketchen & Shook, 1996; Shay, 2014).
Ward’s method and squared Euclidean distance are used as the primary clustering method
in this study for identifying the number of clusters. Selecting an algorithm requires assessing
known systemic tendencies and addressing possible drawbacks. Researchers have found Ward’s
method to be the most effective method for determining clusters that are unknown a priori
(Alexander & Morrisey, 1989; Alexander et al., 1996; Shay, 2014; Short et al., 2008). Ward’s
method is popular among social science scholars and has been used in many studies classifying
health care organizations (Bazzoli, Harless, & Chukmaitov, 2017; Bazzoli et al., 1999; Shay &
Mick, 2017; Short et al., 2008), including the classification of SNFs (Marlin et al., 1999; Zinn et
al., 1994). Following Shay’s (2014) methods for comparing algorithms, simple classification
agreement rates and Hubert-Arabie Adjusted Rand Index (ARIHA) scores are used to help
identify an optimal cluster solution. ARIHA scores provide a way of comparing agreement among
cluster solutions through an algorithm that counts pairs of observations similarly classified.
Comparisons are scored between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating perfect agreement.
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Determining number of clusters.
Determining the number of clusters in an analysis is a subjective process. Hair and
colleagues (2006) provide several methods, known as stopping rules, for selecting the optimal
solution and general rules of thumb for consideration. Stopping rules either measure change in
heterogeneity between successive clusters, or directly measure heterogeneity between clusters. A
change in heterogeneity between successive clusters can be detected by looking at the percentage
increase in distance of cluster solutions, increases in change in variance across clusters, or
statistical measures of heterogeneity change for comparison among solutions. An agglomeration
coefficient provides a measure of the distances used to determine when a new cluster is formed.
A commonly used method for identifying increased distance in cluster solutions is to look for
sizable changes in the agglomeration coefficient. Large rates of change in agglomeration
coefficients indicate new clusters. As the change in the agglomeration coefficient declines, the
differences in clusters becomes smaller (Hair et al., 2006).
Generally, optimal cluster solutions eliminate extremely small clusters, and clusters are
significantly different from one another. A dendrogram is a visual representation of the
hierarchical tree of clusters and provides a means of visually assessing the solutions. Ketchen
and Shook (1996) recommend using multiple methods to determine the number of clusters and
assessing the convergence of the solutions, and this study implements that approach through
examination of dendrograms, changes in agglomeration coefficients, and inspection of
agglomeration plots (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Shay, 2014).
Nonhierarchical cluster analysis.
Once the optimal cluster solution is determined, nonhierarchical cluster analysis is used
for classifying SNFs into clusters. There is agreement that while hierarchical clustering methods
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are best suited for determining the structure of the cluster groups, a nonhierarchical method
“optimizes within-cluster homogeneity and between-cluster heterogeneity” (Ketchen & Shook,
1996, p. 446). The respective final cluster centers of the optimal solution are used as seeds for
conducting a K-means nonhierarchical cluster analysis.
Reliability and validity of clusters.
The reliability of the optimal cluster solution is established in two ways. First, the results
of multiple methods of cluster analysis are compared. Additional methods of hierarchical
analysis are conducted including single-linkage, complete-linkage, average-linkage, and centroid
method. Analyses are conducted using standardized and non-standardized variables.
Nonhierarchical clustering is conducted using centroids from the chosen hierarchical analysis
and by using random initial seeds. Results are evaluated for their consistency using the level of
agreement of classification of across clusters and Hubert-Arabie Adjusted Rand Index (ARIHA)
scores. ARIHA scores account for chance classifications and provide a more robust means of
determining the alignment between classifications (Hubert & Arabie, 1985; Shay, 2014).
Second, the sample is randomly split in half to create a training sample and a testing
sample. After a preferred solution of the number of clusters is found for the training sample, a
separate cluster analysis is performed on the testing sample as an additional means of testing the
reliability of the cluster solution (Hair et al., 2006; Ketchen & Shook, 1996; Shay, 2014).
Multiple discriminant analysis is commonly used to assess internal validity of the cluster
solution, allowing “the researcher to study the differences between two or more groups of objects
with respect to several variables simultaneously” (Klecka, 1980, pg. 7). This technique provides
indication of whether the groups in the optimal cluster solution can be statistically discriminated
from one another. The groups identified in the cluster analysis serve as a categorical dependent
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variable and the clustering variables serve as independent variables. The centroid of each
variable for each group is compared for statistical significance. Discriminant analysis can be
used for evaluating differences among groups for validation, or for classifying new observations
into groups as used in RQ3.
Assumptions for conducting multiple discriminant analysis are assessed for validation of
the optimal solution. Sample sizes are expected to have a minimum of 20 observations per group
and per independent variable., Independent variables are assumed to have a normal distribution,
and the dependent variable is assumed to have equal covariance among the defined groups.
Box’s M test is used to evaluate the equality of covariance among the groups (Hair et al., 2006).
In this study, the cluster dimension variable, referral centrality, is expected to have
nonparametric distributions. Some facilities only receive referrals from one hospital. This results
in a high number of observations with values of one. To accommodate the underlying data, a
nonparametric discriminant analysis using the Kth-nearest-neighbor method is conducted (Hair et
al., 2006). The statistical significance of the overall discriminant model is determined by the
Wilks’ lambda measure, and the predictive accuracy of the model is assessed by the number of
observations correctly classified, known as the hit ratio (Hair et al., 2006).
Proportional chance criterion is used to evaluate the hit ratios as recommended by Hair et
al., (2006). This calculation results in the average probability of classification taking into account
all group sizes. Applying this criterion helps to account for observations that could be classified
correctly simply due to chance. Proportional chance criterion is calculated as CPRO = p12 + p22 +
…pn2 where p is the proportion of observations in the respective groups. Levels of classification
are considered acceptable when the hit ratio is at least 25% greater than the proportional chance
criterion calculation (Hair et al., 2006; Shay, 2014).
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Cluster Profiles.
The chosen optimal cluster solution is profiled in two ways. First, the classification
groups are described in terms of the clustering dimensions. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is
conducted to identify differences in the clustering dimensions across the groups.
MANOVA is the preferred method for identifying differences across group means, but in
the absence of equal variance, ANOVA is used to test for differences across the group means of
each variable (Hair et al., 2006). The Welch and the Brown-Forsythe tests are conducted as
alternative tests of significance equality of means among groups when there is variance
heterogeneity (Lix, Keselman, & Keselman, 1996), and Games-Howell tests are used for posthoc pairwise comparisons since there is unequal variance among the groups (Lee & Lee, 2018;
Shay, 2014). This analysis of variance of clustering dimensions, along with multiple discriminant
analysis, contributes to establishing internal validity of the cluster solution.
Second, the classification groups are described in terms of external descriptive variables.
Clusters are profiled in terms of descriptive variables not used to measure cluster dimensions to
better understand the external characteristics of each cluster. Profiles of clusters are assessed
based on theoretical expectations and practical experience (Hair et al., 2006; Ketchen & Shook,
1996). The analysis of external variables, along with performance measures tested in RQ2
contribute to establishing external validity of the cluster solution. Hypothesis 1 is tested by
establishing the existence of an optimal cluster solution.
RQ2: Regression analyses empirical model.
Association of the optimal cluster solution identified in RQ1 is associated with
performance differences is assessed using two methods. First, ANOVA and Games-Howell tests
are used to test for significance of performance differences between groups identified using
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cluster dimensions derived from 2015 data. Second, a multivariate analysis using ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression is conducted to determine if the strategic group is a significant
predictor of outcomes when controlling for other factors. Separate regression models are
estimated for each of the six performance outcomes. The model is:
Outcomei = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Strategy Groupi + 𝛽2ENV𝑖 + 𝛽3ORG𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
where i indexes the SNF, Outcomei is the financial or quality performance variable, Strategy
Groupi indicates strategic group membership in 2015, ENV𝑖 is a vector of covariates of
environmental factors, ORG𝑖 is a vector of covariates of organizational characteristics, and 𝜀𝑖 is
the error term. All models assess 2015 performance measures and use standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity. The significance of strategic group membership associated with outcomes is
assessed to address Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
RQ3: Empirical models.
Classification of 2012 strategy groups.
To test hypotheses in RQ3, the temporal stability of groups is assessed by first classifying
the 2012 observations into the taxonomy of strategy groups developed in RQ1. Discriminant
analysis is used in the cluster analysis to validate the solution. In this part of the study,
discriminant analysis is used for classifying new observations into groups, also known as
predictive classification. Discriminant coefficients from the final cluster solution for 2015 are
used to classify SNFs based on 2012 observations. Simple classification agreement rates and
Hubert-Arabie Adjusted Rand Index (ARIHA) scores are used to estimate how similar strategy
groups are in 2015 and in 2012 to address Hypothesis 3a.
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Characterization of Shifters and Non-Shifters.
SNFs that have shifted from one strategy group to another are identified. Characteristics
of SNFs that are classified in a different strategy group in 2012 versus 2015 (Shifters) are
compared to SNFs consistently classified in the same group (Non-Shifters) using t-tests.
Performance differences.
Performance differences between Shifters and Non-Shifters are compared to assess
whether moving from one strategy group to another strategy group is associated with a
subsequent change in performance to address Hypothesis 3b. First, t-tests are used to test for
differences from 2012 to 2015 performance measures between Shifters and Non-Shifters within
each strategy group.
Then, a more robust test of changes in performance among SNFs shifting strategy is
conducted with a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis. A DID helps to control for
confounding factors while assessing the significance of differences in performance between
Shifters and non-Shifters between 2012 and 2015. DID assumptions include OLS assumptions,
that common shocks occur to treated and untreated groups, and that parallel trends of outcomes
would continue without treatment (Ryan, Burgess, & Dimick, 2015). Common shocks to SNFs
within a strategy group can be assumed. The assumption of parallel trends of outcomes in the
sample of Shifters and Non-Shifters is a considerably stronger assumption. The sample limits
tracking performance prior to 2012. A limitation of this analysis is that the parallel trends
assumption cannot be assessed.
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The OLS model, extended from the model in RQ2 to include DID estimation and fixed
effects is:
Outcomeit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ENV𝑖t + 𝛽2ORG𝑖t + 𝛽3SHIFT𝑖 + 𝛽4POST𝑖t + 𝛽5(SHIFT x POST)𝑖t + µi + 𝜀𝑖t
where SHIFT𝑖 represents SNFs classified as changing strategy sometime between 2012 and 2015
representing the treatment group, and POST𝑖t indicates observations in 2015 after shifting
strategy groups (post-treatment). The interaction between SHIFT𝑖 and POST𝑖t serves as the DID
estimator. Fixed-effects for SNFs allowing for within-facility comparisons while controlling for
time invariant factors is represented by µi. Observations from 2012 are considered pre-treatment.
Each strategy group is modeled separately based upon SNF classifications in 2015, and a model
is run for each performance measure to test whether SNFs that changed strategy groups had
significant differences in performance compared to those that did not. In total, 36 regressions are
run, one for each strategy group for each of six outcome measures. Robust standard errors are
used to account for heteroskedasticity, and the model is clustered at the facility level.
Sensitivity Analyses
This study conducts sensitivity analysis using an alternative measure for patient
complexity as a dimension for classifying SNFs. SNFs with more complex patients require
higher staffing levels (Bostick, Rantz, Flesner, & Riggs, 2006), and staffing levels may represent
the resources required to care for different levels of patient complexity. Cluster analysis is
conducted substituting average direct-care staff hours per resident day for the average CMI of
admitted patients.
Sensitivity analysis is also conducted by using a process measure of quality in addition to
outcome measures of quality. Prevalence of residents with a catheter is a process measure. Use
of catheters elevates the risk of UTIs and functional decline (Weech-Maldonado, Neff, & Mor,
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2003). Zinn et al., (1994) and Marlin et al., (1999) found the prevalence of residents with a
catheter to be associated with a SNF’s membership in a strategic group in their studies.
Summary
This chapter discusses the research design, data sources, study sample, variables, and
analytic approaches used to address the aims of this study. RQ1 and RQ2 are investigated using
cross-sectional data, and RQ3 employs a balanced panel of SNFs over a period of four years.
Cluster analysis is used to identify a taxonomy of SNFs, and regression models are used to test
associations between group membership and performance outcomes. Discriminant analysis is
used to assess the temporal stability of strategic groups, and differences in performance of SNFs
that shifted strategies groups over time is tested. Chapter 5 presents the results of the analyses.
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Chapter 5: Results

This chapter provides the results of the analysis using the data and methodologies
described in Chapter 4. The first section presents descriptive analysis of the study sample. The
second section presents the cluster analysis and a preferred cluster solution for RQ1.
The third section provides the regression results for RQ2. The fourth section presents the
analysis to address RQ3. Sensitivity analyses are provided in the fifth section, followed by a
summary of the chapter.
Results of Descriptive Analysis
Descriptive statistics.
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used for the study years of 2012
and 2015. The three variables selected to operationalize strategic dimensions for classifying
SNFs are examined first. Most patients are supported by Medicaid, with an average of 61.60% in
2012 (SD = 15.22%) and a significantly lower average of 60.79% in 2015 (SD = 15.84%). The
average case mix index (CMI) of patients admitted to a SNF is 1.332 (SD = 0.104) in 2012 and
significantly higher at 1.343 (SD = 0.100) in 2015. The average calculated measure of referral
centrality is 0.780 (SD = 0.251) in 2012 and 0.783 (SD = 0.250) in 2015, but not significantly
different between 2012 and 2015. Referral centrality is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, with a
higher value indicating greater centrality of patient referrals from hospitals. Means and standard
deviations for control variables, performance measures, and additional descriptive variables that
90

are used to profile strategic groups are included in Table 6. Significant differences in means
between 2012 and 2015 are indicated.
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics of study sample for 2012 and 2015

Variable

2012
Mean
(n=4,539)

SD

2015
Mean
(n=4,539)

61.60
1.332
0.780

15.22
0.104
0.251

60.79
1.343
0.783

15.84 ***
0.100 ***
0.250

14.84
43,013

3.77
10,890

16.02
46,840

3.95 ***
13,454 ***

73.25
4.96
14.36
7.43
NA
24.77
0.175

44.27
21.71
35.08
26.22
NA
13.43
0.216

73.21
5.00
14.36
7.43
9.86
29.52
0.180

44.29
21.80
35.07
26.22
9.61
13.85 ***
0.220

24.64

28.20

22.86

25.05 ***

138
87.24
80.80
62.70

56
9.59
39.40
48.40

137
85.79
79.80
64.30

56
10.20 ***
40.10
47.90

87,786
2.53
0.64
18.87

23,364
6.31
9.13
4.71

88,177
1.09
-0.84
17.55

25,465
6.83 ***
9.85 ***
4.39 ***

SD

Classification Variables:
Medicaid %
Avg CMI Admitted Patients
Referral Centrality
Control Variables:
Environmental Characteristics
Munificence Population > 65 %
Per capita income ($)
Rurality (RUCA)
Urban (0,1)
Suburban (0,1)
Large Rural Town (0,1)
Rural (0,1)
Dynamism
ACO Penetration %
Medicare HMO Penetration %
Complexity HHI (SNF Beds)
Home Health Availability /
Population > 65 per 100,000
Organizational Characteristics
Size (# Beds)
Occupancy %
Ownership (FP 0,1)
Chain Affiliation (0,1)
Performance Measures:
Financial
Revenue/Bed ($)
Total Margin %
Patient Margin %
Short-stay
Adj. Hospital Readmissions %
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Variable
Prevalence of Pressure Ulcers
%
Prevalence of Urinary Tract
Infections %
Additional Descriptive Variables:
Medicare %
Observed Median Length of
Stay (Days)
Significance level of * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Long-stay

2012
Mean
(n=4,539)

SD

2015
Mean
(n=4,539)

SD

6.57

4.26

5.83

3.98 ***

7.43

5.09

4.97

4.16 ***

16.91

9.13

16.18

9.04 ***

31.96

13.39

31.09

12.60 ***
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Outliers and distributions of values.
All variables are assessed for outlying values and distributive qualities. The assessment
shows that the sampling process was robust enough to negate the need to remove any outlying
values. Distributive properties are examined and the measures of per capita income, the number
of beds in a SNF, and revenue per bed are transformed to logarithmic scales to achieve a more
normal distribution of data and reduce skewness.
The measure of referral concentration demonstrates a non-normal distribution due to a
large proportion of SNFs receiving referrals from a single hospital (54% in 2015). Having a
referral concentration equal to one may be caused by the geographic location of a SNF in a rural
area where there is only one hospital within a reasonable distance for referrals, limiting the
number of referral partnerships. Alternatively, highly concentrated referrals may reflect a
strategic decision made by a SNF to focus on a single referral relationship, or an inability of a
SNF to develop stronger referral relationships (Lawrence et al., 2018; McHugh et al., 2021;
Shield et al., 2018). To explore the relationship between geographic location and relational
dynamics, levels of referral centrality of one and less than one are stratified by level of rurality in
Table 7. A larger proportion of SNFs with a single referral relationship are in a rural area or
large rural town compared to SNFs with lower levels of referral centrality (10% vs. 4% and 20%
vs. 8%, respectively). However, approximately 70% of SNFs that have a single referral
relationship are in urban or suburban areas, suggesting that geographic location is not the
underlying reason for having a single referral relationship for all SNFs and that relational
dynamics may better explain referral centrality for some SNFs.
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Table 7. Referral centrality by level of rurality in 2015

RUCA
Designation
Urban
Suburban
Large Rural Town
Rural
Total

Total Sample Referral Centrality < 1
3,323 73%
227
5%
652 14%
337
7%
4,539 100%

1,733
95
160
93
2,081

83%
5%
8%
4%
100%

Referral Centrality = 1
1,590
132
492
244
2,458

65%
5%
20%
10%
100%

Excluded observations.
SNFs that were excluded from the sampling process differ from the final sample. The
means of selected variables from the final study sample were compared with mean values from
the observations that were excluded during the sampling process. For 2015, excluded
observations on average have a lower Medicaid census (45.66% vs. 60.79%), lower average CMI
of admitted patients (1.291 vs. 1.343), are smaller (102 beds vs.137 beds), less likely to be for
profit (64.10% vs. 79.80%), and have lower levels of occupancy (79.24% vs. 85.79%). A smaller
proportion of excluded observations are in urban areas (67.84% vs. 73.21%) and approximately
the same proportion are in suburban areas (5.88% vs. 5.00%) and large rural towns (15.19% vs.
14.36%) compared to observations included in the sample. However, a greater proportion of
excluded SNFs are in rural areas (12.09% vs. 7.43%) compared to the sample. More specifically,
observations that were dropped during the merge with the Torch Insight dataset (approximately
4,405 SNFs in 2015) have a higher Medicaid census (65.92% vs. 60.79%), lower average CMI of
admitted patients (1.244 vs. 1.343), are smaller (84 beds vs. 137 beds), less likely to be for-profit
(71.49% vs. 79.80%), have lower levels of occupancy (78.94% vs. 85.79%), and more are in
rural areas (42.87% vs. 21.79%) compared to urban areas.
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This comparison suggests that a large proportion of SNFs excluded from the sample are
smaller in size, serve more short-stay and less complex patients, and are in rural areas. It is likely
that the Torch Insight dataset did not have matching observations for many of these SNFs due to
CMS’s exclusion of small size cell counts of less than eleven if a SNF had less than eleven
patients referred from a particular hospital in a one-year time period. Exclusion of observations
appears to be systematic rather than random, limiting the generalizability of the study.
RQ1: Empirical Analysis
Identifying strategic groups requires first preparing the variables and then conducting the
cluster analysis. Variables selected for classification are assessed for outliers, the need for
standardization, and whether multicollinearity exists. Then, to conduct the cluster analysis,
clustering algorithms are executed, the number of clusters is determined, a nonhierarchical
cluster analysis is run, the reliability and validity of the cluster solution is assessed, and clusters
are profiled.
Preparing variables for cluster analysis.
Selection of variables. The clustering dimensions are guided by the conceptual
framework discussed in Chapter 3. Three scope of business dimensions – market segments, types
of services, and geographic reach – are operationalized as three classification variables – percent
Medicaid, average CMI of admitted patients, and referral centrality.
Detecting Outliers. Most clustering algorithms are sensitive to outliers, making this
assessment an important part of preparation. Univariate analyses used in the descriptive analyses
do not reveal outlying values reflecting the robust sampling process. An additional step often
used in preparing variables for cluster analysis is to calculate Mahalanobis D2 distance measures
for each observation to detect observations with outlying values. The Mahalanobis distance is the
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distance between multiple variables of an observation and the centroid (or mean) of the sample.
Observations with Mahalanobis distances significantly different from the sample mean are
identified as outliers. This measure provides a way of looking at multiple variables
simultaneously to detect outliers while taking into account correlation among variables. The
Mahalanobis measure for each observation is calculated using the three classification variables:
percent Medicaid, average CMI at admission, and referral centrality. The Mahalanobis measure
is squared and then divided by the degrees of freedom. Observations with D2 / df greater than
four are reviewed as outliers (Hair et al., 2006). The analysis indicated there are no outliers
across the observations based on the classification variables.
Standardization. Standardizing variables used in cluster analysis gives each variable
equal weight, preventing variables of greater magnitudes of scale from having a greater impact
than those with measures of smaller scale. Classification variables are standardized using zscores for the main cluster analysis, and an additional analysis is conducted with nonstandardized classification variables as part of the cluster reliability and validation process.
Multicollinearity. Multicollinearity among classification variables would increase the
weight of a particular construct and should be avoided in cluster analysis. A correlation matrix of
the three classification variables is presented in Table 8. The highest level of correlation is
between the average percentage of patients supported by Medicaid and the level of referral
centrality at 0.2172. Though statistically significant, this level of correlation is acceptable for
performing cluster analysis. Variable inflation factor (VIF) scores of cluster variables and control
variables are well below 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a concern (Hair et al., 2006;
Shay, 2014).
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Table 8. Classification variable correlation matrix

% Medicaid

% Medicaid
CMI for New Admissions
Referral Centrality

CMI for New
Admissions

1.0000
(0.0078)
0.2172*

1.0000
-0.1185*

Referral Centrality

1.0000

* Correlations significant at <0.001 level

Cluster analysis.
Clustering algorithm.
The sample for 2015 is randomly split into halves to provide a subset of data for
validation of the results from the training set. In the first stage of the two-stage cluster analysis,
hierarchical cluster analysis is used to determine the optimal number of clusters. Hierarchical
cluster analysis is conducted on the training set using Ward’s method, single linkage, complete
linkage, and average linkage algorithms. Squared Euclidian distance is used in each of the cluster
analyses as a measure of similarity, and all classification variables are standardized using zscores. Results of cluster analysis using split-half data sets and different algorithms are used to
confirm reliability and validity of the chosen cluster solution.
Determining the number of clusters.
Multiple stopping rules are deployed to identify the optimal cluster solution. Stopping
rules provide a way of identifying solutions that maximize heterogeneity between groups and
homogeneity within groups. In agglomerative hierarchical analysis the intent is to stop the
agglomeration of clusters at a point where a parsimonious cluster solution is balanced with one
that provides groups that are granular enough to inform the analysis (Hair et al., 2006).
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Dendrograms, agglomeration coefficients, and agglomeration plots are assessed to help
determine a final cluster solution.
An examination of the dendrograms in Appendix 1 reveals that the Ward’s method
dendrogram appears to have natural breaks of two, five, and six clusters. The complete linkage
dendrogram appears to have natural breaks at two, four, and five clusters. The average linkage
dendrogram appears to have natural breaks at two and three clusters. Average linkage, however,
shows that there are some observations that are not joined until later in the agglomerative
process, potentially resulting in a small cluster size (n=5). The single linkage algorithm displays
a chaining effect that is not informative to the analysis (Hair et al., 2006; Shay, 2014).
Next, incremental changes in the agglomeration coefficients are reviewed to identify
where the largest increases in heterogeneity occur in the agglomeration process. When dissimilar
clusters are merged, the agglomeration coefficient reflects a relatively large change, indicating
“the number of clusters prior to the merger is most appropriate” (Ketchen & Shook, 1996, pg.
446). The visual breaks in the dendrograms of the four hierarchical analyses are evident in the
agglomeration coefficients shown in Table 9. The largest percentage increases in agglomeration
coefficients resulting from the Ward’s method are prior to combining the last two (215%), five
(65%), and six (74%) clusters. A seven-cluster solution also demonstrates a relatively large
percentage increase of 21%, but this solution is not readily visible on the dendrogram.
Agglomeration coefficients from the complete linkage algorithm have the largest percentage
increases prior to combining the last two (71%), four (44%), and five (26%) clusters. Average
linkage has the largest percentage increases in coefficients prior to combining the last two (26%),
three (81%), and six (23%) clusters. The chaining effect is evident in the largest percentage
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increases in coefficients occurring only in the last three agglomerations of two (80%), three
(58%), and four (175%) clusters.
Table 9. Percent change in agglomeration coefficients in hierarchical cluster analyses

Ward's Method
Agglomeration
%
Coef.

CompleteLinkage
Agglomeration %
Coef.

AverageLinkage
Single-Linkage
AgglomAgglomeration %
eration
%
Coef.
Coef.

Clusters
Combined

#
Clusters
Appropriate

10 to 9

10

271.5

2%

18.96

5%

7.8

18%

0.7

3%

9 to 8

9

310.3

14%

19.93

5%

7.9

1%

0.7

4%

8 to 7

8

333.8

8%

23.86

20%

9.3

17%

0.7

4%

7 to 6

7

403.8

21%

27.94

17%

9.8

5%

0.8

3%

6 to 5

6

703.8

74%

28.62

2%

12.1 23%

0.8

1%

5 to 4

5

1,158.7

65%

36.00 26%

12.8

6%

0.8

5%

4 to 3

4

1,231.5

6%

51.86 44%

14.0

9%

2.2

175%

3 to 2

3

1,360.6

10%

56.71

9%

25.3 81%

3.5

58%

2 to 1

2

4,285.6 215%

96.94 71%

31.8 26%

6.3

80%

Note: Bold values indicate larger percentage increases from one step to the next.

Additionally, agglomeration plots are evaluated for each of the hierarchical methods. The
agglomeration plot is another way of examining changes in agglomeration coefficients (on the xaxis) and the number of clusters at a particular level of the coefficient (on the y-axis). A
flattening of the agglomeration curve indicates greater dissimilarity between the clusters being
combined as the distance between coefficients is greater. An “elbow” in the chart results where
the flattening occurs. There can be multiple “elbows” on a chart if there is more than one natural
set of clusters (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). The agglomeration plots shown in Figure 2 are
consistent with the assessments of changes in the agglomeration coefficients and the
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dendrograms. All methods demonstrate a flattening of the agglomeration curve at the two-cluster
solution. Additionally, the plot for Ward’s method displays a flattening of the agglomeration
curve at the five- and six-cluster solutions. A seven-cluster solution is barely perceptible. The
plot for complete linkage demonstrates a flattening of the curve at the four- and five-cluster
solutions. The plot for average linkage displays flattening of the curve at the three- and sixcluster solutions, and the chaining effect is again evident in the single linkage plot with a
flattened curve between two-, three-, and four-cluster solutions.
Figure 2. Agglomeration plots of hierarchical analyses
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Evaluating the dendrograms, percentage of change in agglomeration coefficients, and
agglomeration plots of the different hierarchical cluster analyses indicates support for a twocluster solution. Three-, four-, and seven- cluster solutions are suggested by the single linkage,
average linkage, complete linkage, and Ward’s method, respectively. Five- and six-cluster
solutions are each indicated by two algorithms – five-cluster by Ward’s method and complete
linkage, and six-cluster by Ward’s method and average linkage.
A two-cluster solution is rejected in favor of a solution that can identify heterogeneity
among clusters more granularly. The five- and six-cluster solutions are compared across the
hierarchical algorithms to help determine the validity and reliability of an optimal cluster
solution. The number of cluster members in each cluster for the five- and six-cluster solutions are
shown in Table 10 for each of the hierarchical algorithms. Neither the five- nor six-cluster
solutions demonstrate high levels of agreement between the clustering algorithms as to the
number of members in a particular cluster. The average linkage and single linkage methods
result in most observations being classified into one cluster. However, with most observations in
one cluster in the average linkage and single linkage results, neither solution is informative.
Ward’s method and complete linkage demonstrate 20% agreement in the five-cluster
solution, but only 1% agreement in the six-cluster solution. Likewise, the Hubert-Arabie
Adjusted Rand Index (ARIHA) scores indicate low levels of agreement of classification among
the hierarchical algorithms. The Ward’s method and complete linkage five-cluster solution
ARIHA score is 0.1297 and the six-cluster solution ARIHA score is 0.1719, both low on a range of
0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect agreement. Further, in the five-cluster solution, the size of cluster
3 in the complete linkage method is considerably larger than any of the clusters in the Ward’s
method and the size of cluster 5 is considerably smaller. Similarly, in the six-cluster solution, the

103

size of cluster 4 in the complete linkage method is considerably larger than any of the clusters in
the Ward’s method and the size of cluster 6 is considerably smaller. The difference in sizes of
clusters between the two methods may be explained by the tendency of Ward’s method to
classify observations into more evenly sized clusters.
Table 10. Comparisons of five- and six-cluster solutions

Comparison
Number of Cluster
Members
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Cluster 5
Cluster 6
Total
Cluster Solution Agreement
(%)
Ward's Method
Complete Linkage
Average Linkage
Single Linkage
Hubert-Arabie Adjusted
Rand Index
Ward's Method
Complete Linkage
Average Linkage
Single Linkage

Ward's
Method

Five-Cluster Solution
Complete Average Single
Linkage
Linkage
Linkage

Ward's
Method

386
459
405
276
732
-2258

603
237
1234
164
20
-2258

2196
55
2
3
2
-2258

1
2
2
1
2252
-2258

386
459
405
276
318
414
2258

-20%
17%
32%

20%
-27%
1%

17%
27%
-0%

32%
1%
0%
--

--

-0.1297
0.0031
0.0008

0.1297
-0.0163
0.0057

0.0031
0.0163
-0.1427

0.0008
0.0057
0.1427
--

Six-Cluster Solution
Complete Average
Linkage
Linkage

308
295
237
1234
164
20
2258

2196
55
2
2
1
2
2258

1
2
2
1
2
2250
2258

1%

18%
1%
0%
--

0.0001
0.0062
0.1373
--

1%
17%
18%

-14%
1%

17%
14%
-0%

-0.1719
0.0004
0.0001

0.1719
-0.1373
0.0062

0.0004
0.1373
-0.1373

The convergence of a cluster solution when examining multiple hierarchical methods is
unclear. Five- and six-cluster solutions appear to have the most agreement across hierarchical
methods, but agreement is limited for these solutions. Ward’s method and the complete linkage
method present solutions that have some distribution of members across groups, unlike the
average and single linkage methods. Ward’s method is favored for conducting hierarchical
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Single
Linkage

cluster analysis when clusters are unknown a priori and has been used in the prior classification
of SNFs (Marlin et al., 1999; Shay, 2014; Zinn et al., 1994), therefore, the cluster solutions are
limited to the five- and six-cluster solutions identified in the Ward’s method.
Hair and colleagues (2006) recommend profiling clusters using the clustering variables to
identify the most appropriate cluster solution once a limited number of possible solutions have
been identified. Table 11 summarizes the means of the three classification variables for the fiveand six- cluster solutions found using Ward’s method on the training sample. The only difference
between the two possible solutions is that in the five-cluster solution, cluster 5 contains the
observations that are separated into clusters 5 and 6 in the six-cluster solution. The main
difference in clusters 5 and 6 in the six-cluster solution is the average CMI of admitted patients
(1.41 vs. 1.27). This suggests that cluster 6 represents a strategy group with higher average
complexity of patients. For reference, in 2015, the average case-mix index of SNFs in the top
quartile of Medicare earnings was 1.40 compared to an average case-mix index of 1.31 for SNFs
in the bottom quartile of Medicare earnings (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2017).
The six-cluster solution likely represents a segment of the underlying industry structure that is
important to the analysis and understanding strategies related to case-mix reimbursement
policies. Therefore, the six-cluster solution using the Ward’s method algorithm is the favored
solution from the hierarchical analysis.
Table 11. Means of classification variables of potential cluster solutions in the training sample

Five-Cluster Solution

Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4

# Cluster
Members
386
459
405
276

%
Medicaid
46.77
72.06
70.85
37.33

Avg CMI
Admitted
1.34
1.25
1.42
1.37

Referral
Centrality
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.51
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Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4

Six-Cluster Solution
# Cluster
% Avg CMI
Members
Medicaid
Admitted
386
46.77
1.34
459
72.06
1.25
405
70.85
1.42
276
37.33
1.37

Referral
Centrality
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.51

Five-Cluster Solution

Cluster 5

# Cluster
Members
732

%
Medicaid
64.35

Avg CMI
Admitted
1.35

Referral
Centrality
0.53

Total

2258

60.77

1.34

0.79

Cluster 5
Cluster 6

Six-Cluster Solution
# Cluster
% Avg CMI
Members
Medicaid
Admitted
318
66.62
1.27
414
62.60
1.41

Total

2258

60.77

1.34

Referral
Centrality
0.52
0.53
0.79

Nonhierarchical cluster analysis.
The second stage of the two-stage approach to cluster analysis is conducted using
nonhierarchical clustering methods. The preferred hierarchical solution is used as the basis for
classifying the observations in the training set into clusters using the K-means method. Cluster
centroids from the six-cluster solution identified with the Ward’s method algorithm are used to
seed the K-means nonhierarchical cluster analysis, resulting in high cluster solution agreement of
80.12% and ARIHA = 0.6160.
Reliability and validity of clusters.
Multiple clustering algorithms. Several analyses are conducted to assess the validity of
the clusters in the preferred solution. Table 12 compares some possible cluster solutions with the
final cluster solution identified by applying the two-step cluster analysis method. The final
cluster solution using the K-means nonhierarchical method has a high degree of agreement with
the solution found using the hierarchical Ward’s method on the training sample. The other
solutions, however, demonstrate poor agreement.
Table 12. Comparison of cluster solutions

Comparison
Solution
Ward's Method
Training Sample

ARIHA

Group
1

Group
2

Group
3

Group
4

Group
5

Group
6

Total

338

492

444

257

411

316

2258
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Cluster
Solution
Agreement

Comparison
Solution
Nonhierarchical KMeans on Training
Sample

ARIHA

Group
1

Group
2

Group
3

Group
4

Group
5

Group
6

Total

Cluster
Solution
Agreement

0.6160

386

459

405

276

318

414

2258

80%

Complete Linkage

0.1911

308

295

237

1234

164

20

2258

1%

Average Linkage
Ward's Method –
Non-standardized
variables
Final Cluster Solution
(K-means)
K-Means 1 - random
seeds
K-Means 2 - random
seeds
K-Means 3 - random
seeds

0.0008
0.1293

2196
504

55
487

2
325

2
186

1
594

2
162

2258
2258

15%
19%

676

970

891

529

850

623

4539

0.5732

1013

87

729

645

1196

859

4539

26%

0.5623

1196

715

642

882

1017

87

4539

7%

0.5605

1019

87

712

884

639

1198

4539

8%

Other than the comparison of the Ward’s method and K-means nonhierarchical analysis,
the other six-cluster solutions do not demonstrate a high level of agreement with the final
solution. The complete linkage and average linkage methods have low levels of agreement with
the final K-means solution just as they did with the Ward’s method hierarchical solution. A sixcluster solution resulting from Ward’s method using non-standardized classification variables
also has a low level of agreement with the K-means solution, reflecting the unequal magnitude of
the classification variables. Finally, random solutions are generated to see if the final solution is
better fitted than random classifications of observations. The full sample of the final solution is
compared to non-hierarchical solutions using randomly generated centroids to seed a six-cluster
solution. This is repeated three times because the order of the observations can affect the solution
(Hair et al., 2006; Shay, 2014). Randomly seeded classifications reflect mid-level agreement
with the final solution, suggesting that a similar cluster solution emerges even when starting with
randomly seeded centroids.
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Discriminant analysis. Multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) is often conducted to
determine if the groups in the chosen solution can be statistically discriminated from one another
using the classification variables. The variable defining the cluster solution is the dependent
variable and the classification variables are the independent variables. However, two
assumptions are required: first, a minimum sample size with at least 20 cases per group and 20
cases per independent variable; second, equality of the covariance matrixes of the groups. The
sample size exceeds the minimum requirements for MDA, but equality of covariance matrixes is
unlikely with the non-normal distribution of the referral centrality variable. Box’s M test is
performed to test for equality of covariance among the cluster groups and found to be significant
(p < 0.001), indicating within-group covariance matrixes are unequal and may demonstrate
heteroscedasticity. As the Box’s M test is sensitive to non-normally distributed variables, the
referral centrality variable is the likely cause of the unequal covariance matrixes (Hair et al.,
2006).
A quadratic rather than a linear function of MDA is an alternative method for conducting
MDA that provides more reliability in discriminating groups when there are unequal variances.
Quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA) relies upon quadratic rather than linear functions. QDA
is applied to the test sample of observations classifying clusters using the K-means method
seeded with the centroids from the training sample. The test sample shows a high level of
agreement with the training sample (87.9%) indicating high internal reliability of the solution
between the two samples (ARIHA = 0.7494). Wilk’s lambda indicates significance of the
discriminant model and for each of the classification variables’ discriminant function (p <
0.001). Finally, the hit ratio of 87.9% is more than 25% greater than the proportional chance
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criterion of 13.5%, indicating that the discriminant classification achieved accuracy beyond a
level attributed to chance.
Cluster profiles.
The cluster solution is first tested to determine if the classification variables of groups of
SNFs demonstrate significant differences across groups. Then, groups are profiled by
classification variables and descriptive study variables that are external to the two-stage cluster
analysis to better understand the characteristics of each cluster.
MANOVA is the preferred method for comparing the means of the cluster variables, but
in the absence of equal variance, ANOVA is used to test for differences across the group means
of each classification variable. The Welch and the Brown-Forsythe tests are conducted as
alternative tests of equality of means among groups when there is variance heterogeneity (Lix et
al., 1996). Both the Welch and the Brown-Forsythe tests indicate significant differences among
the groups for each of the three classification variables (p < 0.001).
The Games-Howell test is used for post-hoc pairwise comparisons since there is unequal
variance among the groups (Lee & Lee, 2018; Shay, 2014). Table 13 summarizes the means of
the classification variables and selected descriptive variables, and with how many groups each
cluster significantly differs. The post-hoc pairwise comparisons indicate that all groups differ
significantly on the means of the percent of Medicaid patients and the average CMI of admitted
patients. The mean referral centrality of groups is differentiated by high and low levels. Groups
1, 2, and 3 have similarly high levels of average referral centrality between 0.99 and 1.00, with
groups 2 and 3 demonstrating equivalency, but both differing significantly from group 1. In
contrast, groups 4, 5, and 6 have low levels of referral centrality between 0.50 and 0.53, but do
not differ significantly from one another. In sum, significant differences across groups suggest
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that the cluster analysis identified groups that differ by market segment served, complexity of
admitted patients, and scope of referral networks. Appendix 2 includes charts of trends of the
classification variables for each strategy group from 2012 to 2015.
Table 13. Cluster solution group mean values for classification variables and selected
descriptive variables

Variable
Classification Variables
% Medicaid*
Avg CMI Adm.
Patients*
Referral Centrality*

Group 1
n=676

Group 2
n=970

Group 3
n=891

Group 4
n=529

Group 5
n=850

Group 6
n=623

44.93

all

72.96

all

67.75

all

36.38

all

66.16

all

62.51

all

1.31

all

1.27

all

1.43

all

1.34

all

1.30

all

1.45

all

0.99

all

1.00

1,4,5,6

0.99

1,4,5,6

0.50

1,2,3,5

0.53

1,2,3,4

0.51

1,2,3

17.57

2,3,4,5

10.95

all

14.98

1,2,4,6

25.57

all

14.43

1,2,4,6

18.92

2,3,4,5

28.62

2,3,4

all

27.93

2,3,4,6

29.62

2,3,4,5

152

1,2,3,4

158

1,2,3,4

Descriptive Variables
% Medicare*
Median Length of
Stay*

33.06

Size (# beds) *

120

all

132

% Occupancy*
% For-profit
Ownership*

85.10

4,6

84.26

1,4,5,6

1,5,6

3,4,5,6

32.78
131
85.71

1,4,5,6

1,5,6

2,6

25.99
132
87.12

1,5,6

1,2

86.11

2

87.45

1,2,3

0.62

2,3,5,6

0.87

1,4,5

0.87

1,4,5

0.68

2,3,5,6

0.79

all

0.89

1,4,5

% Chain Affiliation*

0.61

5

0.66

--

0.64

--

0.61

5

0.69

1,4,6

0.62

5

% Suburban

0.05

--

0.06

--

0.05

--

0.03

--

0.05

--

0.05

--

% Rural*

0.09

4,6

0.11

4,5,6

0.09

4,6

0.03

1,2,3

0.06

2

0.05

1,2,3

% Urban*

0.64

4,5,6

0.65

4,5,6

0.67

4,5,6

0.90

all

0.79

1,2,3,4

0.83

1,2,3,4

% Large Rural Town*

0.22

4,5,6

0.19

4,5,6

0.19

4,5,6

0.04

1,2,3,5

0.10

1,2,3,4

0.08

1,2,3

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Superscripts denote which clusters are significantly different; all = significantly different from all 5 other groups;
-- = not significantly different from any other group

A profile for each group is developed to describe the strategic scope of business that is
captured in dimensions used to classify SNFs as part of strategic modeling. Groups are
characterized based on the means of variables in the analysis. The selection of variables for
characterizing strategic groups is informed by the taxonomies of SNFs developed in prior studies
and review of qualitative literature summarized in Chapter 2. To assist in profiling the final
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cluster solution, the group means of selected study variables are classified as Low, Mid, or High
relative to other groups as presented in Table 14. Groups classified as Low or High are
statistically different from those classified as Mid-range. There was no difference in the
percentage of SNFs located in suburban areas among the groups. The strategic groups are
profiled as follows and described in greater detail subsequently:
Group 1: Private Pay Care Focus – Narrow Network
Group 2: Long-stay Care Focus – Narrow Network
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care Focus – Narrow Network
Group 4: Post-Acute Care Focus – Wide Network
Group 5: Intermediate Care Focus – Wide Network
Group 6: High Acuity Care Focus – Wide Network

Table 14. Study variables for profiling strategy groups

Group 1
% Sample

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Group 5

Group 6

15%

21%

20%

12%

19%

14%

% Medicaid

MID

HIGH

MID

LOW

MID

MID

Avg CMI Adm. Patients

MID

LOW

MID

MID

MID

HIGH

Referral Centrality

MID

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

LOW

LOW

% Medicare

MID

LOW

MID

HIGH

MID

MID

Median Length of Stay

MID

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

MID

MID

Size (# beds)

LOW

MID

MID

MID

HIGH

HIGH

% Occupancy

LOW

LOW

MID

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

% For-profit Ownership

LOW

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

MID

HIGH

% Chain Affiliation

LOW

MID

MID

LOW

HIGH

LOW

--

--

--

--

--

--

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

LOW

LOW

Classification Variables

Descriptive Variables

% Suburban
% Rural
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Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Group 5

Group 6

% Urban

LOW

LOW

LOW

HIGH

MID

MID

% Large Rural Town

HIGH

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

MID

LOW

Group 1: Private Pay Care Focus – Narrow Network: This group is distinguished by a
low total proportion of average Medicaid and Medicare patients (63%), suggesting a higher
proportion of private pay patients than other groups, except the Post-Acute Care Focus group.
Complexity of admitted patients and average length of stay are mid-range compared to the other
groups, indicating provision of an intermediate level of care on average. Although the average
referral centrality of this group is statistically different from the most highly concentrated groups,
it is high at 0.99, indicating that most SNFs in this group receive referrals from a single hospital.
On average, these are the smallest facilities based on number of beds and have low levels of
occupancy relative to the other groups. Although a majority of SNFs are for-profit and chain
affiliated, this group has a low proportion of for-profit and chain affiliated SNFs compared to the
other groups. The exceptions are the Post-Acute Care Focus group in the level of for-profit
ownership and the Post-acute Care and High Acuity Care groups in level of chain affiliation.
While the majority of SNFs in this group are in urban areas (64%), this group has a high level of
SNFs located in rural areas and large rural towns (31% in total).
Group 2: Long-stay Care Focus – Narrow Network: This group has the highest
proportion of Medicaid patients, the lowest proportion of Medicare patients, admits the least
complex patients, and has the longest average length of stay – all indicating low acuity custodial
care. On average, SNFs in this group have highly concentrated referral relationships, receiving
most referrals from a single hospital. The size of facilities based on number of beds are midrange and levels of occupancy are low compared to other groups. There are higher levels of forprofit and chain affiliated SNFs in this group. Like the Private Pay Care Focus group, this group
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has a majority of SNFs located in urban areas (65%), and a high level of SNFs located in rural
areas and large rural towns (30% in total). The long-stay care focus group represents the largest
cluster of SNFs.
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care Focus – Narrow Network: On average, this group
has mid-level ranges of the proportion of Medicaid and Medicare patients, and referrals come
from a single hospital. This group has the second highest average CMI for admitted patients and
high lengths of stay indicating long-stay care for more complex patients. The size of the facility
and rates of occupancy are neither high nor low compared to the other groups. Like the Longstay Care Focus group, the rates of for-profit and chain affiliated SNFs are high in the group.
And, like the Long-stay Care Focus and Private Pay Care Focus groups, there are high levels of
SNFs located in rural areas and large rural towns (28%) compared to the other groups.
Group 4: Post-Acute Care Focus – Wide Network: This group has the highest average
Medicare census and lowest average Medicaid census indicating that SNFs in this group serve a
high level of short-stay post-acute care patients relative to the other groups. The total of the
average of Medicaid and Medicare is the lowest of any group (62%), suggesting a higher
proportion of private pay patients than the other groups, with the exception of the Private Pay
Care Focus group (63%). Admitted patients are in a mid-range of complexity based on average
CMI and have the shortest median length of stay, also in accordance with a high level of postacute care patients. On average, this group has a wide referral network, receiving patient referrals
from multiple hospitals. While this group is in the mid-range of size based on number of beds,
they have the highest level of occupancy indicating high demand for services. Although a
majority of SNFs are for-profit and chain affiliated, this group has a low proportion of each
compared to the other groups, except the Private Pay Care Focus group in the level of for-profit
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ownership and the Private Pay and High Acuity Care Focus groups in level of chain affiliation.
Similarly, a majority of SNFs in each group are located in urban areas, but this group has the
highest proportion of urban SNFs (90%). The Post-Acute Care Focus group represents the
smallest cluster of SNFs.
Group 5: Intermediate Care Focus – Wide network: This group has mid-range levels
of the proportion of Medicaid and Medicare patients compared to the other groups. The average
CMI of admitted patients is also mid-range and referral concentration for this group is low,
indicating relationships with multiple hospitals. Lengths of stay are mid-range. This group is not
distinguished by any one metric and thus is characterized as having an Intermediate Care Focus.
Patients with an intermediate level of care generally require more than custodial care, but not the
same level of care required for the most complex patients. On average, SNFs in this group are
larger and have higher levels of occupancy. The level of for-profit ownership is mid-range
compared to other groups, but the level of chain affiliation is high. Like the other groups, a
majority of SNFs are in urban areas, but this group is also in the mid-range of locations in large
rural towns.
Group 6: High Acuity Care Focus – Wide Network: Average levels of Medicaid and
Medicare patients are mid-range for this group; however, this group admits more complex
patients than any other group. On average, SNFs in this group receive referrals from multiple
hospitals, are large facilities, and have high levels of occupancy. Lengths of stay are mid-range.
There is a high level of for-profit ownership, but low levels of chain affiliation compared to the
other groups. This group is second only to the Post-Acute Care Focus group in urban locality.
The profiles presented validate the six-cluster solution of the two-stage cluster analysis.
The taxonomy confirms Hypothesis 1: there are differences among subsets of SNFs based on the
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average proportion of long-stay care patients, complexity of admitted patients, and the strength
of referral relationships with hospitals. Profiles based on strategic dimensions operationalized as
classification variables and descriptive variables relevant to the industry identify a taxonomy of
strategic groups of SNFs. A comparison of the strategic groups of SNFs found in this study and
strategic groups found in the Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin et al. (1999) studies is presented in
Chapter 6. For ease, strategy groups are referred to without the full description of their network
centrality in the following analyses, or simply with (N) for narrow or (W) for wide.
RQ2: Empirical Analysis
First, differences in performance between strategy groups are tested with ANOVA and
Games-Howell post-hoc tests and results are presented in Table 15. The greatest differences
between strategy groups are in the financial performance measures. Average revenue per bed
differs significantly among each of the strategy groups, with the Post-Acute Care group having
the highest revenue per bed ($110,000), followed by High Acuity ($98,095), Private Pay
($91,654), Intermediate Care ($86,193), Long-stay Complex ($85,818), and the Long-stay Care
group has the lowest revenue per bed ($75,066). Patient margins are highest in the High Acuity
(1.34%) and Long-stay Complex (0.75%) groups and lowest in the Private Pay (-2.42%), PostAcute (-2.17%), Long-stay (-1.61%), and Intermediate (-1.13%) groups. Total margins are
highest in the High Acuity (2.55%) and Long-stay Complex (1.87%) groups, at mid-range in the
Post-Acute (1.35%), Private Pay (1.14%), and Intermediate (0.49%) groups, and lowest in the
Long-stay (-0.20%) group.
There are some differences among strategy groups in quality measures. The short-stay
measure of adjusted 30-day readmissions is highest in the Long-stay (17.99%), Intermediate
(17.97%), High Acuity (17.61%), and Long-stay Complex (17.59%) groups, and lowest in the
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Post-Acute (17.14%) and Private Pay (16.58%) groups. The prevalence of pressure ulcers is
lowest in the Private Pay (5.03%) and Post-Acute (5.64%) groups, and highest in the High
Acuity (6.34%), Long-stay Complex (6.03%), Long-stay (5.94%), and Intermediate (5.89%)
groups. Variation in the prevalence of UTIs is not wide. The highest rate is in the Private Pay
(5.43%) group, and lowest in the High Acuity (4.70%) group with equivalent rates in the Longstay (4.87%), Long-stay Complex (4.92%), Post-Acute (5.26%), and Intermediate (4.79%)
groups.
Table 15.Cluster solution group mean values for performance measures

Variable
Net Patient
Revenue/Bed*

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Group 5

Group 6

n=676

n=970

n=891

n=529

n=850

n=623

$91,654

all

$75,066

all

$85,818

all

Patient Margin*

-2.42

3,6

-1.61

3,6

0.75

1,2,4,5

Total Margin*
Adj 30-day
Readmissions*

1.14

2,6

-0.20

1,3,4,6

1.87

2,5

16.58

2,3,5,6

17.99

1,4

% Pressure Ulcers*

5.03

2,3,5,6

% UTIs*

5.43

5,6

17.59

1

5.94

1

6.03

1

4.87

--

4.92

--

$110,000

all

$86,193

all

$98,095

-2.17

3,6

-1.13

3,6

1.34

1,2,4,5

1.35

2,6

0.49

3,6

2.55

1,2,4,5

17.14

2,5

17.97

1,4

17.61

5.64

6

5.26

--

1

5.89

1

6.34

1,4

4.79

1

4.70

1

* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
Superscripts denote which clusters are significantly different; all = significantly different from all 5 other groups;
-- = not significantly different from any other group
Group 1: Private Pay Care Focus – Narrow Network
Group 2: Long-stay Care Focus – Narrow Network
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care Focus – Narrow Network
Group 4: Post-Acute Care Focus – Wide Network
Group 5: Intermediate Care Focus – Wide Network
Group 6: High Acuity Care Focus – Wide Network

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is performed to assess whether measures of
financial and quality performance are associated with membership in a particular strategic group
while controlling for other factors. The OLS model is estimated for each of the outcome
measures with the outcome as the dependent variable and membership in a strategic group as the
key independent variable of interest. Variables representing environmental and organizational
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all

characteristics are included to control for possible confounding factors, and standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 16 shows the main results from the OLS regressions for financial outcomes, and
Table 18 includes results for quality outcomes. Membership in a strategic group is coded as a
dummy variable to allow for each strategic group to vary in level in relationship to the dependent
variable. Differences of membership in a strategic group are interpreted relative to the base
reference group of Private Pay Care Focus. The Private Pay Care Focus group serves as the
reference group as it may be less directly impacted by policy changes made by Medicare or
Medicaid (Grabowski et al., 2011).
Table 16. OLS Regression results for financial performance

Variable

Group 1: Private Pay Care Focus (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care Focus (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care
Focus (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care Focus (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care Focus (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care Focus (W)
% Population > 65
Per Capita Income (log)
Urban
Suburban
Large Rural Town
Rural
% Medicare HMO Penetration
ACO Penetration
HHI (SNF beds)
Home Health Availability /
Pop > 65 (per 100,000) (log)
# Beds (log)
% Occupancy

Natural log of Revenue
per Bed
Std.
Coef.
Err.
ref
-0.138 ***
0.010

Patient Margin

-0.026
0.133
-0.041
0.070

*
***
***
***

0.011
0.014
0.011
0.011

1.265
-0.608
-0.265
1.533

0.003
0.193
0.068
0.011
-0.003
ref
-0.002
0.001
-0.080

***
***
***

0.001
0.013
0.014
0.019
0.013

***
***

0.000
0.000
0.019

0.063
-1.111
0.272
-1.408
-0.133
ref
0.016
-0.004
2.325

-0.041
-0.075
0.012

***
***
***

0.003
0.010
0.000

-0.142
0.749
0.127
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Std.
Err.

Coef.
ref
-1.099

Total Margin

*

0.532

ref
-1.980

*

0.520
0.724
0.573
0.535

0.053
-0.204
-1.236
0.505

0.037
0.637
0.645
0.939
0.663

*

0.022
0.015
0.920

0.021
-1.257
0.066
-0.417
-0.098
ref
0.010
-0.010
1.823

***

0.165
0.476
0.014

-0.041
0.389
0.137

*

Std.
Err.

Coef.

***

**

*

0.360
0.359
0.394
0.376
0.383
0.024
0.464
0.525
0.661
0.527

*

0.016
0.011
0.735

***

0.117
0.311
0.011

Variable

Natural log of Revenue
per Bed

For-profit
Chain Affiliated

-0.068
-0.016

***
*

0.009
0.006

Patient Margin
6.972
-0.567

***

0.522
0.313

Total Margin
1.920
-0.876

***
***

Significance at p < 0.05= *, p < 0.01 = **, p < 0.001 = ***

Revenue per bed. Net patient revenue per bed was associated with membership in each of
the strategy groups. Net patient revenues per bed, the dependent variable, is a natural log
requiring the regression coefficients to be transformed to their exponential value and then the
value of one is subtracted to find the percentage difference estimated for each of the group
variables. The formula is exponent (natural log) – 1. Using this method, the Long-stay, Longstay Complex, and Intermediate groups generate less in net patient revenues per bed relative to
the Private Pay group (-12.91%, -2.54%, and -4.04%, respectively), whereas net patient revenues
per bed are 14.20% higher in the Post-Acute Group and 7.20% higher in the High Acuity Group
compared to the Private Pay Care group, other things constant.
Patient margins. On average, the Long-stay Care group has patient margins 1.099%
lower than the Private Pay Care Group. In contrast, patient margins are 1.265% higher for the
Long-stay Complex Care group and 1.533% higher for the High Acuity group when compared to
the Private Pay Care group, other things constant.
Total margins. Membership in the Long-stay Care group was associated with a total
margin 1.980% lower, and the Intermediate Care had a total margin 1.236% lower than the
Private Pay Care Group, other things constant.
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0.264
0.208

Table 17. Summary of group membership and association with financial performance

Group
Group 1: Private Pay Care Focus (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care Focus (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care Focus (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care Focus (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care Focus (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care Focus (W)

Patient
Revenue
per Bed
-Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive

Patient
Margin
-Negative
Positive
--Positive

Total
Margin
-Negative
--Negative
--

Measures of financial performance are significantly associated with membership in each
strategic group, demonstrating a relationship between strategies and the selected measures of
financial performance. The results from the OLS models, summarized in Table 17, provide some
support for Hypothesis 2a, that membership in a particular strategic group is associated with
financial performance. Compared to the Private Pay Care group, membership in the Long-stay
Care group is negatively associated with each of the financial performance measures. The Longstay Complex Care group is negatively associated with patient revenue per bed, but positively
associated with patient margin. The Post-Acute Care group is positively associated with revenue
per bed, but not with either measure of margins. The Intermediate Care group is negatively
associated with revenue per bed and total margin. Finally, the High Acuity Care Group is
positively associated with revenue per bed and with patient margin. The rate of occupancy was
positively associated with each of the financial measures. Interestingly, for-profit ownership
status was associated negatively with net patient revenue per bed, but positively associated with
patient margin and total margin.
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Table 18. OLS Regression results for quality performance

Variable

Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex
Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)

Adj. 30-day
Readmissions
Coef.
ref
1.138 ***

0.239

Prevalence of
Pressure Ulcers
Std.
Coef.
Err.
ref
0.584 ** 0.198

0.686 **
0.234
1.094 ***
0.496 *

0.237
0.246
0.241
0.245

0.639 **
0.397
0.580 **
0.774 **

Std.
Err.

% Population > 65
-0.035 *
0.016
Per Capita Income (log)
-0.910 **
0.298
Urban
0.707
0.381
Suburban
0.021
0.453
Large Rural Town
0.083
0.376
Rural
ref
% Medicare HMO Penetration
0.023 *
0.010
ACO Penetration
-0.033 ***
0.007
HHI (SNF beds)
-1.430 **
0.529
Home Health Availability /
Pop > 65 (per 100,000) (log)
0.555 ***
0.073
# Beds (log)
0.538 *
0.209
% Occupancy
-0.011
0.007
For-profit
1.352 ***
0.180
Chain Affiliated
-0.363 *
0.146
Significance at p < 0.05= *, p < 0.01 = **, p < 0.001 = ***

0.207
0.238
0.207
0.226

-0.093
-1.007
-0.031
-0.60
-0.763
ref
0.012
-0.024
-0.149

*** 0.015
*** 0.287
0.346
0.418
*
0.330

-0.162
0.567
-0.010
0.773
-0.377

*
*

0.010
*** 0.006
0.438
0.075
0.194
0.006
*** 0.145
*
0.129

Prevalence of UTIs

0.228

-0.359
0.152
-0.203
-0.396

0.239
0.270
0.232
0.248

-0.017
-0.711 *
-0.721
-0.698
-0.253
ref
-0.015
0.009
0.508

0.016
0.280
0.385
0.446
0.375

-0.030
-0.891 ***
-0.002
-0.362 *
-0.536 ***

0.071
0.185
0.006
0.164
0.137

Adjusted 30-day readmissions. Adjusted 30-day readmissions are positively associated
with the Long-stay Care, Long-stay Complex Care, Intermediate Care, and High Acuity Care
groups, indicating worse performance. On average, these groups have higher rates of 30-day
hospital readmissions of 1.138%, 0.686%, 1.094%, and 0.496%, respectively, compared to the
Private Pay Care group, other things constant.
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Std.
Err.

Coef.
ref
-0.419

0.010
0.006
0.495

Prevalence of Pressure Ulcers. All groups, except the Post-Acute Care group,
demonstrate positive association with the prevalence of pressure ulcers among long-stay patients.
Thus, relative to the Private Pay Care group, four of the five strategy groups show worse
performance on pressure ulcers. The Long-stay Care, Long-stay Complex Care, Intermediate
Care, and High Acuity Care groups are associated with higher rates of prevalence of pressure
ulcers of 0.584%, 0.639%, 0.580%, and 0.774%, respectively, compared to the Private Pay Care
group, other things held constant.
Prevalence of UTIs. None of the strategy groups were associated with the prevalence of
UTIs compared to the Private Pay Care group, other things constant at a significance level of p <
0.05. The Long-stay Care group demonstrated a negative association of 0.419% with the
prevalence of UTIs at p = 0.067.
Table 19. Summary of group membership and association with quality performance

Group
Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)

Adj. 30-day
Readmissions
-Positive
Positive
-Positive
Positive

Prevalence of
Pressure
Ulcers
-Positive
Positive
-Positive
Positive

Prevalence of
UTIs
-------

Measures of quality performance are significantly associated with membership in each
strategic group, except for the Post-Acute Care group, demonstrating a relationship between
strategies and the selected measures of quality performance. The results from the OLS models,
summarized in Table 19, provide some support for Hypothesis 2b, that membership in a
particular strategic group is associated with quality performance. The significant associations are
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all positive, indicating worse performance outcomes. Compared to the Private Pay Care group,
membership in the Long-stay Care group, Long-stay Complex Care, Intermediate Care, and High
Acuity Care groups is associated with higher levels of adjusted 30-day readmissions, and
prevalence of pressure ulcers. None of the groups demonstrated a significant association with the
prevalence of UTIs above the threshold of p < 0.05.
RQ3: Empirical Analysis
To assess RQ3, strategy groups for 2012 are classified. Then, SNFs that changed strategy
groups between 2012 and 2015 are compared to SNFs that did not change. Descriptive
differences are presented, followed by an analysis of change in performance over time between
SNFs changing strategy groups and those that did not change strategy groups.
Classification of 2012 strategy groups.
Quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA) provides more reliability in discriminating groups
where there are unequal variances than multiple discriminant analysis and was used in RQ1 to
assess the reliability of the cluster solution. In this part of the study QDA was used to predict the
composition of strategy groups in 2012 based upon the discriminant coefficients from 2015
strategic groups. The level of agreement between the 2012 and 2015 strategic groups is relatively
low. Only 53.3% of SNFs were classified into the same strategic group in 2012 as in 2015 and
the Adjusted Rand Index is low at 0.2016. Table 20 displays a crosstab of the counts and
percentages of SNFs defined in 2015 and identified as belonging to the same groups in 2012.
By examining the percentages of SNFs classified in each group in 2015 compared to
2012, the shifts from one group to another can be discerned. Many of the shifts from one group
to another group are among groups with some resemblance to one another. Generally, Private
Pay, Long-stay, and Long-stay Complex Groups tended to shift from one to another. Similarly,
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Post-Acute, Intermediate, and High Acuity tended to shift from one to another. Some of the
groups may have more in common (organizational resources or environmental pressures) than
others resulting in lower mobility barriers between some groups and movement from one
strategy to another. The Long-stay groups are likely more similar to one another than to the
groups that provide more short-stay care (Post-Acute, Intermediate, and High Acuity Care
groups). Likewise, groups that have a wide referral network (Post-Acute, Intermediate, and High
Acuity Care) may have greater fluidity in strategic decisions regarding preferred markets than
groups with narrow networks. Environmental uncertainty may also facilitate shifting to a
different strategy. These results provide some support for Hypothesis 3a that the composition of
the strategic groups changes over time and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Of note
is that even though there is evidence of a high proportion of fluidity of SNFs between strategy
groups within the sample, the industry structure of the strategy groups between 2012 and 2015 is
relatively stable: Private Pay Care, 14% vs. 15%; Long-stay Care, 23% vs. 21%; Long-stay
Complex Care, 18% vs. 20%; Post-Acute Care, 11% vs. 12%; Intermediate Care, 21% vs. 19%;
and, High Acuity Care, 13% vs 14%.
Table 20. Crosstab of SNFs in 2015 groups and 2012 groups

2012 Groups
Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total 2015

1
2
355
96
108
576
79
136
55
5
64
147
15
10
676
970
Percentages

2015 Groups
3
4
68
72
203
8
438
16
12 291
86
78
84
64
891 529

5
47
127
39
71
463
103
850

6
20
25
93
57
121
307
623

Total 2012
658
1047
801
491
959
583
4539

6
3%

Total 2012
%
14%

2015 Groups
2012 Groups
Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)

1
53%

2
10%
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3
4
8% 14%

5
6%

2012 Groups
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total 2015 %

1
16%
12%
8%
9%
2%
15%

2
59%
14%
1%
15%
1%
21%

2015 Groups
3
4
23% 2%
49% 3%
1% 55%
10% 15%
9% 12%
20% 12%

5
15%
5%
8%
54%
12%
19%

6
4%
15%
9%
19%
49%
14%

Total 2012
23%
18%
11%
21%
13%
100%

Characterization of Shifters and Non-Shifters.
Next, differences from 2012 to 2015 in classification variables, financial measures, and
quality measures are examined by strategy group. Differences are discussed in absolute
percentage points. Means and differences of classification variables across time for the full
strategy group, Shifters, and Non-Shifters are presented in Table 21. T-tests are used to test for
significance of differences from 2012 to 2015 for each group.
Percentage of Medicaid. Overall, there is a decline of 0.81% in Medicaid census among
SNFs from 2012 to 2015, but strategy groups demonstrate different levels of change. In total,
Private Pay and Post-Acute Care groups have a decline of 6.2% and 6.4%, respectively, in their
average percent of Medicaid patients. The reduction in average Medicaid for SNFs that shifted to
Private Pay and Post-Acute Care groups was about twice that amount at 12.0% and 14.1%,
respectively. Overall, Long-stay Care and Intermediate Care groups increased their average
Medicaid census from 2012 to 2015 by 2.3% and 1.6%, respectively, while Shifters had 5.6%
and 3.6% increases, respectively. Shifters into High Acuity Care had a 1.4% increase in
Medicaid. Non-Shifters did not demonstrate as much change with Private Pay and High Acuity
Care, declining by modest amounts of 0.9% and 0.8%, respectively.
Average CMI of Admitted Patients. The overall trend among all groups was an increase
of 0.01 in CMI from 2012 to 2015. Different levels of change were demonstrated with Private
Pay, Long-stay Complex, Post-Acute, and High-Acuity Care groups having increases of 0.02,
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0.04, 0.01, and 0.03, respectively. Long-stay and Intermediate Care had declines in the
complexity of patients admitted with lower average CMIs of 0.1 each. For Shifters, the trend was
similar with Long-stay and Intermediate Care groups having an average decline of 0.04 and 0.03
points, and Long-stay, Post-Acute, and High Acuity care groups increasing in average admitted
CMI by 0.08, 0.01, and 0.06, respectively. For Non-Shifters, each strategy group had an increase
in the average CMI of admitted patients, except for the Long-stay Complex Care group.
Referral Centrality. Overall, strategy groups demonstrated changes in referral centrality
from 2012 to 2015. Private Pay, Long-stay, and Long-stay Complex Care groups increased in
their levels of referral centrality, each by 0.08, and Shifters at twice that amount (0.16, 0.19,
0.18, respectively). Overall, Post-Acute, Intermediate, and High Acuity had declining levels of
referral centrality of 0.09, 0.10, and 0.09, respectively. Shifters into those groups had similar
declines in referral centrality of 0.18, 0.23, and 0.18, respectively. Non-Shifters did not
demonstrate changes in referral centrality.
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Table 21. Classification variable means 2012 and 2015 by Strategy Group, Shifters, and Non-Shifters

Strategy Group Classification
in 2015

2012

Group 1: Private Pay (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)

51.14
70.61
67.62
42.79

Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total

64.60
62.16
61.60

Group 1: Private Pay (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total

1.29
1.28
1.39
1.33
1.30
1.42
1.33

Group 1: Private Pay (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total

0.91
0.92
0.91
0.59
0.63
0.60
0.78

Overall
Shifters - Different Strategy
2015
2015-2012
2012
2015
2015-2012
% Medicaid
44.93
-6.21 ***
58.79
46.76
-12.03 ***
72.96
2.35 ***
66.08
71.66
5.58 ***
67.75
0.13
67.23
67.76
0.53
36.38
-6.41 ***
52.96
38.87
-14.09 ***
66.16
1.56 ***
61.93
65.50
62.51
0.35
60.35
61.79
60.79
-0.81 ***
62.12
60.72
Average CMI of Admitted Patients
1.31
0.02 ***
1.31
1.31
1.27
-0.01 ***
1.31
1.27
1.43
0.04 ***
1.34
1.42
1.34
0.01 **
1.34
1.35
1.29
-0.01 **
1.33
1.30
1.45
0.03 ***
1.37
1.43
1.34
0.01 ***
1.33
1.35
Referral Centrality
0.99
0.08 ***
0.82
0.98
1.00
0.08 ***
0.81
1.00
0.99
0.08 ***
0.82
1.00
0.50
-0.09 ***
0.70
0.52
0.53
-0.10 ***
0.77
0.54
0.51
-0.09 ***
0.71
0.53
0.78
0.00
0.78
0.79

Significance at p < 0.05= *, p < 0.01 = **, p < 0.001 = ***
(N) indicates Narrow Network and (W) indicates Wide Network
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3.57 ***
1.44 *
-1.40 ***
0.00
-0.04
0.08
0.01
-0.03
0.06
0.02
0.16
0.19
0.18
-0.18
-0.23
-0.18
0.01

***
***
*
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Non-Shifters - Same Strategy
2012
2015
2015-2012
44.23
73.71
68.03
34.47

43.28
73.84
67.74
34.34

-0.95 *
0.13
-0.29
-0.13

66.83
64.03
61.15

66.71
63.24
60.85

-0.12
-0.79 *
-0.30 *

1.28
1.25
1.44
1.33
1.28
1.46
1.33

1.30
1.26
1.44
1.34
1.29
1.47
1.34

0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

0.99
1.00
1.00
0.49
0.52
0.49
0.78

0.99
1.00
0.99
0.49
0.51
0.50
0.78

0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.00
-0.01
0.01
0.00

***
*
*
***
*
***

Performance Differences between Shifters and Non-Shifters
To test Hypothesis 3b, whether shifting from one strategy group to another strategy group
is associated with a subsequent change in performance, performance measures for SNFs using
different strategies are compared to those using the same strategy. Means and differences of
financial measures across time for the full strategy group, Shifters, and Non-Shifters are
presented in Table 22, and significance of differences between 2012 and 2015 is noted based on
t-tests. Estimates from a difference-in-differences OLS regression model help identify whether
the trends demonstrated by the SNFs using a different strategy in 2012 compared to 2015 are
significantly different from SNFs using the same strategy from 2012 to 2015 when controlling
for confounding factors. SNFs classified as changing strategy, the Shifters, represent the
treatment group, and SNFs classified in the same strategy group in 2012 and 2015, the NonShifters, serve as the control group. Observations from 2015 are identified as post-treatment, and
observations from 2012 are considered pre-treatment as a change in strategy occurred prior to
2015. Each strategy group was modeled separately based upon strategy group classifications in
2015, and a model was run for each of six performance measures, for a total of 36 regressions.
The assumptions for DID are strong in this analysis, limiting confidence in its findings.
However, the results are supported by the trends visible on charts of performance measures from
2012 to 2015 for Shifters and Non-Shifters included in Appendix 3. The full regression results
for the Private Pay Care group for patient revenue per bed are presented in Appendix 4 as an
example of the regression results.
Revenue per bed. Comparisons remain in the natural logarithm form. Overall, there was
an increase in average revenue per bed across the strategy groups (0.01). Long-stay care,
however, experienced a decline in revenue per bed (-0.02), and the Intermediate Care group did
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not experience a significant change. Among Shifters, there were increases in revenue per bed for
the Long-stay Complex (0.02), Post-Acute (0.04), and High Acuity Care groups (0.03). Shifters
into Long-stay Care had a decline in average revenue per bed, however, Non-Shifters in the
Long-stay Care group did not have a change in revenue per bed. The Non-Shifters in the Private
Pay (0.03) and High Acuity Care (0.02) groups also had increases in revenue per bed from 2012
to 2015. Difference-in-differences estimators indicate that SNFs shifting to a Private Pay or
Long-stay Care strategy experienced a greater decline in revenue per bed (-2.08 % and -2.27%,
respectively) than Non-Shifters. In contrast, Shifters into Long-stay Complex, Post-Acute, and
High Acuity Care groups had a greater increase in revenue per bed than did Non-Shifters
(1.41%, 3.15%, and 1.92%, respectively).
Patient margin. The average patient margin declined for each of the strategy groups from
2012 to 2015. Among the Shifters, the Post-Acute and High Acuity Care groups did not have a
significant decline in patient margin, though the trend was downward, but the other Shifters had
significantly declining margins across the study period. SNFs that did not change strategy groups
also had declines in patient margin, except for the Private Pay Care group, though their patient
margin trended downward. Difference-in-differences estimators indicate that SNFs shifting to a
Long-stay Care strategy had a 1.27% decline in patient margin compared to Non-Shifters. In
contrast, SNFs shifting to a High Acuity Care focus had a 1.32% increase in patient margin
compared to Non-Shifters.
Total margin. In all strategy groups, Shifters, and Non-Shifters experienced an average
decline in total margin. The exception was Shifters into the High Acuity Care group that did not
have a significant decline in total margin, but the trend was downward. Difference-in-differences
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estimators indicate that SNFs shifting to a Long-stay Care strategy experience a 1.23% greater
decline in total margin compared to Non-Shifters in the group.
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Table 22. Financial measure means 2012 and 2015 by Strategy Group, Shifters, and Non-Shifters and Difference-in-differences
estimator
2012

Overall
2015 2015-2012

Same Strategy
2012
2015 2015-2012

DID Estimator
Coef.
SE

Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex
Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total

11.35
11.22

11.38
11.20

11.38
11.18

11.41
11.18

0.03 ***
0.00

-0.021 0.009 *
-0.023 0.006 ***

11.32
11.54
11.33
11.45
11.35

11.66
11.56
11.34
11.47
11.36

***
***

11.34
11.59
11.33
11.49
11.35

11.35
11.60
11.33
11.51
11.36

0.01
0.01
0.00
0.02 **
0.01 ***

0.014
0.031
-0.001
0.019
0.002

Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex
Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)

-1.36
0.29

-2.42
-1.61

-1.06 *
-1.90 ***

11.29 11.31 0.02
11.47 11.51 0.04
11.34 11.34 0.00
11.40 11.43 0.03
11.34 11.35 0.01
Patient Margin
0.58 -0.88 -1.46
0.72 -2.26 -2.98

**
***

-3.11
0.00

-3.80
-1.16

-0.69
-1.16 ***

-0.556 0.759
-1.266 0.503 *

2.15
-0.98

0.75
-2.17

-1.40 ***
-1.19 *

1.61
-0.90

2.70
-1.05

1.00
-2.32

-1.70 ***
-1.27 *

0.649 0.541
-0.100 0.832

Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total

0.70
2.50
0.64

-1.13
1.34
-0.84

-1.83 ***
-1.16 ***
-1.48 ***

***

0.37
3.55
0.42

-1.11
1.91
-0.90

-1.48 ***
-1.64 ***
-1.32 ***

-0.577 0.572
1.320 0.577 *
-0.094 0.253

Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex
Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total

2.41
1.61

1.14
-0.20

-0.041 0.579
-1.230 0.476 *

3.14
2.80
2.17
3.53
2.53

1.87
1.35
0.49
2.55
1.09

Strategy Group Classification
in 2015

Different Strategy
2012 2015 2015-2012
Revenue Per Bed (Log)
0.02 *** 11.33 11.34 0.01
-0.02 *** 11.27 11.24 -0.03 ***
0.34
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.01

***
***
***
***

0.50
-1.99

***
***

-1.11 **
-1.09
***

-1.27 ***
-1.81 ***

1.10 -1.16 -2.26
1.48
0.78 -0.70
0.89 -0.77 -1.66
Total Margin
2.38
1.17 -1.21
2.15 -0.75 -2.90

*
***

2.43
1.24

1.11
0.17

-1.32 ***
-1.07 ***

-1.27
-1.45
-1.68
-0.98
-1.44

2.79
2.87
2.31
2.88
2.54

*
**
***

3.50
2.75
2.05
4.20
2.53

2.00
1.24
0.39
2.85
1.15

-1.50
-1.51
-1.66
-1.35
-1.38

***
***
***
***
***

Significance at p < 0.05= *, p < 0.01 = **, p < 0.001 = ***
(N) indicates Narrow Network and (W) indicates Wide Network
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1.73
1.48
0.60
2.25
1.03

-1.06
-1.39
-1.71
-0.63
-1.51

***

***
***
***
***
***

0.497
0.039
0.238
1.000
0.073

0.006 *
0.010 **
0.007
0.008 *
0.003

0.487
0.559
0.476
0.529
0.209

Means and differences of quality measures across time for the full strategy group,
Shifters, and Non-Shifters are presented in Table 23.
Adjusted 30-day readmissions. All groups, Shifters, and Non-Shifters had significant
absolute declines in adjusted 30-day readmissions from 2012 to 2015. Difference-in-differences
estimators indicate that SNFs shifting to Long-stay Care and Long-stay Complex Care had
greater declines in adjusted 30-day readmissions (0.73% and 0.83%, respectively) than NonShifters. Shifters into the Post-Acute Care group experienced an increase of 1.17% higher in 30day readmissions than Non-Shifters.
Prevalence of pressure ulcers. Most groups had significant declines in the prevalence of
pressure ulcers. Exceptions were the overall Post-Acute Care group not having a significant
change, Shifters into the Post-Acute Care group not having a significant change, and Shifters into
the Intermediate Care group not having a significant change. Difference-in-differences
estimators indicate there are no significant differences between the changes in prevalence of
pressure ulcers between Shifters and Non-Shifters.
Prevalence of UTIs. All groups, Shifters, and Non-Shifters had significant declines in the
prevalence of UTIs from 2012 to 2015. Difference-in-differences estimators indicate that only
SNFs shifting to a Private Pay group experienced a greater decline (-1.18%) than Non-Shifters.
Significant performance differences in SNFs that shifted to a different strategy compared
to Non-Shifters provide mixed support for Hypothesis 3b, that changing from one strategy group
to another strategy group is associated with a subsequent positive change in performance. For
financial performance, Shifters into Post-Acute Care, High-Acuity Care, and Long-stay Complex
strategies experienced positive changes in performance compared to Non-Shifters, however,
Shifters into Private Pay and Long-stay Care groups experienced greater declines in performance
131

compared to Non-Shifters. The comparison of quality measures is also mixed. Shifters into
Long-stay Care and Long-stay Complex Care had greater reductions in adjusted 30-day
readmissions, and Shifters into Private Pay Care had greater reductions in prevalence of UTIs
compared to Non-Shifters of these groups. However, SNFs shifting into the Post-Acute Care
group had higher increases in adjusted 30-day readmissions than Non-Shifters.
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Table 23. Quality measure means 2012 and 2015 by Strategy Group, Shifters, and Non-Shifters and Difference-in-Differences
estimator

Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex
Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total

17.99
19.14

Overall
Different Strategy
2015 2015-2012 2012 2015 2015-2012
Adj. 30-Day Readmissions
16.58 -1.41 *** 18.79 17.02 -1.77 ***
17.99 -1.15 *** 19.37 17.90 -1.47 ***

18.79
18.71
19.16
19.24
18.87

17.59
17.14
17.97
17.61
17.55

Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex
Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total

5.73
6.95

5.03
5.94

-1.20 *** 19.19 17.59 -1.60 ***
-1.57 *** 18.40 17.43 -0.97 ***
-1.19 *** 18.80 17.84 -0.96 ***
-1.63 *** 19.04 17.53 -1.51 ***
-1.32 *** 18.98 17.58 -1.40 ***
Prevalence of Pressure Ulcers (Long-stay)
-0.70 ***
6.03
5.33 -0.70 *
-1.01 ***
6.84
6.01 -0.83 ***

7.15
5.89
6.28
6.98
6.57

6.03
5.64
5.89
6.34
5.83

-1.12
-0.25
-0.39
-0.64
-0.74

Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex
Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)
Total

7.49
7.10
7.53
8.38
6.96
7.60
7.43

Strategy Group Classification
in 2015

2012

***

2012

Same Strategy
2015 2015-2012

DID Estimator
Coef.
SE

17.27
18.98

16.18
18.04

-1.09 ***
-0.94 ***

-0.599 0.409
-0.732 0.347 *

18.38
18.96
19.46
19.45
18.77

17.59
16.90
18.08
17.69
17.52

-0.79
-2.06
-1.38
-1.76
-1.25

-0.825
1.167
0.434
0.210
-0.158

5.46
7.03

4.76
5.90

-0.70 **
-1.13 ***

-0.060 0.377
0.370 0.336

*
***

6.89
5.91
6.24
7.29
6.52

6.07
5.43
5.60
6.46
5.72

-0.82
-0.48
-0.64
-0.83
-0.80

-0.534
0.452
0.616
0.311
0.109

***
***
***
***
***

***

5.43
4.87

7.41
6.00 -1.41
5.88
5.89 0.01
*
6.33
6.22 -0.11
***
6.68
6.22 -0.46
***
6.61
5.96 -0.65
Prevalence of UTIs
-2.06 ***
7.58
5.00 -2.58
-2.23 ***
7.13
4.82 -2.31

***
***

7.40
7.07

5.82
4.91

-1.58 ***
-2.16 ***

-1.182 0.506 *
0.457 0.349

4.92
5.26
4.79
4.70
4.97

-2.61
-3.12
-2.17
-2.90
-2.46

***
***
***
***
***

7.74
8.63
6.81
7.36
7.41

5.13
5.17
4.85
4.32
5.03

-2.61
-3.46
-1.96
-3.04
-2.38

0.101
1.018
-0.383
0.059
-0.072

***
***
***
***
***

7.32
8.08
7.13
7.83
7.45

Significance at p < 0.05= *, p < 0.01 = **, p < 0.001 = ***
(N) indicates Narrow Network and (W) indicates Wide Network
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4.73
5.38
4.72
5.07
4.91

-2.59
-2.70
-2.41
-2.76
-2.54

***
*
**
***
***

0.324 *
0.377 **
0.327
0.320
0.144

***
***
***
***
***

0.341
0.431
0.340
0.380
0.148

0.401
0.608
0.368
0.451
0.177

Sensitivity Analyses
As noted in the Methods chapter, there are several aspects of cluster analysis that are
subjective. Sensitivity analyses were performed to better understand outcomes under different
scenarios. The choice of clustering variables is subjective and greatly impacts a cluster analysis.
Sensitivity analyses are conducted using alternative staffing measures as a proxy for patient
complexity to classify SNFs. First, direct-care staff hours per resident day was substituted for
average CMI of admitted patients in a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method. This
resulted in a six-cluster solution that closely resembled the taxonomic profiles developed using
in the study. Then, RN hours per resident day was substituted as a classification dimension for
average CMI of admitted patients in a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method.
However, three- and five-cluster solutions resulted that did not resemble the study results. The
sensitivity analysis suggests that direct-care staff hours per resident day serves as a better proxy
of average CMI of admitted patients than does RN hours per resident day. Nursing home staffing
levels are based on the acuity level of patients, but other factors may affect specific types of
staffing (Mueller et al., 2006). Average CMI of admitted patients appears to be a more reliable
indicator of complexity of patients than staffing levels.
Choosing a specific quality measure may not provide a full picture of quality of care and
a few additional quality measures were tested for association with membership in a strategy
group to broaden this assessment. Different qualitative measures were tested for association with
membership in a strategic group. There was no association between prevalence of catheters and
strategy group membership. Other measures were associated with group membership, with the
Private Pay Care Group serving as a reference group as follows: the use of restraints was 0.26%
lower in the Post-Acute Care Group; the use of antipsychotic medication was 2.59% higher in
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Long-stay Care, 1.66% higher in Long-stay Complex Care, and 1.14% higher in Intermediate
Care. Increase in help with activities of daily living was 1.32% higher in Long-Stay Care, 1.20%
higher in Intermediate Care, and 0.92% lower in High Acuity Care groups. Except for the
prevalence of catheters, these quality measures also demonstrated an association with
membership in a specific strategic group.
Summary of Results
This chapter presents the results of the methods outlined in Chapter 4. A descriptive
analysis of the study sample is followed by summarized results from analyses to address each of
the study’s three research questions. A two-stage cluster analysis resulted in a typology of six
strategic groups of SNFs (Hypothesis 1). Membership in a particular strategy group was
significantly associated with some financial and quality performance measures (Hypotheses 2a
and 2b). Additionally, there is evidence of the composition of strategic groups changing over
time, and changes in some performance measures for SNFs shifting strategies compared to SNFs
that do not change strategy (Hypotheses 3a and 3b), though the direction of changes in
performance measures is mixed. Sensitivity analyses regarding classification variables and
performance measures are provided.
In the next chapter, these findings are summarized in the context of prior literature and
implications for health policy and theory are explored. The study concludes with a review of its
limitations and suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 6: Discussion

This chapter summarizes and interprets the empirical results presented in Chapter 5. A
summary of the study’s findings is followed by a discussion of the results in the context of prior
studies of strategic modeling of SNFs. The third section discusses the study’s contributions and
implications for policy and theory. The fourth and fifth sections address limitations and future
research, and the last section provides a brief summary.
Summary of Study Findings
Changes in health care policies, competitive factors, and demand for services have added
uncertainty to the environment in which nursing homes operate. This study seeks to better
understand the nursing home industry through strategic group modeling and exploring the
structure-performance link and changes in the structure of the industry over time. Strategic
management theory informs the conceptual framework to explain how environmental and
organizational factors contribute to strategic decision making by managers, which in turn leads to
performance. A series of hypotheses are derived from the conceptual framework and tested.
Support is found for most of the hypotheses. The study’s aims, hypotheses, and results are
summarized in Table 24 and discussed in the following sections.
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Table 24. Summary of study findings

Aim 1: To better understand the behavior of SNFs by classifying SNFs into groups based on their
strategic orientation.
Hypothesis 1:

There are differences among subsets of SNFs based on: 1) the
proportion of long-stay care patients, 2) complexity of
admitted patients, and 3) the strength of referral relationships
with hospitals.

Supported

Aim 2: To examine whether financial and quality outcomes are associated with strategic
orientation.
Hypothesis 2a:

Membership in a specific strategic group of SNFs is
associated with a SNF’s financial performance.

Supported

Hypothesis 2b:

Membership in a specific strategic group of SNFs is
associated with a SNF’s quality performance.

Supported

Aim 3: To evaluate whether SNFs change their strategic orientation during a time of
environmental uncertainty indicating a change in the structure of the nursing home industry.
Hypothesis 3a:

The composition of the strategic groups changes over time.

Hypothesis 3b:

Shifting from one strategy group to another strategy group is
associated with a subsequent positive change in performance.

Supported
Mixed Support

Strategic groups of SNFs
The first aim of the study is to better understand the behavior of SNFs by classifying
SNFs into strategic groups. Strategic group modeling provides a means of identifying groups of
SNFs using similar strategies and helps to identify mobility barriers faced by strategic groups
(Porter, 1979, 1980). An inductive approach is taken to classify SNFs without a priori
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expectations of the number of strategy groups. Two-step hierarchical cluster analysis using
Ward’s method to determine the number of clusters and then the K-means method is used to
classify the sample into groups. Dimensions of scope of business are used for classification to
represent market segment (short-stay or long-stay), services offered (complexity of admitted
patients), and market reach (referral centrality). Using a limited national sample of 2015 data, a
six-cluster solution of groups is found to be valid and reliable. The strategy groups of SNFs are
characterized as: Private Pay Care Focus – Narrow Network, Long-stay Care Focus – Narrow
Network, Long-stay Complex Care Focus – Narrow Network, Post-Acute Care Focus – Wide
Network, Intermediate Care Focus – Wide Network, and High Acuity Care Focus – Wide
Network. This taxonomy of SNFs provides support for Hypothesis 1, that there are differences
among subsets of SNFs based on: 1) the proportion of long-stay care patients, 2) complexity of
admitted patients, and 3) the strength of referral relationships with hospitals. Descriptions of
each of the strategy groups are detailed in Chapter 5.
Structure – Performance Link
The second aim of the study is to examine whether financial and quality outcomes are
associated with strategic orientation. A series of OLS regressions finds that there is an
association between membership in a particular group and some measures of financial or quality
performance in 2015. Table 25 summarizes the statistically significant results from OLS
regressions testing the association of performance measures with membership in a particular
strategic group. A discussion of financial and quality measures for each group follows.
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Table 25. Summary of group membership and association with performance measures

Group
Group 1: Private Pay Care (N)
(reference)
Group 2: Long-stay Care (N)
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care (N)
Group 4: Post-Acute Care (W)
Group 5: Intermediate Care (W)
Group 6: High Acuity Care (W)

Net
Patient
Revenue
per Bed

Patient
Margin

Total
Margin

Adj. 30-day
Readmissions

Prevalence
of Pressure
Ulcers

Prevalence
of UTIs

-Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive

-Negative
Positive
--Positive

-Negative
--Negative
--

-Positive
Positive
-Positive
Positive

-Positive
Positive
-Positive
Positive

-------

Group 1: Private Pay Care Focus – Narrow Network. The Private Pay Focus group
serves as the reference group in the regression analyses as it is less likely to be influenced by
Medicare policy changes. This group has mid-level patient revenue per bed and total margin, but
the lowest patient margin of any group. Interestingly, low patient margins are paired with
stronger quality measures as the Private Pay Care Focus group has the lowest levels of 30-day
readmissions and prevalence of pressure ulcers. Perhaps this group has more incentive to focus
on quality measures to compete effectively for private pay patients, or they may place greater
importance on quality measures compared to other SNFs.
Group 2: Long-stay Care Focus – Narrow Network. For this group, having the highest
rate of Medicaid patients is reflected in having the lowest patient revenues per bed. Patient
revenue per bed and patient and total margins are negatively associated with membership in the
Long-stay Care Focus group, compared to the Private Pay Care group. Lower levels of quality
performance are indicated by positive association with 30-day readmissions and prevalence of
pressure ulcers compared to the Private Pay Care group. This group represents SNFs providing
mostly long-stay custodial care that is not very profitable.
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Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care Focus – Narrow Network. The Long-stay Complex
Care group has the lowest average patient revenue per bed, except for the Long-stay Care group.
Interestingly, membership in the Long-stay Complex Care group is negatively associated with
patient revenue per bed, but positively associated with patient margin, compared to the Private
Pay Care group. Membership in this group is associated with worse quality measures for
prevalence of pressure ulcers compared to the Private Pay Care group. Managers in these SNFs
seem to have the ability to turn a profit on low revenues.
Group 4: Post-Acute Care Focus – Wide Network. The average patient revenue per bed
in the Post-Acute Care Focus group is the highest of the strategy groups. Membership in the
Post-Acute Care group is positively associated with patient revenue per bed compared to the
Private Pay Focus group, however patient margins and total margins are not associated with
membership in the group. Overall, the Post-Acute Care Focus group demonstrates high levels of
quality performance, like the Private Pay Focus group. The Post-Acute Focus Care group seems
to be able to attract high revenue referrals, but perhaps not the most profitable patients. This
could be a result of lack of managerial skill in turning a profit, or a result of accepting less
profitable patients in order to have working referral relationships with multiple hospitals (Shield
et al., 2018).
Group 5: Intermediate Care Focus – Wide Network. Membership in the Intermediate
Care Focus group is negatively associated with patient revenue per bed and total margin
compared to the Private Pay Care Focus group. Membership is associated with worse quality
performance in adjusted 30-day readmissions and the prevalence of pressure ulcers. The
Intermediate Care Focus group appears to be less profitable because these SNFs do not admit
more profitable or more complex patients as do the Private Pay Care, Post-Acute Care, High
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Acuity Care, and Long-stay Complex Care Focus groups. SNFs in the Intermediate Care Focus
group appear not to have a clear strategy, or struggle to effectively execute their strategy.
Group 6: High Acuity Care Focus – Wide Network. The High Acuity Care Focus group
has the second highest average revenue per bed and one of the largest average bed sizes.
Membership in the High Acuity Care Focus groups is positively associated with patient revenues
per bed and with patient margin, but there is not an association with total margin. On average,
this group has worse outcomes for 30-day readmissions and the prevalence of pressure ulcers
compared to the reference group, Private Pay Focus. This is the only group that appears to turn
high revenues per bed into a positive patient margin. Patients of greater acuity can produce more
revenues, and this group seems to be able to manage complex patients more profitably than the
other groups. Poor quality performance may reflect higher acuity patients than the other groups,
or a focus on profitability at the expense of quality.
The results of the OLS regressions provide support for Hypothesis 2a, that membership in
a particular strategy group is associated with financial performance, specifically patient revenue
per bed, patient margin, and total margin. There is also support for Hypothesis 2b, that
membership in a particular strategy group is associated with quality performance, specifically the
prevalence of pressure ulcers.
Shifters versus Non-Shifters
The third aim of the study is to evaluate whether SNFs change their strategic orientation
during a time of environmental uncertainty, indicating a change in the structure of the nursing
home industry. First, strategic groups of SNFs in 2012 are found using discriminant analysis and
changes in the composition of groups between 2012 and 2015 are assessed. Then, performance
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differences between SNFs that have changed strategic groups versus those that have not changed
strategic groups are evaluated with a difference-in-differences model.
The results of the analysis provide support for Hypothesis 3a, that the composition of
strategic groups changes over time. Among strategic groups in the current study, there is stability
in the proportion of strategy groups within the industry from 2012 to 2015, but almost half of
individual SNFs shift from one strategy group to another. This fluidity may be an artifact of
using secondary data to classify SNFs into groups. The averages of payer proportions, patient
complexity, and referral centrality are continuous variables that may fluctuate within ranges that
do not represent a change in managerial strategy, but rather statistically move a SNF from one
group to another that is not meaningful. Nonetheless, SNFs that shift from one strategy group to
another demonstrate some interesting similarities across the strategic groups. Appendix 3
provides charts of performance measures of Shifters and Non-Shifters by group from 2012 to
2015.
SNFs that shift into the Private Pay, Long-stay Complex, Post-Acute, and High Acuity
Care Focus groups have lower average levels of revenue per bed in 2012 than non-shifting SNFs
in those groups. Shifters into the Long-stay Complex and High Acuity Care Focus groups have
lower average patient margins and total margins in 2012. This suggests that SNFs may adapt
their strategic orientation to a strategy that generates greater revenues and better margins. And,
for some SNFs a change in strategic focus is beneficial. Shifting into Long-stay Complex Care
and Post-Acute Care Focus groups is associated with higher revenue per bed.
In contrast, SNFs that shift into Long-stay Care Focus groups have higher average levels
of revenue per bed and higher total margins in 2012 compared to Non-Shifters of these groups.
Moreover, shifting into Long-stay Care Focus is associated with worse financial performance in
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2015 compared to non-shifting SNFs in this group. It seems it would not be in the best financial
interest of a SNF to shift its focus to Long-stay Care. On average, Shifters into the Intermediate
Care Focus group have equivalent financial performance in 2012 and in 2015 with Non-Shifters.
This finding aligns with the mid-range characteristics and performance demonstrated in previous
review of this strategy group.
In sum, support for Hypothesis 3b, that shifting from one strategy group to another
strategy group is associated with a subsequent positive change in performance, is mixed. For
some SNFs, shifting strategies is associated with a subsequent positive change in performance,
but for others shifting is associated with a subsequent negative change in performance, or
equivocal performance.
It is not clear from the current study if shifts from one strategy group to another are
intentional shifts, or if pressures from environmental changes effectively shift SNFs to different
groups. The largest shifts seem to be natural extensions from one focus to another. For example,
the greatest proportion of Shifters is represented by 23% of SNFs classified as Long-stay Care
Focus in 2012 shifting to the Long-stay Complex Care Focus group in 2015 (see Table 20).
Continuing to focus on long-stay care but providing services for more complex patients is a
conceivable shift in strategic focus that may not require major investment. Both groups already
focus on long-stay care and have narrow networks, and only the complexity of patients is
changing. The shift to more complex admissions may be a proactive strategic choice to focus on
a more profitable market segment, or it may be a consequence of external pressures such as
accepting more complex patients to maintain good will in a referral relationship (Shield et al.,
2018).
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In contrast, the groups demonstrating the least amount of shifting from one to another
would require greater adaptation of facilities, staffing, and referral relationships to accommodate
a different market segment. Only 1% of SNFs shift from Post-Acute Care Focus or from High
Acuity Care Focus in 2012 to Long-stay Care Focus in 2015, and only 1% of SNFs shift from
Post-Acute Care Focus in 2012 to Long-stay Complex Care Focus in 2015 (see Table 20). These
shifts indicate a change of focus to a very different market segment and are not immediately
explicable without a better understanding of their circumstances.
More research is required to better understand the intentions and environmental pressures
preceding the shift of SNFs changing from one strategy focus to another. The high level of
fluidity among strategy groups suggests that, in the nursing home industry, mobility barriers may
be low enough to allow movement from group to group more easily than in some other
industries. Changes required in staffing, facilities, or referral relationships to focus on a different
market segment may be accomplished in a relatively short time span, or at least across a threeyear time span. Moreover, it appears there is variation in the height of mobility barriers within
the nursing home industry. Generally, for SNFs that focus on segments of the market with
similar characteristics regarding length of stay, patient complexity, or referral centrality, the
barriers to movement between groups appear to be lower than barriers between groups that focus
on markets that are dissimilar.
Comparison of Strategy Groups with Prior Studies and Industry Trends
Comparison with Prior Studies
Two prior studies used an inductive approach to modeling strategic groups of SNFs,
Zinn, Aaronson, and Rosko (1994) and Marlin, Sun, and Huonker (1999). Each study finds seven
strategic groups of SNFs using hierarchical cluster analyses similar to the analysis in the current
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study. A comparison of the strategic groups from Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin et al. (1999) is
presented in Chapter 2 and the comparison is extended with the addition of the current study.
The strategic groups from this study are added to the comparison with Zinn et al. (1994) and
Marlin et al. (1999) and summarized in Table 26.
Despite differences in samples and years and classification variables, there are six
strategy groups that are consistent in each of the earlier studies and in the current study. The
Post-Acute Care, Private Pay, High Acuity Care, Intermediate Care, Long-stay Care, and Longstay Complex Care Focus groups are clearly defined in each study by distinguishing
characteristics and strongly resemble one another in each study.
In Chapter 2, when comparing the strategy groups from the Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin
et al. (1999) studies, there was a seventh strategy group in each study that does not seem to align
well with any group in the other study (Group E). Interestingly, the group from Zinn et al.
(1994), Low-cost Skilled and Intermediate Care, which does not seem to align with another
group in the Marlin et al. (1999) study, aligns with the Long-stay Complex Care Focus group in
this study. The average case mix of the Zinn study’s Low-cost Skilled and Intermediate Care
group is the same as for their Large Municipal Facilities group. Additionally, though the average
length of stay is in the mid-range, the group has the highest proportion of Medicaid patients,
indicating a high level of long-stay care like the Long-stay Complex Care Focus group in this
study. This suggests that the seven-strategy group solution in Zinn et al. (1994) can be rolled up
into a six-strategy group solution that aligns with the strategy groups in the current study.
However, the Short-term Skilled Nursing group from Marlin et al. (1999) does not appear to
have a similar group in Zinn et al. (1994). Marlin et al. (1999) recognize that even though they
find seven strategy groups like Zinn et al. (1994), there are differences in the taxonomies.
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Therefore, although Marlin et al. (1999)’s Short-term Skilled Nursing group has some similarity
to the Post-Acute Care or Private Pay or Intermediate Care groups in the current study, it is left
as representing a seventh strategy group.
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Table 26. Comparison of strategy groups in the current study, Zinn et al. (1994), and Marlin et al. (1999)

Group

Group
A

Group
B

Group
C

Group
D

Group
E

Group
F

Study

Study
Group
#

Description of Group

% of
Sample

Referral
Centrality

Case
Mix

%
Medicaid

%
Medicare

%
Private
Pay

ALOS

%
ForProfit

%
Chain

Current

Group 4

Post-Acute Care Focus - Wide
Network

12%

LOW

MID

LOW

HIGH

HIGH

LOW

68%

61%

Zinn

Group 1

Medicare Skilled Nursing Care Focus

19%

NA

HIGH

LOW

HIGH

LOW

LOW

79%

NA

Marlin

Group 3

Medicare Skilled Nursing Care Focus

17%

NA

MID

MID

HIGH

MID

LOW

97%

97%

Current

Group 1

Private Pay Focus - Narrow Network

15%

HIGH

MID

MID

MID

HIGH

MID

62%

61%

Zinn

Group 2

Differentiated Focus - Care Continuum

5%

NA

LOW

LOW

LOW

HIGH

MID

5%

NA

Marlin

Group 7

Private Pay and Medicare Focus

6%

NA

MID

LOW

MID

HIGH

LOW

91%

74%

Current

Group 6

High Acuity Care Focus - Wide
Network

14%

LOW

HIGH

MID

MID

MID

MID

89%

62%

Zinn

Group 3

Generic Skilled Nursing Care

18%

NA

HIGH

MID

MID

LOW

MID

59%

NA

Marlin

Group 5

Low-Cost Intermediate Nursing Care

9%

NA

HIGH

MID

MID

MID

LOW

83%

78%

Current

Group 5

Intermediate Care Focus - Wide
Network

19%

LOW

MID

MID

MID

MID

MID

79%

69%

Zinn

Group 4

Low-cost Intermediate

23%

NA

LOW

MID

LOW

LOW

MID

25%

NA

Marlin

Group 6

Intermediate Nursing Care

11%

NA

LOW

HIGH

MID

LOW

MID

86%

72%

Current

--

Marlin

Group 2

Short-term Skilled Nursing Care

20%

NA

MID

MID

MID

MID

LOW

96%

91%

Current

Group 2

Long-Stay Care Focus - Narrow
Network

20%

HIGH

LOW

HIGH

LOW

MID

HIGH

87%

66%

Zinn

Group 6

Low-cost Focus -Care Continuum

19%

NA

LOW

MID

LOW

MID

HIGH

17%

NA

Marlin

Group 1

Low-Cost Skilled Nursing Care

18%

NA

LOW

MID

MID

MID

MID

92%

93%
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Group

Group
G

Study

Study
Group
#

Description of Group

% of
Sample

Referral
Centrality

Case
Mix

%
Medicaid

%
Medicare

%
Private
Pay

ALOS

%
ForProfit

%
Chain

Current

Group 3

Long-stay Complex Care Focus Narrow Network

20%

HIGH

MID

MID

MID

MID

HIGH

87%

64%

Zinn

Group 7

Large Municipal Facilities

3%

NA

MID

HIGH

MID

MID

HIGH

0%

NA

Zinn

Group 5

Low-cost Skilled & Intermediate care

13%

NA

MID

HIGH

MID

LOW

MID

63%

NA

Marlin

Group 4

Long-term Intermediate Nursing Care

19%

NA

MID

HIGH

LOW

MID

HIGH

72%

66%

Note: There are some differences in the measures of the earlier studies and the current study to note. Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin et al. (1999) use
an average CMI whereas this study includes the average CMI of admitted patients. The average CMI in the current study, though lower, has the
same relative levels among strategy groups as the average CMI of admitted patients, and is used for comparison with the prior studies. An estimate
of the proportion of private paying residents is measured differently in each study. In the Zinn et al. (1994) study, a measure of the percentage of
independent living capacity is used to approximate the percentage of private pay patients. In the Marlin et al. (1999) study, percent of private pay
is the number of private pay patient days divided by the total number of patient days. In the current study, the percentage of patient days that are
not Medicaid or Medicare is used to estimate the percentage of private pay patients.
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Using results from the current study and the Zinn et al. (1994) study, the structure of the
industry can be compared across different time periods to identify patterns of change over time.
Marlin et al. (1999) is included in the discussion, but the seventh strategy group in the study
limits comparisons. Conclusions are general and must be considered with the limitation of
comparing samples from different time periods and different states (Pennsylvania and Florida),
and a limited national sample of SNFs. Figure 3 depicts the proportion of each strategy group in
the market in the respective samples.
Figure 3. Comparison of strategy groups across Zinn et al. (1994) and current study
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Industry Trends
Changes in policy and other environmental factors are briefly reviewed to provide some
context for discussing the changes in strategy groups between the 1987 sample of SNFs used in
the Zinn et al. (1994) study and the 2015 sample in the current study. A substantial change in the
reimbursement method for Medicare nursing home patients occurred after the Zinn et al. (1994)
and Marlin et al. (1999) years of study (1987 and 1995, respectively), but prior to the current
study’s timespan. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) implemented PPS for nursing home
care to reduce increases in CMS’s spending on post-acute care. PPS for nursing home care
includes case-mix adjustment based on the Resource Utilization Group III (RUG-III) system,
allowing SNFs to be reimbursed based on use of resources for care of more complex patients
(Konetzka, Yi, Norton, & Kilpatrick, 2004). The implementation of case mix payment by CMS
and its adoption by Medicaid agencies increased access to care for high acuity patients as
intended (Feng, Grabowski, Intrator, & Mor, 2006), while introducing a financial incentive to
provide more care to patients. Health services researchers have found a shift to greater volumes
and intensity of care (Grabowski et al., 2011) and regional differences in care (Bowblis & Brunt,
2014) since the implementation of case mix adjusted PPS. MedPAC reports an increase in
intensive therapy days as a share of total days from 29% in 2002 to 81% in 2014 that is not
related to the frailty of members (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2016). For
instance, there is evidence of “thresholding behavior, which occurs when patients are provided a
certain amount of therapy very close to thresholds resulting in higher reimbursement”
(Prusynski, Frogner, Dahal, Skillman, & Mroz, 2020, p. 1945).
In addition to changes in reimbursement policies, there have been changes in the
dynamics of the nursing home industry since the Zinn et al. (1994) study. The increasing
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availability of substitutes of care and the development of long-term care insurance in the late
1980s have likely contributed to the shifting focus of some SNFs over the last twenty years.
SNFs operate in an industry where there are alternative sources for different levels of care. For
post-acute and high-acuity patients, alternative sites of care are inpatient rehabilitation facilities
(IRFs), long-term acute care hospitals (LTACHs), and home health agencies (HHA). Medicare
introduced prospective payments for SNFs in 1998, for HHAs in 2000, and for IRFs in 2002.
There is evidence of changes in utilization at different sites following the introduction of PPS for
each of these sources of care, with reduction in utilization at a site of care once its respective PPS
was implemented, as well as corresponding increases in utilization at alternative sites of care
(Buntin et al., 2009), confirming the substitutability of these sites. There are fewer IRFs and
LTACHs in the US than SNFs (1,182 IRFs and 391 LTACHs versus 15,052 SNFs in 2015
(Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2017)), but when they coexist in a market, SNFs are
likely to lose some of the post-acute and high acuity patients who would otherwise be referred to
a SNF. The number of HHAs has ebbed and flowed over the years. Between 1997 and 2000 the
number of HHAs decreased by 31%, but between 2000 and 2015 the number of HHAs increased
by 64% to 12,346 agencies (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2017). HHAs can
substitute for SNF care for both short-stay and long-stay patients.
For long-stay care patients, in addition to HHAs, alternative sites of care are assisted
living facilities (ALFs) and continuing care retirement centers (CCRCs) which have grown in
number since the 1990s. There were an estimated 30,200 assisted living providers in 2014
(Cornell, Zhang, & Thomas, 2020) and over 2,000 CCRCs in 2014 (Zebolsky, 2014). Assisted
living offers a less-restrictive setting to private paying residents that may reduce the demand for
private-pay care for less complex, low-care patients of nursing homes (Clement & Khushalani,
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2015; Cornell et al., 2020; Silver et al., 2018). For private pay patients, CCRCs present another
alternative to long-stay care in a nursing home and for patients that require post-acute or highacuity care. Private insurance for long-term care was introduced in the late 1980s.
Approximately 10% of individuals over age 60 owned a long-term care insurance policy in 2000
(Brown & Finkelstein, 2009), however, long-term care insurance has not been widely embraced
(Nixon, 2014). A discussion of each strategy group and some observations about how the group
may have been impacted by trends in the industry follows.
Group A: Post-Acute Care Focus.
In each study, a strategy group emerges that has the highest average proportion of
Medicare patients and one of the lowest average proportions of Medicaid patients, shorter
lengths of stay, and mid to high ranges of average case mix. Likely to be in urban areas, these
SNFs focus on treating patients that are discharged from a hospital who need short-stay
convalescent care. This strategy group appears to be successful at admitting the patients
described as the most desirable referrals in the qualitative studies: short-stay, Medicare or private
paying patients that are low in complexity (Lawrence et al., 2018; Shield et al., 2018). In the
current study, the referral centrality for this group is low, indicating that SNFs that focus on postacute care receive patient referrals from a wide network of hospitals.
Post-Acute Care Focus industry trend. The proportion of SNFs in the Post-Acute Care
Focus strategy groups appears to have declined over time from 19% in Zinn et al. (1994) to 11%
- 12% in both years of the current study. This group has the highest revenues per bed in the
current study and its focus on less complex Medicare patients is what the qualitative literature
concludes is the goal of many SNFs. MedPAC finds that after the implementation of SNF PPS,
medically complex admissions are concentrated among fewer SNFs (Medicare Payment

152

Advisory Commission, 2011). MedPAC’s finding is in accordance with the proportion of SNFs
in the current study being 7% to 8% lower than in SNFs focusing on post-acute care in the Zinn
et al. (1994) study.
MedPAC poses that fewer SNFs serving more complex patients is likely due to higher
payments for rehabilitative therapy and the special resources required to treat more complex
patients. Additionally, some areas may lack IRF or LTAC alternatives resulting in SNFs treating
more acute patients (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2011). This suggests that the
mobility barriers for entry into this segment of the industry have become higher over time in
some markets. Greater levels of resources required to provide complex care is a barrier to entry
while higher reimbursements make focusing on this segment more desirable. In the current
study, SNFs in this strategy group rely upon a wide network of hospital referrals for most of their
patients. Local environmental factors may represent a barrier to entry into this group if a SNF is
not in proximity to multiple hospitals. On the other hand, SNFs in markets without IRFs, HHAs,
or LTACs may not have any competition for post-acute care referrals. Policy changes in
conjunction with the ACA in 2010 incentivizing hospitals to prefer referrals to higher quality
SNFs may have also increased mobility barriers for SNFs seeking to focus on post-acute
patients.
Group B: Private Pay Focus.
Each study has a group that is characterized as having a high average proportion of
private pay patients, mid-level lengths of stay and CMIs. SNFs in the Zinn et al. (1994) Private
Pay Focus group have the lowest average level of Medicaid and highest level of Medicare, and a
majority are in urban areas. The current study has mid-level rates of both payer types compared
to other strategy groups, and though a majority of SNFs in the group are in urban areas, this
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group has a higher proportion of SNFs located in rural areas than other groups. SNFs in the
Private Pay Focus group tend to receive patient referrals from a single hospital and are the
smallest SNFs in terms of bed count.
Private Pay Focus industry trend. The greatest difference in the structure of the industry
over time is the growth in the proportion of Private Pay Focus group members. The proportion
of Private Pay Focus strategy groups increased substantially in the current study (15% in both
2012 and 2015) from the time of the Zinn study (5%). Zinn et al. (1994) does not assess financial
performance, however the Marlin et al. (1999) study includes performance measures. The Private
Pay Care group has the highest level of average profit per bed and operating margin and
demonstrates better quality performance in Marlin et al. (1999). In the current study, the Private
Pay Care group is no longer the most profitable group but has the lowest patient margin and midrange patient revenue per bed and total margin. Instead, the High Acuity Care and Long-stay
Complex Care groups have the highest average patient revenue per bed, patient margin, and total
margin. It is likely that there are multiple market dynamics occurring in the private pay market.
The number of CCRCs has increased over the last twenty years and most CCRCs include a
licensed SNF with patients that are usually private pay (Zebolsky, 2014). In the current study,
almost 20% of the SNFs in the Private Pay Care Focus group are CCRCs, the highest level of
any of the strategy groups. The introduction of long-term care insurance allowing more
individuals to pay for SNF care may also help explain an increase in the proportion of SNFs
focusing on private pay patients.
Group C: High Acuity Care Focus.
In all three studies, this group has the highest average case mix, indicating a focus on
high acuity care patients. The percent of Medicaid and Medicare patients and lengths of stay are
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mid-range in each of the studies in this group. In the Zinn et al. (1994) study, this group includes
many of the hospital-based SNFs. It is not clear if hospital-based SNFs are included in the
Marlin et al. (1999) study, and the current study excludes hospital-based SNFs. This group has
low average levels of referral centrality, indicating referrals are received from multiple hospitals.
High Acuity Care Focus industry trend. The proportion of SNFs focusing on High Acuity
is higher in the Zinn et al. (1994) study (18%) than in the current study (13% in 2014 and 14% in
2015). In the current study, this group has referral relationships with multiple hospitals, has the
highest average patient margin and total margin, and is one of two groups positively associated
with patient or total margins (along with Long-stay Complex Care). Like the Post-Acute Care
Focus group, the increased concentration of SNFs providing care to high acuity patients may
reflect the high resource requirements, making it more difficult for competitors to serve this
market segment. Depending upon the market, SNFs may not face competition for high acuity
referrals. Less competition and higher reimbursements contribute to the High Acuity Care Focus
group being the most profitable group, on average.
Group D: Intermediate Care Focus.
In the current study, this group is not distinguished by any one characteristic and has midrange levels of average percent of Medicaid patients, case mix of admitted patients, length of
stay, and receives referrals from multiple hospitals. Although not as clearly aligned as the other
five strategy groups, each of the earlier studies has a group that can be characterized as providing
intermediate levels care. The Low-cost Intermediate group in Zinn et al. (1994) ranks in the midrange of rates of Medicaid patients and average length of stay like the Intermediate Care Focus
group in the current study. The Intermediate Nursing Care group in Marlin et al. (1999) has
similar mid-level ranges of average percent of Medicare patients and lengths of stay.
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Intermediate Care Focus industry trend. Zinn et al. (1994) find 23% of SNFs focusing on
Intermediate Level Care, which declines to 21-19% in the current study. The Intermediate Care
group appears not to have a care focus, falling in the mid-range of average characteristics
compared to the other strategy groups. This group may represent what Shield et al. (2018)
describe as SNFs that cast a wide net to fill their beds. Consequently, revenues per bed and total
margin are negatively associated with membership in this group.
Group F: Long-stay Care Focus.
A strategy group that clearly focuses on Long-Stay Care is included in each study. SNFs
in this group have high average rates of Medicaid patients, low rates of Medicare or private pay
patients, longer lengths of stay, and low levels of CMI, indicating provision of long-stay
custodial care. In the Zinn et al. (1994) and Marlin et al. (1999) studies, the majority of SNFs in
this group are in rural areas. In the current study, the Long-Stay Care Focus group tends to
receive patient referrals from a single hospital and, while the majority are in urban areas, this
group has a greater proportion of SNFs located in rural areas than the other groups.
Long-Stay Care Focus industry trend. The proportion of Long-Stay Care Focus strategy
groups has been stable across the studies, ranging from 19% in the Zinn et al. (1994) study to 23
– 21%% in the current study. This group focuses on providing long-stay custodial care for
patients that are less complex and are mostly Medicaid patients. In the current study, this group
is the most rural of the strategic groups, though a majority are in urban areas. SNFs in the LongStay Care Focus groups tend to receive referrals from a single hospital, suggesting that
geographic reach or limited referral relationships may deter SNFs from moving to other strategy
groups. The growth of ALFs and HHAs over the last twenty years has likely put downward
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pressure on the profitability of caring for long-stay care patients by diverting some private pay
and low-care patients (Clement & Khushalani, 2015; Cornell et al., 2020; Silver et al., 2018).
Group G: Long-Stay Complex Care Focus.
These groups are similar to the Long-Stay Care Focus groups but have a higher average
case mix compared to the Long-stay Care groups, indicating a greater complexity of care
provided to long-stay patients. On average, in the current study, the Long-stay Complex Care
focus group receives referrals from a single hospital, and a greater proportion of SNFs in this
strategy group are in rural areas compared to most other strategy groups.
Long-stay Complex Care Focus industry trend. The proportions of Long-Stay Complex
Care Focus groups are relatively stable in each study, ranging from 16% in the Zinn et al. (1994)
study to 20% in the current study in 2015. Referral centrality is high on average in this group,
again suggesting that geographic reach or limited referral relationships may deter SNFs from
moving to other strategy groups. On the other hand, this group, along with the High Acuity Care
group, are the only groups positively associated with patient or total margin in the current study.
Having resources to care for more complex patients may act as a barrier to other SNFs seeking to
enter this more profitable market segment, while SNFs in locations without substitutes for care
may not need to compete for referrals.
Study Contributions and Implications
This study provides an updated taxonomy of SNFs incorporating referral patterns that had
not previously been used in strategic modeling of SNFs. Strategic modeling based solely upon
dimensions of scope of business, rather than scope of business and resource deployment as used
in previous studies, resulted in a reliable, valid cluster solution. The findings of this study have
implications for the study referral dynamics between hospitals and SNFs, structural changes in
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the nursing home industry, and policymaking. Theoretical implications are discussed in the next
section.
Referral patterns for Medicare patients from hospitals to SNFs have been studied from
the hospital perspective (Liao et al., 2018), but study of referrals patterns from hospitals to SNFs
from the perspective of SNFs is not evident in the literature. The current study provides a unique
assessment of the relational dynamics between strategy groups of SNFs and referral patterns
from hospitals. The ACA of 2010 includes provisions to incentivize better coordination of postacute care between hospitals and SNFs (Rahman et al., 2018). The expectation of Medicare
programs such as the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement initiatives, and accountable care organizations is to incentivize a strong
relationship between hospitals and post-acute care providers for improved post-acute care
coordination and better patient outcomes (McHugh et al., 2017; Schoenfeld et al., 2016). This
study finds that SNFs that focus on post-acute care and high acuity patients are more likely to
have a wide referral network, except for those focusing on more complex, long-stay patients. The
implications of this are not clear. A recent study by McHugh, Rapp, Mor, & Rahman, (2021)
finds that SNFs with higher concentrations of hospital referrals may admit less complex patients.
Their findings partially align with characterizations of strategy groups found in this study. Two
of the groups with narrow referral networks, Long-stay Care and Private Pay Care, have low
average CMI of admitted patients compared to the other groups. Additionally, this study found
that between 2012 and 2015 referral networks became narrower for SNFs in strategy groups with
narrow networks (Private Pay, Long-stay, and Long-stay Complex Focus groups), and wider for
SNFs in strategy groups with wider networks (Post-Acute, Intermediate, and High Acuity Focus
groups). This an area for further study by researchers, especially since some of the health reform

158

efforts to incentivize stronger relationships between hospital and post-acute care providers have
been in place for over a decade, reducing the uncertainty surrounding those policies. Post-acute
care providers have had time to evaluate the landscape and then develop and implement their
strategies.
This study assesses the composition across a recent three-year time span and finds that
while strategy groups are stable, a large proportion of SNFs appear to shift from focusing on one
strategy to focusing on another. In the current study, some SNFs that shift their scope of business
focus can achieve better financial performance after shifting to a new strategy.
Although there are many limitations in comparing the current study to different studies
modeling strategic groups of SNFs, results are compared to those of two similar studies
conducted over twenty years ago as a basis for analysis of the industry over time. The studies
demonstrate a high level of stability in the characteristics of strategic groups of SNFs. The
commonalities in the strategies employed by SNFs over the last decades points to a limited
number of strategies available to SNFs. Over time, however, the consequences of changes in
reimbursement methods, growth in substitutes, and changing demands are apparent in shifts in
the proportions of SNFs pursuing particular strategies. These shifts among strategy groups
suggest structural changes have occurred within the industry. The implementation of PPS for
hospitals has increased the acuity of SNF patients, but the most acute and least complex patients
may choose alternative locations of care if it is available in the marketplace. Greater mobility
barriers have reduced competition for high acuity patients, resulting in a lower proportion of
SNFs focusing on high acuity care. The most profitable market segment in nursing home care
has shifted from private pay to high acuity patients. In contrast, the proportion of SNFs focusing

159

on private pay patients has increased in the last twenty years, possibly due to the growth in
CCRCs and introduction of long-term care insurance.
As policymakers evaluate the results of the Patient-Driven Payment Model (PDPM) and
other policies, it will be important to understand how the change in reimbursement policy may
impact the industry. In 2019, Medicare made changes to its reimbursement policy to address the
increase in volume and intensity of care that may not be necessary. The PDPM incentivizes
shorter SNF stays with less therapy versus the RUG system incentivizing longer stays and more
therapy (Unruh, Khullar, & Jung, 2020). Initial studies indicate that PDPM has reduced therapy
hours and levels of therapy staffing, particularly among SNFs with higher proportions of
Medicare patients (McGarry, White, Resnik, Rahman, & Grabowski, 2021; Prusynski, Leland,
Frogner, Leibbrand, & Mroz, 2021). Possible unintended consequences of PDPM include
incentivizing SNFs to selectively admit the most acute patients, as they can provide more
services to clinically complex patients. Conversely, incentives for shorter stays and less therapy
may result in patient discharges from SNFs sooner than appropriate (Unruh et al., 2020).
Concerns for patient access to quality providers and the viability of SNFs are ongoing. Strategic
modeling of SNFs provides an intermediate frame of reference for tracking shifts in the industry
that can help policymakers better understand the consequences of policy changes.
This study fills a gap in the literature by providing an updated taxonomy of SNFs. By
building upon previous studies to develop a longitudinal perspective, changes occurring over
time because of environmental changes are more apparent than in a cross-sectional analysis. The
study helps contextualize the findings of quantitative studies that explore the hospital to SNF
referral process. For managers, the study can help them to better understand the nursing home
industry and assess performance consequences of changing strategic focus. This study
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contributes to the foundation for evaluating the strategic focus of SNFs in the future. The
generalizability of the study, however, is limited due the systematic exclusion of some SNFs in
the sampling process.
The COVID-19 pandemic has proven to be a great environmental shock to SNFs. Policy
changes including higher levels of reimbursement for patients are underway. Understanding the
industry structure can help policymakers target funding and policy changes to better prepare
SNFs for future public health emergencies. Subsequent monitoring of the strategic focus of SNFs
can help policymakers determine whether changes in the industry occur as these new policies are
implemented.
Theoretical Implications
Strategic management theory serves as the theoretical underpinning for this study and is
the basis for strategic group modeling. Finding a reliable and valid taxonomy of strategy groups
of SNFs supports the principles of SMT that managers make strategic choices to adapt to
environmental factors and that there may be multiple strategies within an industry (Porter, 1979,
1980; Scott & Davis, 2007). Likewise, variation in performance among strategy groups supports
SMT’s concepts of strategic choices being the primary factor associated with performance and
that some strategies result in better performance than others. This study provides evidence of
strategic adaptation of SNFs shifting to different strategies and such shifts may reflect a lack of
“fit” between a SNF’s strategy and its environment. The question remains, however, whether
SNFs shift because of managerial decisions guiding their respective SNF to shift to a different
strategy (i.e., agency), or whether it is because the environment nudges or even forces some of
them to shift their strategy (i.e., determinism). While SMT helps explain managerial agency in
strategic decisions, it is limited in explaining environmental determinism.
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Future studies of SNF strategy groups can be enhanced by integrating contingency theory
(CT) as a means of exploring and explaining the fit between strategies and environmental and
organizational factors. CT can help explain why some SNFs pursue certain strategic groups. For
example, if a SNF shifts its focus from Long-stay Care to Long-stay Complex Care is it because
of a strategic decision to pursue a more profitable strategy, or could it be because of rising levels
of managed care in the local environment pressuring hospitals to discharge patients ‘sicker and
quicker’ to SNFs, or some other environmental pressure? In sum, SMT provides the theoretical
basis for strategic group modeling. CT can help explain why strategies are selected in the context
of environmental and organizational factors and to conceptualize why particular strategies may,
or may not, result in better outcomes for some organizations.
Limitations
There are several limitations to the study. Perhaps most importantly, this study uses
secondary data for determining the strategic focus of SNFs which may not fully represent the
strategic intent of managers. The comparison of this study with earlier studies may be limited as
the studies use different measures for classifying SNFs. However, the general alignment of
taxonomies helps provide greater confidence in the comparison of the studies.
A large number of SNFs did not match with the Torch Insight dataset and were excluded
from the study. Excluded SNFs are characteristically different from SNFs that are included in the
study and consequently, a segment of the industry may have been systematically excluded from
the analysis. This limits the generalizability of results to facilities that have at least eleven
Medicare patient referrals from a single hospital.
A large proportion of SNFs are part of chain-affiliated organizations (approximately 80%
of this study’s sample). The evidence on the agency of managers to make scope of business
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decisions is mixed. On one hand, managers of chain-affiliated nursing homes have less
autonomy than managers of independent nursing homes (Kruzich, 2005). On the other hand,
managers of chain-affiliated nursing homes often have greater resources to innovate services
(Castle, 2001; Castle & Banaszak-Holl, 1997). This study assumes that managers of SNFs at the
facility level, or at a higher level within the chain, have agency in defining their strategy.
Finally, the choice of comparing changes across the composition of strategy groups over
a three-year period from 2012 to 2015 is driven by the convenience of the dataset rather than
evidence of using a specific timespan. Future research may provide evidence of a more
appropriate timespan for comparing shifts across strategy groups.
Suggestions for Future Research
There are several areas for future study that could enhance the understanding of the
strategic orientation of SNFs. The association of referral concentration and implications for
patients, SNFs, and policy should be explored further as discussed in the Implications of the
Findings section above. Better coordination of hospital and post-acute providers is a continuing
goal and additional insights from the SNF perspective may help uncover barriers or successful
tactics for better patient care.
Policymakers and managers could benefit from strategic modeling of SNFs on a regular
basis to provide a more complete longitudinal record for assessing industry changes. MedPAC,
for instance, identified that the proportion of SNFs treating more acute patients was becoming
more concentrated after SNF PPS case mix reimbursement was implemented (Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission, 2011), but this shift in the industry is better understood in the context of
strategic group analysis. The concept of higher mobility barriers helps explain why there is less
competition in the market segment treating more acute patients, and strategic modeling helps to
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identify alternative strategies on which SNFs may focus. Unintended consequences of policies
may become apparent and adjusted, if needed. Assessing the structure of the industry on a
regular basis would help policymakers to track whether policies such as the PDPM model have
unintended consequences like reducing access to care for post-acute patients in SNFs or reducing
the viability of SNFs focusing on more acute patients. Future studies could achieve greater
validity by incorporating an expert panel composed of industry stakeholders to review findings.
Strategic modeling of SNFs could benefit from using a fuller sample for greater
generalizability. The generalizability of the study is limited as a consequence of merging the
Torch Insight dataset and excluding SNFs that did not have a matching observation. Obtaining a
measure of referral centrality that is available for a greater number of SNFs would strengthen
future studies. Many observations were also lost because of balancing the panel of data across
2012 to 2015. It may be more beneficial to have a more robust cross-sectional sample that can be
compared to analyses from prior years than to have a limited balanced panel of data, but more
work needs to be done assess this.
Another area of future research would be to explore more fully SNFs that shift from one
strategy group to another in comparison to those that do not change strategy. The current study
looks at whether SNFs shifted focus and associated changes in performance. A better
understanding of which SNFs are shifting into specific groups and why they are shifting in terms
of their strategy and organizational characteristics, and whether they are experiencing
environmental changes may provide insights into organizational behavior. As discussed in the
Theoretical Implications section, integrating CT into the conceptual framework of the study can
inform development of hypotheses as to why SNFs shift their strategic focus. While this study
has explored changes in strategic groups over time, it has not tested the fit of strategies of SNFs
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within their environments. Given that organizational structures such as facilities and staffing are
pivotal to implementing strategies, it would be beneficial to draw upon contingency theory to
better explain and test the fit of organizational and environmental factors within each strategy
group.
Finally, applications of more advanced methods of cluster analysis such as application of
significance tests to strategic group modeling (Carroll & Thomas, 2019) or temporal data
clustering looking at changes across time (Atluri, Karpatne, & Kumar, 2018) may add more rigor
to the clustering method and may help elucidate the fluidity with which SNFs shift from one
strategy group to another.
Summary
This study has prioritized describing strategy groups of SNFs that exist within the nursing
home industry, how those strategies are linked to the performance of groups, and whether there
are changes in strategy groups over time. The inclusion of referral dynamics is a unique
contribution to strategic modeling of SNFs. By comparing the taxonomy of strategy groups in
the current study with taxonomies profiled in prior literature, this study establishes the stability
of strategies used by SNFs over the last two decades. There are, however, structural shifts in the
composition of strategy groups. Recommendations for future research include extending the
study to address why shifts in strategies occur.
Managers may benefit from a better understanding of the industry at an intermediate
frame of reference when making strategic decisions to improve performance. Policymakers at the
federal and state levels may benefit from a clearer understanding of how to align the needs of
patients with the availability of SNFs when making policy decisions, with the goal of improving
patient outcomes.
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Appendix 1: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis Dendrograms
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Appendix 2: Measures of classification variables from 2012 to 2015

% Medicaid across groups from 2012 to 2015

% Medicaid
Strategy Groups 2015
2012
2013
Group 1: Private Pay Care *
51.1
50.4
Group 2: Long-stay Care *
70.6
70.6
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care
67.6
67.3
Group 4: Post-Acute Care *
42.8
41.5
Group 5: Intermediate Care*
64.6
64.2
Group 6: High Acuity Care
62.2
62.2
Total*
61.6
61.2
* Difference between 2015 and 2012 significant at p < 0.001
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2014
49.0
70.6
67.2
40.5
64.8
63.2
61.1

2015
44.9
73.0
67.8
36.4
66.2
62.5
60.8

Average CMI of Admitted Patients across groups from 2012 to 2015

Average CMI Admitted Patients
Strategy Groups 2015
2012
2013
Group 1: Private Pay Care*
1.29
1.30
Group 2: Long-stay Care *
1.28
1.28
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care*
1.39
1.40
Group 4: Post-Acute Care*
1.33
1.34
Group 5: Intermediate Care*
1.30
1.30
Group 6: High Acuity Care*
1.42
1.43
Total*
1.33
1.34
* Difference between 2015 and 2012 significant at p < 0.001
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2014
1.30
1.27
1.42
1.34
1.30
1.44
1.34

2015
1.31
1.27
1.43
1.34
1.29
1.45
1.34

Referral Centrality across groups from 2012 to 2015

Strategy Groups 2015

Referral Centrality
2012

2013

Group 1: Private Pay Care*
0.91
0.92
Group 2: Long-stay Care *
0.92
0.94
Group 3: Long-stay Complex Care*
0.91
0.92
Group 4: Post-Acute Care*
0.59
0.57
Group 5: Intermediate Care*
0.63
0.64
Group 6: High Acuity Care*
0.60
0.60
Total
0.78
0.78
* Difference between 2015 and 2012 significant at p < 0.001
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2014

2015

0.93
0.94
0.92
0.55
0.63
0.59
0.78

0.99
1.00
0.99
0.50
0.53
0.51
0.78

Appendix 3: Performance of Shifters and Non-Shifters by group from 2012 to 2015
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Appendix 4: Difference-in-Differences Regression Result Sample

Group 1 Revenue/Bed ($) (in 2015 dollars)
(log)
Coef.
SHIFT (0,1)
POST

Robust
Std. Err.

t

P>t

[95% Conf. Interval]

0 (omitted)
0.044

0.014

3.060

0.002

0.016

0.072

SHIFT * POST

-0.021

0.009

-2.450

0.015

-0.039

-0.004

% Population > 65
Per capita income ($) (log)
Urban (0,1)
Suburban (0,1)
Large Rural Town (0,1)
Rural (0,1)
% Medicare HMO Penetration
% ACO Penetration
HHI (SNF Beds)
Home Health Availability /
Population > 65 per 1000 (log)
Size (# Beds) (log)

0.003
-0.118
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.001
0.000
0.088

0.011
0.077
(omitted)
(omitted)
(omitted)
(omitted)
0.001
(omitted)
0.112

0.260
-1.540

0.792
0.124

-0.018
-0.269

0.024
0.032

-0.760

0.448

-0.003

0.001

0.790

0.432

-0.132

0.309

-0.022
-0.687

0.017
0.111

-1.270
-6.200

0.204
0.000

-0.055
-0.904

0.012
-0.469
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Group 1 Revenue/Bed ($) (in 2015 dollars)
(log)
Occupancy
Ownership (FP 0,1)
Chain Affiliation (0,1)
constant

Coef.
0.005
0.013
-0.004
15.469

Robust
Std. Err.
0.001
0.083
0.016
1.028

195

t
7.960
0.160
-0.220
15.050

P>t
0.000
0.872
0.822
0.000

[95% Conf. Interval]
0.004
0.006
-0.150
0.176
-0.035
0.028
13.451
17.487
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